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When electoral risks are not understood and addressed, they can undermine the credibility of the process and the results it yields. Electoral management bodies (EMBs) encounter numerous risks across all phases of the electoral cycle. They operate in environments that are increasingly complex and volatile and where factors such as technology, demographics, insecurity, inaccurate or incomplete information and natural calamities, create increasing uncertainty. The experiences of EMBs show that when formal risk management processes are successfully implemented, the benefits are profound. Greater risk awareness helps organizations to focus their resources on where they are most needed, thus achieving cost-effectiveness. Over the last decade it has been observed that EMBs are increasingly moving from informal to formal risk management processes. The purpose of this Guide is to lay out a set of practical steps for EMBs on how to establish or advance their risk management framework. The Guide’s chapters reflect the breadth of key considerations in the implementation process and offer basic resources to assist in the process.
When elections go wrong, they can contribute to political crises that undermine democratic processes and institutions, trigger violent conflicts and instability, and harm governments’ domestic and international legitimacy. Therefore, calls to protect electoral integrity against manipulation from autocratic figures, malicious foreign interferences, negative impacts from natural hazards, and technical and human errors are ever increasing. The main objective of this Discussion Paper is to outline the importance of and avenues for an increased use of risk management, resilience-building and crisis management methods to protect electoral integrity.
The G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad) will organize elections in 2020 and 2021. These elections will take place in a context in which all are facing serious humanitarian and security challenges, aggravated by the fragility of their institutions. The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and its socio-economic impacts worsen the situation and even raise questions about the possibility to organize elections in so volatile an environment. This Guide has been developed to assist decision-makers and practitioners in this context. It provides an overview of 26 process-related risk factors that can trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence. These internal risk factors are election-specific and do not exist outside of the electoral context. They relate to electoral actors, events, practices and materials that can undermine the credibility of electoral processes or, in the worst-case scenario, trigger or contribute to triggering election-related violence.
This Handbook was developed for electoral administrators and those involved in reforming EMBs. It provides comparative experience of and best practices on EMB structures and funding models, as well as means for evaluating performance. A range of case studies illustrate examples from specific contexts in Afghanistan, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Haiti, India, Kenya, the Republic of Korea, Liberia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Republic of Seychelles, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. This new and revised edition of the 2006 International IDEA Handbook includes updated country-level data and case studies and significantly expanded sections on the role of gender, professional development and technology in elections.
Information and communication technologies are increasingly prevalent in electoral management and democratic processes, even for countries without any form of electronic voting. These technologies offer numerous new opportunities, but also new threats. Cybersecurity is currently one of the greatest electoral challenges. It involves a broad range of actors, including electoral management bodies, cybersecurity expert bodies and security agencies. Many countries have found that interagency collaboration is essential for defending elections against digital threats. In recent years significant advances have been made in organizing such collaboration at the domestic and international levels. This guide tracks how countries are making progress on improving cybersecurity in elections. Based on an extensive collection of 20 case studies from all over the world, it provides lessons for those wanting to strengthen their defences against cyberattacks.
Electronic voting is often seen as a tool for making the electoral process more efficient and for increasing trust in its management. Properly implemented, e-voting solutions can increase the security of the ballot, speed up the processing of results and make voting easier. However, the challenges are considerable. If not carefully planned and designed, e-voting can undermine the confidence in the whole electoral process. Technology upgrades in elections are always challenging projects that require careful deliberation and planning. Introducing e-voting is probably the most difficult upgrade as this technology touches the core of the entire electoral process—the casting and counting of the votes. E-voting greatly reduces direct human control and influence in this process. This provides an opportunity for solving some old electoral problems, but also introduces a whole range of new concerns. Consequently, e-voting usually triggers more criticism and opposition and is more disputed than any other information technology application in elections. This Policy Paper outlines contextual factors that can influence the success of e-voting solutions and highlights the importance of considering these factors before choosing to introduce new voting technologies.
The cybersecurity of election systems has long been a central focus of election officials and the federal government, starting with the passage of the Help America Vote Act in 2002 and, more recently, in 2017 with the designation of elections as a critical infrastructure subsector. Federal partners in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology are supporting the election community, including election officials and vendors, to improve cybersecurity. More recently, this focus has expanded to concerns about the supply chain of components that are integral to election system equipment. This concern for the cybersecurity of supply chains is found throughout industry as organizations strive to protect their equipment and customers from cyber threats. In this Perspective, RAND Corporation researchers lay out the considerations for securing election system supply chains against cyber threats and how the federal government can partner with state and local officials and the vendor community to understand where risk lies in the supply chain. The Perspective discusses how existing tools and approaches can be adapted and used to facilitate cyber supply chain risk management. It should be of interest to federal, state, and local election officials who will manage their relationships with the manufacturers of election equipment; to manufacturers that will, in turn, manage their relationships with their suppliers; and to those developing tools for mapping supply chains and assessing supply chain risk.
During the 2016 presidential election, America's election infrastructure was targeted by actors sponsored by the Russian government. Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy examines the challenges arising out of the 2016 federal election, assesses current technology and standards for voting, and recommends steps that the federal government, state and local governments, election administrators, and vendors of voting technology should take to improve the security of election infrastructure. In doing so, the report provides a vision of voting that is more secure, accessible, reliable, and verifiable.
In the midst of the extraordinary challenges and uncertainty stemming from COVID-19, decision-makers are under increasing pressure to determine how to manage the pandemic’s immediate impact on, and consequences for, the timing and sequencing of elections. These decisions cannot be taken lightly, as they could jeopardize public health and shape the state of democracy in their countries, states or territories for years to come. The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly challenged elections, making new and pressing demands on how they are managed. The main public health threat associated with elections arises from the requirement for voters to cast their ballots in person at a polling station, most often on a single day. Having to converge to polling stations and handle voting materials that have been touched by many others, while being confined in crowded spaces where maintaining a safe distance from others may be difficult has suddenly become a new challenge. By devising timely, appropriate and sustainable solutions, drawn from own or others’ experience, electoral democracy frameworks can be gradually strengthened to withstand undue pressure.