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This unique analysis of Soviet and Russian defense affairs provides an authoritative and thoroughly documented assessment from a former Soviet foreign policy insider. As an active and informed participant, Sokov's discussion of the evolution of the Soviet and Russian strategic posture offers fascinating and illuminating firsthand insights into Soviet weapons systems, elite decisionmaking, and bureaucratic politics during both the Soviet and Russian periods. The book thus casts light not merely on the development of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM programs, but on a much broader spectrum of issues linked to Soviet and Russian security policy formulation. With its combination of informed analysis and use of new documentation, this work will be invaluable for all concerned with U.S.-Russian strategic relations.
Russia is modernizing its nuclear arsenal. In this dissertation, I seek to answer two questions. Why is Russia modernizing its nuclear arsenal? And what factors determine which specific weapons are prioritized over others? I argue that Russian nuclear modernization is driven by security concerns. Specifically, nuclear modernization hedges against the future development of American ballistic missile defense and conventional counterforce capabilities that could erode Russia's nuclear deterrent, which Russian leaders perceive to be the ultimate guarantor of Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity. While Russia's perception of an American threat can explain why Russia is modernizing its nuclear arsenal, it cannot explain why it prioritizes particular systems over others, as multiple weapons systems may increase the survivability of the Russian nuclear arsenal. I argue that powerful domestic actors-including Vladimir Putin and his inner circle, the Russian military, and the defense industry-support weapons systems that are useful for advancing their political or financial interests. The weapons supported by the most powerful of these actors are the weapons Russia prioritizes. Weapons that Russian leaders believe will enhance Russia's international status and systems that align with Russian strategic culture or otherwise meet the needs of the Russian military-including the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, Russian Navy, and Russian Air Forces-are the weapons most likely to be developed. This resulted in the prioritization of novel nuclear weapons-the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, Kinzhal hypersonic aeroballistic missile, Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, and Tsirkon hypersonic sea-launched cruise missile-as well as weapons that Russia claims are the best at something-including the Sarmat ICBM or Tu-160M strategic bomber, which Russia claims are the longest-range ICBM and fastest bomber, respectively-as Russian leaders perceive them as useful tools for status competition.
Building on an original interpretation of social theory and an interdisciplinary approach, this book creates a new paradigm in the Russian studies. Taking a fresh view of Russia’s multiple experiences of modernization, it seeks to explain the Putin era in a completely new way. This book explores the paradoxical and contradictory aspects of Russia, analyzing the energy-dependent economy and hybrid political regime, but also religion, welfare, and culture, and their often complex interrelations. Written by a community of both Western and Russian scholars, this book re-affirms the value of social science when confronting a society that has undergone enormous and costly systematic changes. The Russian elites see modernization narrowly as economic and technological competitiveness. The contributors to this volume see contemporary Russia facing a series of antinomies, which are macro-level dilemmas that cannot be abolished, either by philosophical mediation or by immediate political decisions. As such, they are the tension fields that constitute choices for various competing agencies. This book will be of interest to scholars and students of Russian studies, transition studies, sociology, social policy, political science, energy policy, cultural studies, and stratification studies. Professionals involved in energy, ecology, and security policy will also find this publication a rich source.
This new IISS Strategic Dossier examines the recent development of Moscow’s armed forces and military capabilities. It analyses the aspirations underpinning Russia’s military reform programme and its successes as well as its failures. The book also provides insights into Russia’s operational use of its armed forces, including in the intervention in Syria, the goals and results of recent state armament programmes, and the trajectory of future developments. This full-colour volume includes more than 50 graphics, maps and charts and over 70 images, and contains chapters on: Russia's armed forces since the end of the Cold War Strategic forces Ground forces Naval forces Aerospace forces Russia’s approach to military decision-making and joint operations Economics and industry At a time when Russia’s relations with many of its neighbours are increasingly strained, and amid renewed concern about the risk of an armed clash, this dossier is essential reading for understanding the state,capabilities and future of Russia’s armed forces.
