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Monetary policy faces a particularly difficult task in most economies going through structural reforms: having to stabilise fluctuations around the trend, central banks have also to deal with a trend that is itself subjected to shifts, as a result of reforms. This book proposes some perspectives on these issues, with various contributions from both practitioners and academics, emphasising how rather simple techniques can be conveniently used to solve complex problems. Several issues are hence considered, each emphasising a particular aspect of the theme proposed: (i) forecasting inflation, with the experience of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand being taken as an example, since this country went through drastic structural change, (ii) understanding underlying trends of inflation, focusing on expectations and data revision, wage-bargaining process and more generally supply effects, since structural change magnifies them, (iii) formulating policy recommendations, the example taken is the strategy towards the euro for Eastern European countries and (iv) assessing risks of sudden stops.
We examine the performance and robustness properties of monetary policy rules in an estimated macroeconomic model in which the economy undergoes structural change andwhere private agents and the central bank possess imperfect knowledge about the true structure of the economy. Policymakers follow an interest rate rule aiming to maintain price stability and to minimize fluctuations of unemployment around its natural rate but areuncertain about the economy's natural rates of interest and unemployment and how private agents form expectations. In particular, we consider two models of expectations formation :rational expectations and learning. We show that in this environment the ability to stabilize the real side of the economy is significantly reduced relative to an economy under rational expectations with perfect knowledge. Furthermore, policies that would be optimal under perfect knowledge can perform very poorly if knowledge is imperfect. Efficient policies that take account of private learning and misperceptions of natural rates call for greater policy inertia, a more aggressive response to inflation, and a smaller response to the perceived unemployment gap than would be optimal if everyone had perfect knowledge of the economy. We show that such policies are quite robust to potential misspecification of private sector learning and the magnitude of variation in natural rates.
This book isa collection of research papers that contribute to the understanding of ongoing developments in financial institutions and markets both in the United States and globally.
The standard theory of decision making under uncertainty advises the decision maker to form a statistical model linking outcomes to decisions and then to choose the optimal distribution of outcomes. This assumes that the decision maker trusts the model completely. But what should a decision maker do if the model cannot be trusted? Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent, two leading macroeconomists, push the field forward as they set about answering this question. They adapt robust control techniques and apply them to economics. By using this theory to let decision makers acknowledge misspecification in economic modeling, the authors develop applications to a variety of problems in dynamic macroeconomics. Technical, rigorous, and self-contained, this book will be useful for macroeconomists who seek to improve the robustness of decision-making processes.
We examine the performance and robustness of monetary policy rules when the central bank and the public have imperfect knowledge of the economy and continuously update their estimates of model parameters. We find that versions of the Taylor rule calibrated to perform well under rational expectations with perfect knowledge perform very poorly when agents are learning and the central bank faces uncertainty regarding natural rates. In contrast, difference rules, in which the change in the interest rate is determined by the inflation rate and the change in the unemployment rate, perform well when knowledge is both perfect and imperfect.