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The first book to explore the tension between presidents and federal agencies from the perspective of careerists in the executive branch. Winner of the Herbert A. Simon Book Award of the American Political Science Association Why do presidents face so many seemingly avoidable bureaucratic conflicts? And why do these clashes usually intensify toward the end of presidential administrations, when a commander-in-chief’s administrative goals tend to be more explicit and better aligned with their appointed leadership’s prerogatives? In Rethinking the Administrative Presidency, William G. Resh considers these complicated questions from an empirical perspective. Relying on data drawn from surveys and interviews, Resh rigorously analyzes the argument that presidents typically start from a premise of distrust when they attempt to control federal agencies. Focusing specifically on the George W. Bush administration, Resh explains how a lack of trust can lead to harmful agency failure. He explores the extent to which the Bush administration was able to increase the reliability—and reduce the cost—of information to achieve its policy goals through administrative means during its second term. Arguing that President Bush's use of the administrative presidency hindered trust between appointees and career executives to deter knowledge sharing throughout respective agencies, Resh also demonstrates that functional relationships between careerists and appointees help to advance robust policy. He employs a “joists vs. jigsaws” metaphor to stress his main point: that mutual support based on optimistic trust is a more effective managerial strategy than fragmentation founded on unsubstantiated distrust.
Modern presidents regularly appeal over the heads of Congress to the people at large to generate support for public policies. The Rhetorical Presidency makes the case that this development, born at the outset of the twentieth century, is the product of conscious political choices that fundamentally transformed the presidency and the meaning of American governance. Now with a new foreword by Russell Muirhead and a new afterword by the author, this landmark work probes political pathologies and analyzes the dilemmas of presidential statecraft. Extending a tradition of American political writing that begins with The Federalist and continues with Woodrow Wilson’s Congressional Government, The Rhetorical Presidency remains a pivotal work in its field.
How the executive branch—not the president alone—formulates executive orders, and how this process constrains the chief executive's ability to act unilaterally The president of the United States is commonly thought to wield extraordinary personal power through the issuance of executive orders. In fact, the vast majority of such orders are proposed by federal agencies and shaped by negotiations that span the executive branch. By Executive Order provides the first comprehensive look at how presidential directives are written—and by whom. In this eye-opening book, Andrew Rudalevige examines more than five hundred executive orders from the 1930s to today—as well as more than two hundred others negotiated but never issued—shedding vital new light on the multilateral process of drafting supposedly unilateral directives. He draws on a wealth of archival evidence from the Office of Management and Budget and presidential libraries as well as original interviews to show how the crafting of orders requires widespread consultation and compromise with a formidable bureaucracy. Rudalevige explains the key role of management in the presidential skill set, detailing how bureaucratic resistance can stall and even prevent actions the chief executive desires, and how presidents must bargain with the bureaucracy even when they seek to act unilaterally. Challenging popular conceptions about the scope of presidential power, By Executive Order reveals how the executive branch holds the power to both enact and constrain the president’s will.
"The extraordinary nature of the Trump presidency has spawned a resurgence in the study of the presidency and a rising concern about the power of the office. In Power Shifts: Congress and Presidential Representation, John Dearborn explores the development of the idea of the representative presidency, that the president alone is elected by a national constituency, and thus the only part of government who can represent the nation against the parochial concerns of members of Congress, and its relationship to the growth of presidential power in the 20th century. Dearborn asks why Congress conceded so much power to the Chief Executive, with the support of particularly conservative members of the Supreme Court. He discusses the debates between Congress and the Executive and the arguments offered by politicians, scholars, and members of the judiciary about the role of the president in the American state. He asks why so many bought into the idea of the representative, and hence, strong presidency despite unpopular wars, failed foreign policies, and parochial actions that favor only the president's supporters. This is a book about the power of ideas in the development of the American state"--
America’s model of representational government rests on the premise that elected officials respond to the opinions of citizens. This is a myth, however, not a reality, according to James N. Druckman and Lawrence R. Jacobs. In Who Governs?, Druckman and Jacobs combine existing research with novel data from US presidential archives to show that presidents make policy by largely ignoring the views of most citizens in favor of affluent and well-connected political insiders. Presidents treat the public as pliable, priming it to focus on personality traits and often ignoring it on policies that fail to become salient. Melding big debates about democratic theory with existing research on American politics and innovative use of the archives of three modern presidents—Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan—Druckman and Jacobs deploy lively and insightful analysis to show that the conventional model of representative democracy bears little resemblance to the actual practice of American politics. The authors conclude by arguing that polyarchy and the promotion of accelerated citizen mobilization and elite competition can improve democratic responsiveness. An incisive study of American politics and the flaws of representative government, this book will be warmly welcomed by readers interested in US politics, public opinion, democratic theory, and the fecklessness of American leadership and decision-making.