Russia's nuclear forces consist of both long-range, strategic systems-including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers-and shorter- and medium-range delivery systems. Russia is modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era systems with new missiles, submarines and aircraft while developing new types of delivery systems. Although Russia's number of nuclear weapons has declined sharply since the end of Cold War, it retains a stockpile of thousands of warheads, with more than 1,500 warheads deployed on missiles and bombers capable of reaching U.S. territory. Doctrine and Deployment During the Cold War, the Soviet Union valued nuclear weapons for both their political and military attributes. While Moscow pledged that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, many analysts and scholars believed the Soviet Union integrated nuclear weapons into its warfighting plans. After the Cold War, Russia did not retain the Soviet "no first use" policy, and it has revised its nuclear doctrine several times to respond to concerns about its security environment and the capabilities of its conventional forces. When combined with military exercises and Russian officials' public statements, this evolving doctrine seems to indicate that Russia has potentially placed a greater reliance on nuclear weapons and may threaten to use them during regional conflicts. This doctrine has led some U.S. analysts to conclude that Russia has adopted an "escalate to de-escalate" strategy, where it might threaten to use nuclear weapons if it were losing a conflict with a NATO member, in an effort to convince the United States and its NATO allies to withdraw from the conflict. Russian officials, along with some scholars and observers in the United States and Europe, dispute this interpretation; however, concerns about this doctrine have informed recommendations for changes in the U.S. nuclear posture. Russia's current modernization cycle for its nuclear forces began in the early 2000s and is likely to conclude in the 2020s. In addition, in March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was developing new types of nuclear systems. While some see these weapons as a Russian attempt to achieve a measure of superiority over the United States, others note that they likely represent a Russian response to concerns about emerging U.S. missile defense capabilities. These new Russian systems include, among others, a heavy ICBM with the ability to carry multiple warheads, a hypersonic glide vehicle, an autonomous underwater vehicle, and a nuclear-powered cruise missile. The hypersonic glide vehicle, carried on an existing long-range ballistic missile, entered service in late 2019.
Russia's political leaders are currently pushing a state- and society-wide process of modernization. The Russian military, a deeply conservative institution, is being asked to accept fundamental changes that threaten the very livelihoods of those being asked to implement them. New structures can be created and new equipment and technologies procured, but the crucial element is the degree to which such changes are accepted by the human element. This is often the most difficult aspect in any process of organizational change. It is no wonder that the military modernization process is progressing slowly in Russia. The Russian ground forces will not be very different in the next few years than they are now. Time and future investment will eventually produce the more refined army that a host of Russian politicians have wished to see. But it will take time and investment.
This collection examines the extent to which nuclear weapons modernization has become a significant point of concern and consideration in international security. Recent statements and substantial investments by nuclear weapon possessor states in the upkeep and modernization of their nuclear postures – particularly the United States, Russia and China – illustrate a return of primacy and the salience of nuclear forces in international politics. The upgrading of systems, the introduction of new capabilities, the intermingling of new technologies, and the advancement of new strategic models, are all indicative of their elevation in importance and reliance. With contributions from leading thinkers in the nuclear weapons domain, this book elucidates the global strategic and policy implications such modernization efforts by the above-mentioned states will have on international security. In unpacking and conceptualizing this developing source of potential (in)security and tension, the collection not only provides a technical context, but also frames the likely effects modernization could have on the relations between these nuclear weapon powers and the larger impact upon efforts to curb nuclear weapons – both in terms of horizontal and vertical proliferation. The chapters have been arranged so as to inform a variety of stakeholders, from academics to policy-makers, by connecting analytical and normative insights, and thereby, advancing debates pertaining to where nuclear modernization sits as a point of global security consternation in the 21st century.
This monograph examines the recent process of organizational change in the Russian ground forces. It begins by charting the whole post-Soviet military reform debate. This debate was dominated, on the one hand, by those seeking to make the armed forces more professional, flexible, and adroit -- and thus better suited to the security demands of a major 21st-century power -- and, on the other hand, by senior military figures wedded to the concepts of mass and a conscript based military. It was actually only after the war with Georgia in 2008, and when military opposition was weakened, that change within the ground forces could begin in earnest. New command tiers were established, divisions became brigades, and the idea of absorbing professional soldiers into the ground forces was refined. The problems of generating a suitable corps of non-commissioned officers, of training suitable officers, and of marrying equipment to strategic need are all issues covered here. This work concludes with the thought that even though the changes being introduced in the ground forces look dramatic, they cannot be implemented overnight. The road towards fundamental change where Russia's ground forces are concerned will be quite a long one.
We are currently faced with a highly uncertain future regarding our own nuclear deterrent modernization program. Despite commitments from many key leaders that modernization of our nuclear weapons stockpile, delivery systems, and supporting infrastructure is critically needed, we're on the verge of halting our modernization program before it even begins. The FY12 Energy and Water appropriations bills currently in Congress would make dramatic cuts to nuclear modernization funding levels that were agreed to last year by the President and Senate during consideration on the New START Treaty. In that context, it is important to understand if and how other countries-especially China and Russia-are modernizing their nuclear forces, and how that modernization should impact our decisions here in the United States.