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This book offers a forthright and discerning evaluation of American foreign policy and its impact on the political system of an important Third World country. After assessing the situation in the Congo when independence was achieved in 1960, Mr. Weissman compares the policies of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. He throws new light on such questions as the role of the United States in the overthrow of Patrice Lumumba, the UN action in Katanga, and the repression of the 1964 rebellions. Weighing various influences—economic, administrative, congressional, international—on U.S. policy, he concludes that the major factor was ideological. American actions, he maintains, were based on certain mistaken assumptions that were held in common by key American decision-makers whose backgrounds and training blinded them to the realities of Congolese life. Based on extensive research, including interviews with nearly all important figures who contributed to the making of American policy, this book effectively challenges some fashionable interpretations of the causes and results of American intervention in the Third World.
The book reinterprets the role of the UN during the Congo crisis from 1960 to 1964, presenting a multidimensional view of the organisation. Through an examination of the Anglo-American relationship, the book reveals how the UN helped position this event as a lightning rod in debates about how decolonisation interacted with the Cold War. By examining the ways in which the various dimensions of the UN came into play in Anglo-American considerations of how to handle the Congo crisis, the book reveals how the Congo debate reverberated in wider ideological struggles about how decolonisation evolved and what the role of the UN would be in managing this process. The UN became a central battle ground for ideas and visions of world order; as the newly-independent African and Asian states sought to redress the inequalities created by colonialism, the US and UK sought to maintain the status quo, while the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld tried to reconcile these two contrasting views.
This is the first of two volumes examining the so-called 'Congo Crisis' of the 1960s on the basis of documentation from the CIA's archives. It throws entirely new light upon developments in a country which many US citizens of the time believed would become the next major battlefield.
In August 1964, thousands of Simba rebels attacked and captured the city of Stanleyville in the newly independent Republic of the Congo and took more than 1,600 European and American residents as hostages, threatening to kill them if any attempt was made to recapture the city. In November of that year, after months of increasingly tense and complex discussions among the governments whose nationals were being held, an airborne assault by Belgian paracommandos dropped by American Air Force planes, combined with a CIA-piloted air strike against the Stanleyville airport, liberated most of the hostages, but only after a Simba-initiated massacre. "Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965" provides both the political background to these events and a detailed account of the actual operations: Dragon Rouge, the operations in Stanleyville, and Dragon Noir, focused on the city of Paulis, several hundred miles away. The book highlights the difficulties in organizing an international rescue effort with insufficient joint planning and inadequate command and control among the Belgian and American forces, as well as their differing political ideas and goals. The ad hoc nature of the planning was exemplified by an initial American Special Forces plan to air drop its forces east of Stanleyville and float down the river to Stanleyville. This plan was aborted when it was pointed out that the existence of Stanley Falls between the drop zone and the city was an insuperable obstacle. The operation also suffered from the Belgian commander's colonial-era contempt for the numerical strength of the Simbas and American fears of what was in reality a non-existent Communist element in the rebel movement."Dragon Operations" demonstrates that, despite the slapdash nature of their planning and communications aspects, as well as the distance involved, the austere support, the large number of hostages, and a lack of intelligence data, they were remarkably successful in rescuing most of the hostages. Although less than ideal, the operations worked better than expected, given the conditions under which they were conducted. This important study of an almost forgotten episode of the Cold War has much to offer to military strategists and tacticians, political scientists and students of contemporary history alike. Orginally published in 1988: 236 p. maps. ill.