In The Rhetorical Presidency, Jeffrey Tulis argues that the president’s relationship to the public has changed dramatically since the Constitution was enacted: while previously the president avoided any discussions of public policy so as to avoid demagoguery, the president is now expected to go directly to the public, using all the tools of rhetoric to influence public policy. This has effectively created a "second" Constitution that has been layered over, and in part contradicts, the original one. In our volume, scholars from different subfields of political science extend Tulis’s perspective to the judiciary and Congress; locate the origins of the constitutional change in the Progressive Era; highlight the role of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and the mass media in transforming the presidency; discuss the nature of demagoguery and whether, in fact, rhetoric is undesirable; and relate the rhetorical presidency to the public’s ignorance of the workings of a government more complex than the Founders imagined. This book was originally published as a special issue of Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society.
This volume proposes a capacity-centered approach for understanding American bureaucracy. The administrative institutions that made the country a superpower turned out to be fragile under Donald Trump’s presidency. Laboring beneath systematic accusations of deep statism, combined with a market oriented federal administration, bureaucratic capacity manifested its decay in the public health and constitutional cataclysms of 2020, denting America’s global leadership and contributing to its own people’s suffering. The authors combine interviews with a historical examination of federal administrative reforms in the backdrop of the recent pandemic and electoral tumult to craft a developmental framework of the ebb and flow of capacity. While reforms, large and small, brought about professionalization and other benefits to federal administration, they also camouflaged a gradual erosion when anti-bureaucratic approaches became entrenched. A sclerotic, brittle condition in the government’s capacity to work efficiently and accountably arose over time, even as administrative power consolidated around the executive. That co-evolutionary dynamic made federal government ripe for the capacity bifurcation, delegitimization, and disinvestment witnessed over the last four years. As the system works out the long-term impacts of such a deconstruction, it also prompts a rethinking of capacity in more durable terms. Calling attention to a more comprehensive appreciation of the dynamics around administrative capacity, this volume argues for Congress, citizens, and the good government community to promote capacity rebuilding initiatives that have resilience at the core. As such, the book will be of interest to citizens, public reformers, civic leaders, scholars and students of public administration, policy, and public affairs.
From the political rumour mill to pop culture, all signs suggest that the United States is finally ready for a woman in the White House. This text offers a critical assessment of the inroads made by female candidates into the previously male bastion of electoral success.
Throughout American history, presidents have shown a startling power to act independently of Congress and the courts. On their own initiative, presidents have taken the country to war, abolished slavery, shielded undocumented immigrants from deportation, declared a national emergency at the border, and more, leading many to decry the rise of an imperial presidency. But given the steep barriers that usually prevent Congress and the courts from formally checking unilateral power, what stops presidents from going it alone even more aggressively? The answer, Dino P. Christenson and Douglas L. Kriner argue, lies in the power of public opinion. With robust empirical data and compelling case studies, the authors reveal the extent to which domestic public opinion limits executive might. Presidents are emboldened to pursue their own agendas when they enjoy strong public support, and constrained when they don’t, since unilateral action risks inciting political pushback, jeopardizing future initiatives, and further eroding their political capital. Although few Americans instinctively recoil against unilateralism, Congress and the courts can sway the public’s view via their criticism of unilateral policies. Thus, other branches can still check the executive branch through political means. As long as presidents are concerned with public opinion, Christenson and Kriner contend that fears of an imperial presidency are overblown.
Presidents and the American Presidency, Third Edition, engages students in the study of the presidency through an exploration of both the political institution and the men who have held the office. Considering both the strengths and the weaknesses of the office, authors Lori Cox Han and Diane J. Heith move beyond purely theoretical analysis to examine the real-life, day-to-day responsibilities and challenges of the presidency. They incorporate archival documents from multiple administrations, offer extensive coverage of methodology, and integrate both institutional and president-centered approaches. Now available in an enhanced ebook format, the text incorporates chapter Learning Objectives, section reviews, videos and web activities, within the narrative offering a digitally enhanced learning experience.