Download Free Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy In A Microfounded New Keynesian Model Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy In A Microfounded New Keynesian Model and write the review.

We analytically characterize optimal monetary policy for an augmented New Keynesian model with a housing sector. With rational private sector expectations about housing prices and inflation, optimal monetary policy can be characterized by a standard 'target criterion' that refers to inflation and the output gap, without making reference to housing prices. When the policymaker is concerned with potential departures of private sector expectations from rational ones and seeks a policy that is robust against such possible departures, then the optimal target criterion must also depend on housing prices. For empirically realistic cases, the central bank should then 'lean against' housing prices, i.e., following unexpected housing price increases (decreases), policy should adopt a stance that is projected to undershoot (overshoot) its normal targets for inflation and the output gap. Robustly optimal policy does not require that the central bank distinguishes between 'fundamental' and 'non-fundamental' movements in housing prices.
We study the effects of model uncertainty in a simple New-Keynesian model using robust control techniques. Due to the simple model structure, we are able to find closed-form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing both instrument rules and targeting rules under different timing assumptions. In all cases but one, an increased preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond more aggressively to cost shocks but leaves the response to demand shocks unchanged. As a consequence, inflation is less volatile and output is more volatile than under a non-robust policy. Under one particular timing assumption, however, increasing the preference for robustness has no effect on the optimal targeting rule (nor on the economy).
This paper analyzes the use of unconventional policy instruments in New Keynesian setups in which the ‘divine coincidence’ breaks down. The paper discusses the role of a second instrument and its coordination with conventional interest rate policy, and presents theoretical results on equilibrium determinacy, the inflation bias, the stabilization bias, and the optimal central banker’s preferences when both instruments are available. We show that the use of an unconventional instrument can help reduce the zone of equilibrium indeterminacy and the volatility of the economy. However, in some circumstances, committing not to use the second instrument may be welfare improving (a result akin to Rogoff (1985a) example of counterproductive coordination). We further show that the optimal central banker should be both aggressive against inflation, and interventionist in using the unconventional policy instrument. As long as price setting depends on expectations about the future, there are gains from establishing credibility by using any instrument that affects these expectations.
The classic introduction to the New Keynesian economic model This revised second edition of Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle provides a rigorous graduate-level introduction to the New Keynesian framework and its applications to monetary policy. The New Keynesian framework is the workhorse for the analysis of monetary policy and its implications for inflation, economic fluctuations, and welfare. A backbone of the new generation of medium-scale models under development at major central banks and international policy institutions, the framework provides the theoretical underpinnings for the price stability–oriented strategies adopted by most central banks in the industrialized world. Using a canonical version of the New Keynesian model as a reference, Jordi Galí explores various issues pertaining to monetary policy's design, including optimal monetary policy and the desirability of simple policy rules. He analyzes several extensions of the baseline model, allowing for cost-push shocks, nominal wage rigidities, and open economy factors. In each case, the effects on monetary policy are addressed, with emphasis on the desirability of inflation-targeting policies. New material includes the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and an analysis of unemployment’s significance for monetary policy. The most up-to-date introduction to the New Keynesian framework available A single benchmark model used throughout New materials and exercises included An ideal resource for graduate students, researchers, and market analysts
We use robust control to study how a central bank in an economy with imperfect interest rate pass-through conducts monetary policy if it fears that its model could be misspecified. The effects of the central bank's concern for robustness can be summarised as follows. First, depending on the shock, robust optimal monetary policy under commitment responds either more cautiously or more aggressively. Second, such robustness comes at a cost: the central bank dampens volatility in the inflation rate preemptively, but accepts higher volatility in the output gap and the loan rate. Third, if the central bank faces uncertainty only in the IS equation or the loan rate equation, the robust policy shifts its concern for stabilisation away from inflation.
This paper investigates the optimal monetary policy response to a shock to collateral when policymakers act under discretion and face model uncertainty. The analysis is based on a New Keynesian model where banks supply loans to transaction constrained consumers. Our results confirm the literature on model uncertainty with respect to a cost-push shock. Insuring against model misspecification leads to a more aggressive policy response. The same is true for a shock to collateral. A preference for robustness leads to a more aggressive policy. Increasing the weight attached to interest rate smoothing raises the degree of aggressiveness. Our results indicate that a preference for robustness crucially depends on the way different types of disturbances affect the economy: in the case of a shock to collateral the policymaker does not need to be as much worried about model misspecification as in the case of a conventional cost-push shock.
I develop a multisector New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model incorporating heterogeneities in the sector size, price stickiness, price indexation, and the price markup. I estimate a 12-sector version with post-1984 U.S. data using Bayesian techniques. The estimates suggest that over the sample period the Federal Reserve (the Fed) did not respond to changes in the prices of gasoline and other energy goods or changes in the price of health care, yet responded relatively more aggressively to changes in the prices of housing and utilities. I obtain multiple welfare-maximizing monetary policy schemes via simulation. The optimal schemes suggest that the Fed should focus on the prices of housing and utilities as well as the prices of food and beverages when responding to inflation. However, the welfare gains are small, suggesting that the current inflation target adopted by the Fed is almost indistinguishable from the optimal one in terms of welfare. On the other hand, more aggressive targeting of the output gap can offer much larger welfare improvement.
This paper studies the implications for optimal monetary policy of introducing job search into the new Keynesian framework. Using the linear-quadratic approach described by Benigno and Woodford (2003, 2005), we derive a utility-based loss function that indicates that the goals of policymakers should include the stabilization of inflation, output, employment, and labor-market tightness. We subsequently characterize the policy that is optimal from a timeless perspective. Complete inflation stabilization is optimal if the distortion arising from monopolistic competition in the goods market is eliminated, and if job search is efficient in the sense that the Hosios (1990) condition holds for all periods. In cases where the Hosios condition fails, either in or out of the steady state, complete inflation stabilization is no longer optimal, and the optimal responses of inflation to technology and fiscal shocks may depend on labor-market fundamentals.