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Includes the War in North Africa Illustration Pack - 112 photos/illustrations and 21 maps. This study is a historical analysis to determine why Rommel’s tactical success on the battlefield could not accomplish strategic objectives in North Africa. Rommel’s operations are reviewed from his arrival in North Africa in February 1941 through his last offensive to destroy the British Eighth Army at Alamein in August-September 1942. The study compares his ability to conduct tactical operations with his apparent inability to plan and execute actions at the operational level of war. Rommel’s problems with operational planning are addressed within the scope of campaign planning principles set forth in FM 100-5, Operations, (Final Draft). His planning is expressly judged on how he shaped his operational plans by using the concepts of aims, resources, constraints, and restrictions to conform to strategic guidance. Rommel’s tactical execution is contrasted with his operational performance. This comparison is based on the AirLand Battle tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. The study concludes that Rommel’s failure lies in planning operations that exceeded his resources and conducting needless operations that resulted in the loss of the initiative at the decisive point. Rommel’s plans exceeded the strategic objectives desired by the theater strategists. His execution was ultimately defeated by his quest for tactical victories without regard to how they contributed to achieving campaign objectives. Rommel’s weakness at the operational level led to failure to sequence tactical victories to achieve campaign goals. This failure illustrates the importance of understanding how operational art orchestrates tactical activities to achieve strategic objectives within a theater of operations.
This study is a historical analysis to determine why Rommel's tactical success on the battlefield could not accomplish strategic objectives in North Africa. Rommel's operations are reviewed from his arrival in North Africa in February 1941 through his last offensive to destroy the British Eighth Army at Alamein in August-September 1942. The study compares his ability to conduct tactical operations with his apparent inability to plan and execute actions at the operational level of war. Rommel's problems with operational planning are addressed within the scope of campaign planning principles set forth in FM 100-5, Operations, (Final Draft). His planning is expressly judged on how he shaped his operational plans by using the concepts of aims, resources, constraints, and restrictions to conform to strategic guidance. Rommel's tactical execution is contrasted with his operational performance. This comparison is based on the AirLand Battle tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. The study concludes that Rommel's failure lies in planning operations that exceeded his resources and conducting needless operations that resulted in the loss of the initiative at the decisive point. Rommel's plans exceeded the strategic objectives desired by the theater strategists. His execution was ultimately defeated by his quest for tactical victories without regard to how they contributed to achieving campaign objectives.
For Hitler and the German military, 1942 was a key turning point of World War II, as an overstretched but still lethal Wehrmacht replaced brilliant victories and huge territorial gains with stalemates and strategic retreats. In this major reevaluation of that crucial year, Robert Citino shows that the German army's emerging woes were rooted as much in its addiction to the "war of movement"-attempts to smash the enemy in "short and lively" campaigns-as they were in Hitler's deeply flawed management of the war. From the overwhelming operational victories at Kerch and Kharkov in May to the catastrophic defeats at El Alamein and Stalingrad, Death of the Wehrmacht offers an eye-opening new view of that decisive year. Building upon his widely respected critique in The German Way of War, Citino shows how the campaigns of 1942 fit within the centuries-old patterns of Prussian/German warmaking and ultimately doomed Hitler's expansionist ambitions. He examines every major campaign and battle in the Russian and North African theaters throughout the year to assess how a military geared to quick and decisive victories coped when the tide turned against it. Citino also reconstructs the German generals' view of the war and illuminates the multiple contingencies that might have produced more favorable results. In addition, he cites the fatal extreme aggressiveness of German commanders like Erwin Rommel and assesses how the German system of command and its commitment to the "independence of subordinate commanders" suffered under the thumb of Hitler and chief of staff General Franz Halder. More than the turning point of a war, 1942 marked the death of a very old and traditional pattern of warmaking, with the classic "German way of war" unable to meet the challenges of the twentieth century. Blending masterly research with a gripping narrative, Citino's remarkable work provides a fresh and revealing look at how one of history's most powerful armies began to founder in its quest for world domination.
A highly illustrated account of The North African campaign of November 1942-May 1943 during World War II. This campaign was a baptism of fire for the US Army. After relatively straightforward landings, the US II Corps advanced into Tunisia to support operations by the British 8th Army. Rommel, worried by the prospect of an attack, decided to exploit the inexperience of the US Army and strike a blow against their overextended positions around the Kasserine Pass. However, the Germans were unable to exploit their initial success, and later attacks were bloodily repulsed. The fighting in Tunisia taught the green US Army vital combat lessons, and brought to the fore senior commanders such as Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley.
This study focuses on the operational level of war-that level which links tactics to strategy. The study seeks to identify and define principles applicable to the operational level of war. If valid, those principles ought to guide and/or govern the conduct of war at the operational level. Also, understanding of operational principles and the theoretical foundations of the operational level of war can assist US Army commanders and staff officers in preparation for and conduct of war at that level. Selected campaigns and battles conducted by Erwin Rommel and Bernard Montgomery during World War II are analyzed. The objective of the analyses is to determine what each commander considered as guides in making battlefield decisions. The research is not limited, however, to specific campaigns and battles. A description of each commander is offered; that is, his experiences and the evolution of his military thought. The prevailing German and British military doctrines are also reviewed. Interestingly, the criteria each commander used in making battlefield decisions-his operational principles-are apparent by understanding the man and the doctrine; the campaign and battle analyses serve to substantiate those principles. While Rommel and Montgomery represented different styles of war-fighting, maneuver and attrition respectively, they demonstrated a remarkable commonality in battlefield decision-making...Apparently the operational level of war can accommodate a broad range of war-fighting styles and instruments. The implications for the US Army derived from this study cover a wide range of subjects. Some involve organization, training, and preparation of operational-level commanders and staff officers. Most important is the development of an army which can successfully fight the campaigns and battles in future war.
Discusses the Allied invasion of Normandy, with extensive details about the planning stage, called Operation Overlord, as well as the fighting on Utah and Omaha Beaches.
Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.
In 1940 a British offensive in the Western Desert provoked a major Italian military disaster. By early February 1941 the whole of Cyrenaica had been lost, and German help became necessary to avoid the loss of all of Libya. On 14 February 1941 the first echelons of German troops hurriedly arrived at the port of Tripoli, starting the 27-month German engagement in Northern Africa. This book covers the complex and oft-changing organisation and structure of German forces in North Africa from their first deployment through to the conclusion of the battle of El Alamein, an engagement that irrevocably changed the strategic situation in the Western Desert.
Includes the Aerial Warfare In Europe During World War II illustrations pack with over 200 maps, plans, and photos. This book is a comprehensive analysis of an air force, the Luftwaffe, in World War II. It follows the Germans from their prewar preparations to their final defeat. There are many disturbing parallels with our current situation. I urge every student of military science to read it carefully. The lessons of the nature of warfare and the application of airpower can provide the guidance to develop our fighting forces and employment concepts to meet the significant challenges we are certain to face in the future.