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A comment from the commander of Tactical Air Command (TAC) that the air operations center (AOC) did not work and that it needed to be fixed stimulated this research project. Having long been associated with the theater air control system (TACS), I have been aware of concerns about the AOC and other elements of the system. Periodically, the Air Force has tried to implement improvements, particularly in hardware, but these efforts sometimes fell short. Some of the expressed concerns included statements that the air tasking order (ATO) was not effective means of controlling the force, that centralized control will break down and leave us unable to perform our task, and that the system is too physically cumbersome and airlift intensive to be useful. Certainty, there is some truth in these comments.
The author, Colonel Tillotson, discusses the functions the air commander must perform in a contingency, describes the organization intended to support the commander, and assesses the organization's performance during two recent events. His conclusions may disappoint the more reform-minded, but will reinforce the lessons of our air power history. Colonel Tillotson suggests the theater air control system can certainly be streamlined, but the major required change is that the system needs to be exercised, regularly and realistically, by the senior commanders who will depend on it in a crisis. Despite the pressures of declining budgets, the Air Force must continue to give time and attention to the means for controlling its forces it is to maintain its leadership role in air power deployment.
In response to U.S. Army reorganization and lessons learned from Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, the Air Force and Army agreed to realign the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) with the Army division instead of the corps. Implementation has since stalled because of funding reductions and command-level disagreements. Squadrons directed to realign lack guidance about how this is to be accomplished, often resulting in unit level company grade officers executing as they see fit. These officers are missing a sufficient frame of reference to help them understand how to realign or why it is being directed. Additionally, each Army division has a unique mission that the ASOC must be molded to fit, but the ASOC remains a one-size-fits-all organization based on corps alignment. A frame of reference is needed to make informed decisions at all levels. A cost-benefit analysis is necessary to determine whether realignment is economically viable, even if it remains the best decision for joint interoperability. This research supplies a practical frame of reference through the lens of a coherent and critically analyzed history of the ASOC, focusing on the timeless principles that are required for optimal execution. The principles identified are flexibility, proximity, and communications. Whether the Air Force continues to build a division aligned ASOC, or withdraws it to the corps, these historically-derived principles should be applied to its design.Command and Control (C2) of Close Air Support (CAS) has a long history of learning, and subsequently forgetting, the principles of effective implementation. Since World War I first required management of offensive air power in close proximity to friendly ground forces, the military components have debated over the methods of CAS management in each successive conflict. Near the end of each of these conflicts, an effective organization has typically been achieved; one that largely conforms to the pre-war doctrine and the organization in place at the end of the previous conflict. At the center of this recurring debate is the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). The ASOC is the organization responsible for providing C2 of the air commander's assets that have been allocated to support the mission of the ground commander. It has gone by many names and taken a variety of forms over the years, but its mission and the general principles that make for effective execution of that mission remain the same. In the last 13 years, Army restructuring has caused Air Force leaders to reevaluate where the ASOC should be aligned in the Army's new organization. Planning shortfalls in Operation Anaconda led both services to reexamine how the ASOC should integrate in joint mission execution. The realignment plan, and subsequently the joint integration process, has stalled because of high costs coupled with shrinking budgets. Contributing to slowed implementation is the fact that the current ASOC is not designed for the specific mission needs of all the units it is now meant to support. These challenges call for an examination of ASOC history to provide clear guidance for leaders designing the contemporary ASOC. Research Question - What does the historical interaction between the doctrine and practice of air-to-ground command and control reveal about the Air Support Operations Center? Can enduring principles be identified that should be applied to its design? - An examination of close air support command and control history since World War I will reveal that flexibility, proximity, and robust communications are critical to fielding an effective Air Support Operations Center.
The United States (US) military is undergoing a tremendous transformation. Much of the change uses technology to improve command and control (C2) of military forces. The end state gives the commander the ability to command a more flexible and adaptive force. Since the early 1990s, the US Air Force has focused much of its effort on command and control networks to enable centralized control and decentralized execution. The Air Operations Center used in Desert Storm was a major step towards improved C2 in the USAF. In the late 1990s a wing level command and control center was developed. This center, now the Installation Command Center (referred to as the Installation Operations Center (IOC) in this paper) is being incorporated into Air Force doctrine. The research question focuses on what the installation operations center provides to the deployed commander. Using doctrine and history as a baseline and fourteen criteria for measurement, the installation operations center greatly enhances the deployed commander's ability to integrate the unit mission into the joint fight. The installation operations center provides the commander with a tailorable command and control center, with better trained personnel, greater flexibility in personnel to run the center, significantly better situational awareness for local and area of responsibility operations, and also improves information sharing and integration vertically and horizontally. The IOC will substantially increase the deployed commander's combat capability.
