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Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939) was one of the leading Polish logicians and founders of the Warsaw School of Logic whose membership included, beside himself, Jan Lukasiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Alfred Tarski, and many others. In his lifetime LeSniewski published only a few hundred pages. He produced many important results in many areas of mathematics; these stood in various relations to each other, and to materials produced by others, and, in time, created more and more editorial problems. Very many were left unpublished at the time of his death. Then in 1944 in the fire of Warsaw the whole of this material was burned and lost -a considerable loss since a great deal of what is important could have been reconstructed from these notes. The present publication aims at presenting unique Lesniewski's materials from alternative sources comprising lecture notes taken during some of Lesniewski's lectures and seminars delivered at the University of Warsaw be tween the two world wars. The editors are aware of the limitations of student notes which cannot compensate for the loss of the original materials. However, they are unique in reflecting Lesniewski's ideas as he himself presented them. Already at the time of his death it was realized that these notes would provide a unique access to Lesniewski's own thought as well as a valuable record of some of the activities of the Warsaw School of Logic.
This meticulous critical assessment of the ground-breaking work of philosopher Stanislaw Leśniewski focuses exclusively on primary texts and explores the full range of output by one of the master logicians of the Lvov-Warsaw school. The author’s nuanced survey eschews secondary commentary, analyzing Leśniewski's core philosophical views and evaluating the formulations that were to have such a profound influence on the evolution of mathematical logic. One of the undisputed leaders of the cohort of brilliant logicians that congregated in Poland in the early twentieth century, Leśniewski was a guide and mentor to a generation of celebrated analytical philosophers (Alfred Tarski was his PhD student). His primary achievement was a system of foundational mathematical logic intended as an alternative to the Principia Mathematica of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. Its three strands—‘protothetic’, ‘ontology’, and ‘mereology’, are detailed in discrete sections of this volume, alongside a wealth other chapters grouped to provide the fullest possible coverage of Leśniewski’s academic output. With material on his early philosophical views, his contributions to set theory and his work on nominalism and higher-order quantification, this book offers a uniquely expansive critical commentary on one of analytical philosophy’s great pioneers.​
Between the two world wars, Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939), created the famous and important system of foundations of mathematics that comprises three deductive theories: Protothetic, Ontology, and Mereology. His research started in 1914 with studies on the general theory of sets (later named `Mereology'). Ontology followed between 1919 and 1921, and was the next step towards an integrated system. In order to combine these two systematically he constructed Protothetic - the system of `first principles'. Together they amount to what Z. Jordan called `... most thorough, original, and philosophically significant attempt to provide a logically secure foundation for the whole of mathematics'. The volume collects many of the most significant commentaries on, and contributions to, Protothetic. A Protothetic Bibliography is included.
The central idea developed by the contributions to this book is that the split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology - perhaps the most impor tant schism in twentieth-century philosophy - resulted from a radicalization of reciprocal partialities. Both schools of thought share, in fact, the same cultural background and their same initial stimulus in the thought of Franz Brentano. And one outcome of the subsequent rift between them was the oblivion into which the figure and thought of Brentano have fallen. The first step to take in remedying this split is to return to Brentano and to reconstruct the 'map' of Brent ani sm. The second task (which has been addressed by this book) is to revive inter est in the theoretical complexity of Brentano' s thought and of his pupils and to revitalize those aspects that have been neglected by subsequent debate within the various movements of Brentanian inspiration. We have accordingly decided to organize the book into two introductory es says followed by two sections (Parts 1 and 2) which systematically examine Brentano's thought and that of his followers. The two introductory essays re construct the reasons for the 'invisibility', so to speak, of Brentano and set out of his philosophical doctrine. Part 1 of the book then ex the essential features amines six of Brentano's most outstanding pupils (Marty, Stumpf, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Husserl and Twardowski). Part 2 contains nine essays concentrating on the principal topics addressed by the Brentanians.
Issues surrounding the status and nature of `nonexistent objects' constitute one of philosophy's oldest and densest thickets. In this book Perszyk takes his readers surefootedly through this thicket, informed both historically and at the level of contemporary discussion of relevant themes. His main aim is to develop a `bundle' or `set of properties' interpretation of Meinong's theory of nonexistent objects (as opposed to a set of properties neo-Meinongian metaphysics), and to defend this nonstandard interpretation against competing views in both the philosophical and scholarly literature on Meinong. The Meinong who emerges is neither the hero nor the villain his friends and foes have commonly led us to believe. This clearly written book is a valuable addition both to the literature on Meinong and to contemporary metaphysics of modality. It is written for students and professionals interested in these, and related, areas.
