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The theory of revealed preference has a long, distinguished tradition in economics but lacked a systematic presentation of the theory until now. This book deals with basic questions in economic theory and studies situations in which empirical observations are consistent or inconsistent with some of the best known economic theories.
Collective Household Consumption Behavior: Revealed Preference Analysis presents a nonparametric `revealed preference' methodology for analyzing collective consumption behavior in practical applications, while possibly accounting for externalities, public consumption and the use of assignable quantity information. Collective Household Consumption Behavior: Revealed Preference Analysis considers two types of collective models: The general collective model considers general preferences of the individual household members, which allow for externalities and public consumption within the household. The special collective models that do not allow for consumption externalities. After the introduction, section 2 sets the stage by introducing the revealed preference characterizations of the unitary model. Section 3 presents a collective model that allows for general individual preferences and discusses its revealed preference characterization. Sections 4 and 5 show how to bring this theoretical characterization to observational data. More specifically, Section 4 introduces the mixed integer programming characterizations for special collective models that impose restrictions on the household members' preferences. Section 5 does the same for the general collective model. Throughout Section 2 to Section 5, the authors illustrate the most relevant concepts by means of numerical examples. In Section 6 we subsequently illustrate our main results for data drawn from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey.
The Making of Economic Policy begins by observing that most countries' trade policies are so blatantly contrary to all the prescriptions of the economist that there is no way to understand this discrepancy except by delving into the politics. The same is true for many other dimensions of economic policy. Avinash Dixit looks for an improved understanding of the politics of economic policy-making from a transaction cost perspective. Such costs of planning, implementing, and monitoring an exchange have proved critical to explaining many phenomena in industrial organization. Dixit discusses the variety of similar transaction costs encountered in the political process of making economic policy and how these costs affect the operation of different institutions and policies. Dixit organizes a burgeoning body of research in political economy in this framework. He uses U.S. fiscal policy and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as two examples that illustrate the framework, and show how policy often deviates from the economist's ideal of efficiency. The approach reveals, however, that some seemingly inefficient practices are quite creditable attempts to cope with transaction costs such as opportunism and asymmetric information. Copublished with the Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute
Smart Economic Decision-Making in a Complex World is a fresh and reality-based perspective on decision-making with significant implications for analysis, self-understanding and policy. The book examines the conditions under which smart people generate outcomes that improve their place of work, their household and society. Within this work, the curious reader will find interesting open questions on many fascinating areas of current economic debate, including, the role of realistic assumptions robust model building, understanding how and when non-neoclassical behavior is best practice, why the assumption of smart decision-makers is best to understand and explain our economies and societies, and under what conditions individuals can make the best possible choices for themselves and society at large. Additional sections cover when and how efficiency is achieved, why inefficiencies can persist, when and how consumer welfare is maximized, and what benchmarks should be used to determine efficiency and rationality. - Makes the case for 'smart and rational' decision-making as a context-dependent rational process that is framed by socio-cultural environment and conditioned by institutional capacities - Explains how incorporation of the 'smart' decision-maker concept into economic thought improves our understanding of how, why and when people generate certain outcomes - Explores how economic efficiency can be achieved, individual preferences realized, and social welfare maximized through the use of 'smart and rational' approaches
Preference falsification, according to the economist Timur Kuran, is the act of misrepresenting one's wants under perceived social pressures. It happens frequently in everyday life, such as when we tell the host of a dinner party that we are enjoying the food when we actually find it bland. In Private Truths, Public Lies Kuran argues convincingly that the phenomenon not only is ubiquitous but has huge social and political consequences. Drawing on diverse intellectual traditions, including those rooted in economics, psychology, sociology, and political science, Kuran provides a unified theory of how preference falsification shapes collective decisions, orients structural change, sustains social stability, distorts human knowledge, and conceals political possibilities. A common effect of preference falsification is the preservation of widely disliked structures. Another is the conferment of an aura of stability on structures vulnerable to sudden collapse. When the support of a policy, tradition, or regime is largely contrived, a minor event may activate a bandwagon that generates massive yet unanticipated change. In distorting public opinion, preference falsification also corrupts public discourse and, hence, human knowledge. So structures held in place by preference falsification may, if the condition lasts long enough, achieve increasingly genuine acceptance. The book demonstrates how human knowledge and social structures co-evolve in complex and imperfectly predictable ways, without any guarantee of social efficiency. Private Truths, Public Lies uses its theoretical argument to illuminate an array of puzzling social phenomena. They include the unexpected fall of communism, the paucity, until recently, of open opposition to affirmative action in the United States, and the durability of the beliefs that have sustained India's caste system.
