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Sam Harris dismantles the most common justification for religious faith--that a moral system cannot be based on science.
Since the 1990s, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. These three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging, collaboratory field.
The idea that science is or should be value-free, and that values are or should be formed independently of science, has been under fire by philosophers of science for decades. Science and Moral Imagination directly challenges the idea that science and values cannot and should not influence each other. Matthew J. Brown argues that science and values mutually influence and implicate one another, that the influence of values on science is pervasive and must be responsibly managed, and that science can and should have an influence on our values. This interplay, he explains, must be guided by accounts of scientific inquiry and value judgment that are sensitive to the complexities of their interactions. Brown presents scientific inquiry and value judgment as types of problem-solving practices and provides a new framework for thinking about how we might ethically evaluate episodes and decisions in science, while offering guidance for scientific practitioners and institutions about how they can incorporate value judgments into their work. His framework, dubbed “the ideal of moral imagination,” emphasizes the role of imagination in value judgment and the positive role that value judgment plays in science.
The role of science in policymaking has gained unprecedented stature in the United States, raising questions about the place of science and scientific expertise in the democratic process. Some scientists have been given considerable epistemic authority in shaping policy on issues of great moral and cultural significance, and the politicizing of these issues has become highly contentious. Since World War II, most philosophers of science have purported the concept that science should be "value-free." In Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal, Heather E. Douglas argues that such an ideal is neither adequate nor desirable for science. She contends that the moral responsibilities of scientists require the consideration of values even at the heart of science. She lobbies for a new ideal in which values serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but where the role values play is constrained at key points, thus protecting the integrity and objectivity of science. In this vein, Douglas outlines a system for the application of values to guide scientists through points of uncertainty fraught with moral valence.Following a philosophical analysis of the historical background of science advising and the value-free ideal, Douglas defines how values should-and should not-function in science. She discusses the distinctive direct and indirect roles for values in reasoning, and outlines seven senses of objectivity, showing how each can be employed to determine the reliability of scientific claims. Douglas then uses these philosophical insights to clarify the distinction between junk science and sound science to be used in policymaking. In conclusion, she calls for greater openness on the values utilized in policymaking, and more public participation in the policymaking process, by suggesting various models for effective use of both the public and experts in key risk assessments.
The past decade has witnessed a renaissance in scientific approaches to the study of morality. Once understood to be the domain of moral psychology, the newer approach to morality is largely interdisciplinary, driven in no small part by developments in behavioural economics and evolutionary biology, as well as advances in neuroscientific imaging capabilities, among other fields. To date, scientists studying moral cognition and behaviour have paid little attention to virtue theory, while virtue theorists have yet to acknowledge the new research results emerging from the new science of morality. Theology and the Science of Moral Action explores a new approach to ethical thinking that promotes dialogue and integration between recent research in the scientific study of moral cognition and behaviour—including neuroscience, moral psychology, and behavioural economics—and virtue theoretic approaches to ethics in both philosophy and theology. More particularly, the book evaluates the concept of moral exemplarity and its significance in philosophical and theological ethics as well as for ongoing research programs in the cognitive sciences.
Offers the view that only an interdisciplinary view grounded in the impartial method of scientific inquiry can hope to develop moral principles and rules of action appropriate to today's world. Daleiden, a lecturer and author, argues that only a scientific understanding of human nature in conjunction with a rigorous empirical analysis of human behavior and its consequences can provide a basis for formulating sets of norms best suited to society's needs. He reviews various systems of ethics, from those proposed by the ancient Greeks to the theories of 20th-century thinkers, in his discussion of modern ethical issues such as abortion, capital punishment, euthanasia, drug use, sexual behavior, and pornography. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Why efforts to create a scientific basis of morality are neither scientific nor moral In this illuminating book, James Davison Hunter and Paul Nedelisky trace the origins and development of the centuries-long, passionate, but ultimately failed quest to discover a scientific foundation for morality. The "new moral science" led by such figures as E. O. Wilson, Patricia Churchland, Sam Harris, Jonathan Haidt, and Joshua Greene is only the newest manifestation of that quest. Though claims for its accomplishments are often wildly exaggerated, this new iteration has been no more successful than its predecessors. But rather than giving up in the face of this failure, the new moral science has taken a surprising turn. Whereas earlier efforts sought to demonstrate what is right and wrong, the new moral scientists have concluded, ironically, that right and wrong don't actually exist. Their (perhaps unwitting) moral nihilism turns the science of morality into a social engineering project. If there is nothing moral for science to discover, the science of morality becomes, at best, a feeble program to achieve arbitrary societal goals. Concise and rigorously argued, Science and the Good is a definitive critique of a would-be science that has gained extraordinary influence in public discourse today and an exposé of that project's darker turn.
. . . this is a very ambitious book ranging over a great deal of territory and a great number of issues . . . the general perspectives offered are certainly engaging. Alan Hamlin, Journal of Economic Methodology . . . an illuminating book, informed by careful thought and wide-ranging scholarship. David Gordon, The Mises Review Economics claims to be a science of choice and its unintended consequences, but economists sneak moral judgments in through the back door. Ethics, on the other hand, often falters on the stilts of weak economic theories and assumptions. The result economics without ethics is often sterile, and ethics without economics is often incoherent. Severed from one another, each can be dangerously misleading, and each misses the opportunity to better understand the economic and moral complexity behind social cooperation. Ethics as Social Science helps reconcile the two disciplines, and represents years of seasoned, careful thinking on the topic. Using clear, straightforward language, Yeager argues that economists should be alert to their ethical positions, rather than preach tacitly behind the mask of social welfare analysis and the like. Calling for a comparative institutional analysis, Yeager himself advances an argument in favor of an indirect or rule utilitarianism, one that is sure to unleash debate among libertarians, classical liberals, and defenders of mainstream welfare economics, and among moral philosophers who follow the present state of economic theory. David L. Prychitko, Northern Michigan University, US With this important book, esteemed economist Leland B. Yeager grounds moral and political philosophy in the requirements of a well-functioning society, one whose members reap the gains from peaceful cooperation while pursuing their own diverse goals. This book explores the reasons an individual may have for helping to uphold such a society rather than seeking a free ride on the moral behavior of others. A work in the tradition of Hume, Smith, Mill, von Mises, Hayek and Hazlitt, it expounds a rules or indirect version of utilitarianism. It reviews criticisms of utilitarianism in detail, as well as alternative grounds of ethics including contractarianism, rights-based doctrines, and appeals to specific intuitions. Yeager brings the insights of economics to bear on a field usually dominated by philosophers and theologians. Ethics comes across as a subject amply open to the findings of economics and the other social and natural sciences. Economists, philosophers and other students and scholars of the social sciences will welcome this book. It will also appeal to any reader interested in exploring the ideas of ethics.
Studies of Gottfried Leibniz's moral and political philosophy typically focus on metaphysical perfection, happiness, or love. In this new reading of Leibniz, Christopher Johns shows that it is based on a 'science of right'. Based on the deontic concepts of jus (right) and obligation, this science of right is established in Leibniz's early writings on jurisprudence and depended on throughout several of his major late writings. Johns shows that the moral rightness of an action is grounded in the rights and obligations derived from the agent's capacity for freedom. This new interpretation of Leibniz's moral philosophy compares Leibniz's positions with Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke, and Kant. Providing a comprehensive examination of Leibniz's most important writings on natural right, John's argues that Leibniz, properly understood, provides a compelling account of the grounds of morality and of political institutions-an account relevant to present philosophical debates.
Explores the extent to which Aristotle's ethical treatises employ the concepts, methods, and practices developed in his 'scientific' works.