The general view of Russell's work amongst philosophers has been that repeat edly, during his long and distinguished career, crucial changes of mind on fun damental points were significant enough to cause him to successively adopt a diversity of radically new philosophical positions. Thus Russell is seen to have embraced and then abandoned, amongst others, neo-Hegelianism, Platonic re alism, phenomenalism and logical atomism, before settling finally on a form of neutral monism that philosophers have generally found to be incredible. This view of Russell is captured in C. D. Broad's famous remark that "Mr. Russell pro duces a different system of philosophy every few years . . . " (Muirhead, 1924: 79). Reflecting this picture of Russell continually changing his position, books and papers on Russell's philosophy have typically belonged to one of two kinds. Either they have concentrated on particular periods of his thought that are taken to be especially significant, or, accepting the view of his successive conversion to dis tinctly different philosophical positions, they have provided some account of each of these supposedly disconnected periods of his thought. While much good work has been done on Russell's philosophy, this framework has had its limitations, the main one being that it conceals the basic continuity behind his thought.
What is aesthetic value? A property in an object? An experience of a perceiving person? An ideal object existing in a mysterious sphere, inaccessible to normal cognition? Does it appear in one form only, or in many forms, perhaps infinitely many? Is it something constant, immutable, or rather something susceptible to change, depending on the individual, the cultural milieu, or the epoch? Is a rational defence of aesthetic value judgements possible, or is any discussion of this topic meaningless? The above questions arise out of the most complicated philosophic problems. Volumes have been written on each of them. The discussions which continue over the centuries, the plurality of views and suggested solutions, indicate that all issues are controversial and contestable. Each view can adduce some arguments supporting it; each has some weaknesses. Another source of difficulty is the vagueness and ambiguity of the language in which the problems are discussed. This makes it hard to understand the ideas of particular thinkers and sometimes makes it impossible to decide whether different formulations express the actual divergence of views or only the verbal preferences of their authors. Let us add that this imperfection does not simply spring from inaccuracy on the part of scholars, but also results from the complexity of the problems themselves. The matter is further complicated by important factors of a social character.
Roman Ingarden's very extensive philosophical work in metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, and aesthetics con tinues to attract increasing attention both in Poland and in North America. Further work left uncompleted at his death is appearing. Major bibliographies of his work as well as of studies about his work are now in print. Ingar den's scattered articles on various questions in philosophy are being collected. And conferences devoted to his work are now held regularly. These diverse activities might suggest a similar diver sity in Ingarden's philosophical legacy. But such a sugges tion would be misleading. For interest in Ingarden's work has continued to centre on the one area which is arguably at the core of his achievement, namely the complex prob lems of aesthetics. In this field Ingarden seemed to pull together his various interests in ontology and epistemology especially. Here he brought those interests to focus on a set of issues that would occupy him creatively throughout the vicissitudes of his long and difficult scholarly life. More over, aesthetics is also the field where Ingarden perhaps most succeeded in orchestrating the many themes he owed to his phenomenological training while finally transposing the central issues into something original, something dis tinctively his own that philosophers can no longer identify as merely phenomenological. Ingarden's aesthetics not surprisingly has captured the interest today of many scholars in different fields.
Many students coming to grips with Kant's philosophy are understandably daunted not only by the complexity and sheer difficulty of the man's writings, but almost equally by the amount of secondary literature available. A great deal of this seems to be - and not only on first reading - just about as difficult as the work it is meant to make more accessible. Any writer deliberately setting out to provide an authentically introductory text thus faces a double problem: how to provide an exegesis which would capture some of the spirit of the original, without gross and misleading over-simplification; and secondly, how to anchor the argument in the best and most imaginative secondary literature, yet avoid the whole project appearing so fragmented as to make the average book of chess openings seem positively austere. Until fairly recently, matters were made even more difficul t, in that commentaries on Kant were very often of a whole work, say, The Critique of Pure Reason, with the result that students would have to struggle through a very great deal of material indeed in order to feel any confidence at all that they had begun to understand the original writings. Recently, things have changed somewhat. There are now excellent commentaries on "Kant's Analytic", "Kant's Analogies" etc. . We have also seen, (at least as reflected in book titles), a resurgence of interest in what is perhaps the most controversial and far-reaching Kantian claim, viz.
This book is dedicated to the memory of Professor Henryk Mehlberg, primarily because I want to recall his name to readers in the West; for, although Professor Mehlberg was the foremost Polish philosopher in the field of philosophy of time-in that version which is related to twentieth century physics-his fundamental work concerning time was published in English 43 years after its original publication (cf. Mehlberg, 1980). I am deeply indebted to Henryk Mehlberg. For two years after the Second World War, I was his student at Wroclaw University (where he lectured on philosophy and mathematical logic). At that time, I developed, under his influence, a long-life fascination with the philosophy of time, and was taught by him how to approach these problems effectively. My research in this field has resulted in three books. The first, Prop erties of Time, published (in Polish) in 1970, concerns the topological properties and properties of symmetry (homogeneity and anisotropy) of time. The second, The Nature of Time, published (in Polish) in 1975, looks at possible definitions of time within both theories of relativity. The present book is the third, originally published (in Polish) in 1979; it concerns philosophical problems of past, present, and future and is here presented in English to reach a wider audience.