USSOCOM needs to change its mix of vertical lift aircraft supporting its mission. It should acquire sufficient Army helicopters to accomplish the helicopter mission, acquire the MV-22 to fulfill the long-range vertical lift requirement, and, as these aircraft become operational, retire the aging MH-53s of the Air Force and give them to the Marine Corps. The Marines can then equip their newer H-53 with the avionics, navigational, and electronic warfare equipment from the retired Air Force aircraft. USSOCOM should also assume responsibility for Combat Search and Rescue, assume command of the Air Rescue Service, and become the joint unified command for both special operations and rescue. A comprehensive approach to building the vertical lift forces assigned to USSOCOM can achieve efficient and joint command and control along with modernization. The Marine Corps can gain from the retirement of the Air Force MH-53s from the special operations command, significantly enhancing the capabilities of the expeditionary units at small relative cost. The timing of the new aircraft becoming operational and the projected retirement of the MH-53 provide us with the opportunity to do some good for the Army, Air Force, and Marines while also providing for career protection and safe transitions of the aircraft.
Improvements in information technologies, and communications have produced dramatic efficiencies in many information dependent organizations. A long period of decreased military budgets, and a major decrease in force structure have created an environment where we must leverage new information technologies to create efficiencies that will increase combat power as described in Joint Vision 2020. The heavy and forward-based Air Operations Center is an organization where these technologies can have a positive impact. Over the past few years, efforts have been made to streamline AOC operations and reduce the logistical "tail" and in theater "footprint" of this unit. Chief among these emerging concepts is the Split Air Operations Center. This research project proposes to explore the Split Air Operations Center concept and analyze its operational acceptability. Specifically, does the Split AOC concept take into account the emerging threats and does it achieve the goals outlined in Joint Vision 2020. Lastly, this paper proposes a concept to disperse forward elements of the Air Operations among USAF airborne C4ISR assets. This proposal will create a mobile, survivable, and logistically light Expeditionary Air Operations Center that better adapts to current wisdom on future warfighting and is aligned to meet the goals of Joint Vision 2020. Implementation of this concept would flatten the theater C2 structure, decreases decision time, and provide the JFC: a rapidly deployable base line AOC that is not Time Phased Force Deployment Data dependent, a forced entry air command post, and an AOC deployable with our Aerospace Expeditionary Forces.
Except in a few instances, since World War II no American soldier or sailor has been attacked by enemy air power. Conversely, no enemy soldier orsailor has acted in combat without being attacked or at least threatened by American air power. Aviators have brought the air weapon to bear against enemies while denying them the same prerogative. This is the legacy of the U.S. AirForce, purchased at great cost in both human and material resources.More often than not, aerial pioneers had to fight technological ignorance, bureaucratic opposition, public apathy, and disagreement over purpose.Every step in the evolution of air power led into new and untrodden territory, driven by humanitarian impulses; by the search for higher, faster, and farther flight; or by the conviction that the air way was the best way. Warriors have always coveted the high ground. If technology permitted them to reach it, men, women andan air force held and exploited it-from Thomas Selfridge, first among so many who gave that "last full measure of devotion"; to Women's Airforce Service Pilot Ann Baumgartner, who broke social barriers to become the first Americanwoman to pilot a jet; to Benjamin Davis, who broke racial barriers to become the first African American to command a flying group; to Chuck Yeager, a one-time non-commissioned flight officer who was the first to exceed the speed of sound; to John Levitow, who earned the Medal of Honor by throwing himself over a live flare to save his gunship crew; to John Warden, who began a revolution in air power thought and strategy that was put to spectacular use in the Gulf War.Industrialization has brought total war and air power has brought the means to overfly an enemy's defenses and attack its sources of power directly. Americans have perceived air power from the start as a more efficient means of waging war and as a symbol of the nation's commitment to technology to master challenges, minimize casualties, and defeat adversaries.
This collection of essays reflects the proceedings of a 1991 conference on "The United States Air Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in the 1990s," sponsored by the USAF and Tufts University. The 20 contributors comment on the pivotal role of airpower in the war with Iraq and address issues and choices facing the USAF, such as the factors that are reshaping strategies and missions, the future role and structure of airpower as an element of US power projection, and the aerospace industry's views on what the Air Force of the future will set as its acquisition priorities and strategies. The authors agree that aerospace forces will be an essential and formidable tool in US security policies into the next century. The contributors include academics, high-level military leaders, government officials, journalists, and top executives from aerospace and defense contractors.