This manual offers a detailed, up-to-date explanation of how to carry out stated preference techniques. The techniques use surveys to ask individuals how much they would be willing to pay or willing to accept in compensation for gains or losses of non-market goods and services. Applications of the technique include changes in air and water quality; noise nuisance; health care; risk; recorded heritage; cultural assets; habitats; Landscape and so on. It shows how to choose the most appropriate technique and how to design the questionnaires. Detailed advice on econometric analysis is provided, as well as explanation of the pitfalls that need to be avoided.
This volume contains a refereed selection of revised papers which were originally presented at the Second International Conference on Econometric Decision Models, University of Hagen (FernUni versitat). The conference was held in Haus Nordhelle, a meeting place in the mountainous area " Sauerland" , some 50 kilometers south of Hagen, on August 29 - September 1, 1989. Some details about this conference are given in the first paper, they need not be repeated here. The 40 papers included in this volume are organized in 10 "parts", shown in the table of contents. Included are such "fashionable" topics like "optimal control", "cointegration" and "rational expec tations models". In each part, the papers have been arranged alphabetically by author, unless there were good reasons for a different arrangement. To facilitate the decision making of the readers, all papers (except a few short ones) contain an abstract, a list of keywords and a table of contents. At the end of the proceedings volume, there is a list of authors. More than ten years ago, I began to organize meetings of econometricians, mainly called "seminar" or " colloquium". One major purpose of these meetings has always been to improve international cooperation of econometric model builders (and model users) from "the East" and "the West". Unprecedented changes to the better have taken place recently ("perestroika"). For a large fraction of participants from the Soviet Union, the 1989 conference was the first conference in a Western country.
The standard theory of decision making under uncertainty advises the decision maker to form a statistical model linking outcomes to decisions and then to choose the optimal distribution of outcomes. This assumes that the decision maker trusts the model completely. But what should a decision maker do if the model cannot be trusted? Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent, two leading macroeconomists, push the field forward as they set about answering this question. They adapt robust control techniques and apply them to economics. By using this theory to let decision makers acknowledge misspecification in economic modeling, the authors develop applications to a variety of problems in dynamic macroeconomics. Technical, rigorous, and self-contained, this book will be useful for macroeconomists who seek to improve the robustness of decision-making processes.
Behavioral economics questions the basic underpinnings of economic theory, showing that people often do not act consistently in their own self-interest when making economic decisions. While these findings have important theoretical implications, they also provide a new lens for examining public policies, such as taxation, public spending, and the provision of adequate pensions. How can people be encouraged to save adequately for retirement when evidence shows that they tend to spend their money as soon as they can? Would closer monitoring of income tax returns lead to more honest taxpayers or a more distrustful, uncooperative citizenry? Behavioral Public Finance, edited by Edward McCaffery and Joel Slemrod, applies the principles of behavioral economics to government's role in constructing economic and social policies of these kinds and suggests that programs crafted with rational participants in mind may require redesign. Behavioral Public Finance looks at several facets of economic life and asks how behavioral research can increase public welfare. Deborah A. Small, George Loewenstein, and Jeff Strnad note that public support for a tax often depends not only on who bears its burdens, but also on how the tax is framed. For example, people tend to prefer corporate taxes over sales taxes, even though the cost of both is eventually extracted from the consumer. James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick assess the impact of several different features of 401(k) plans on employee savings behavior. They find that when employees are automatically enrolled in a retirement savings plan, they overwhelmingly accept the status quo and continue participating, while employees without automatic enrollment typically take over a year to join the saving plan. Behavioral Public Finance also looks at taxpayer compliance. While the classic economic model suggests that the low rate of IRS audits means far fewer people should voluntarily pay their taxes than actually do, John Cullis, Philip Jones, and Alan Lewis present new research showing that many people do not underreport their incomes even when the probability of getting caught is a mere one percent. Human beings are not always rational, utility-maximizing economic agents. Behavioral economics has shown how human behavior departs from the assumptions made by generations of economists. Now, Behavioral Public Finance brings the insights of behavioral economics to analysis of policies that affect us all.