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The National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia (NBRNM) is implementing advanced transparency practices. The long-standing commitment to transparency noted by a number of stakeholders and forcefully re-affirmed in the recent period is well anchored in the law, and it has been designated by the NBRNM as a strategic objective to fulfill its mandate. This policy has earned the NBRNM noteworthy trust from stakeholders met by the mission, and it has paid significant dividends in terms of anchoring its autonomy and ensuring policy effectiveness.
This paper reports to the Executive Board on the outcomes of the Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT) pilot reviews. The pilot CBT reviews helped central banks evaluate their transparency practices and strengthen dialogue with external stakeholders. The CBT pilots provided valuable information on the resources required for the reviews going forward. Staff will continue to offer CBT reviews to the rest of the membership. The staff will report back to the Board in FY2026 on the progress of the CBT reviews and an update to the Code following five years of implementation.
Recent Developments, Outlook and Risks. Staff project GDP growth of 2.3 percent in 2023, lower than at the time of PLL arrangement approval, driven by lower external demand and a slowdown in investment. Staff expect an investment recovery to be a key driver of the recovery in 2024, with projected GDP growth of 3.0 percent. Inflation is coming down, driven by monetary tightening and lower global commodity prices, and is projected to be at 4.5 percent average in 2024. The current account is benefitting from lower international energy prices, and international reserves are at an adequate level and projected to remain so. Risks are mainly related to geopolitical tensions, commodity price volatility, and unfunded promises ahead of the elections planned for the spring.
The economy is rebounding. After a 6 percent drop in 2020, real GDP is projected to grow at 4 percent both in 2021 and 2022, reflecting improved mobility, a return of the diaspora, and continued policy support. With uncertainty remaining high, including about the course of the pandemic, policies need to be kept flexible. Emphasis should be on limiting the economic scars from the pandemic crisis while making progress on long-standing reform priorities such as further strengthening public financial management and revenue administration and buttressing the financial safety net.
North Macedonia's economy has been hit by two large external shocks. While recovering from the pandemic, the outlook deteriorated again following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and sharply rising energy and food prices. Given high dependence on energy imports, the external financing need has increased, while at the same time, global financial conditions have tightened, increasing the cost of market financing.
The Central Bank of Chile (CBC) has implemented broadly advanced transparency practices. This reflects the CBC’s strong public commitment to transparency, which is anchored in the law and has been designated by the CBC as a strategic objective to fulfill its mandate. This policy has earned the CBC the broad trust of its stakeholders and has paid significant dividends for the CBC in terms of safeguarding its autonomy and ensuring its policy effectiveness.
This edition of Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide (Manual) updates and merges into one volume methodological and practical aspects of the compilation process of monetary statistics. The Manual is aimed at compilers and users of monetary data, offering guidance for the collection and analytical presentation of monetary statistics. The Manual includes standardized report forms, providing countries with a tool for compiling and reporting harmonized data for the central bank, other depository corporations, and other financial corporations.
This departmental paper investigates how countries in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) can improve fiscal transparency, thereby raising government efficiency and reducing corruption vulnerabilities.
This paper takes stock of external audit arrangements at central banks. Its focus is on the annual audit of central bank financial statements, as well as legal and institutional measures that support audit quality and independence. The paper outlines good practices in these areas and provides a summary of actual practices observed based on a review of audited financial statements and central bank legislation. While the audit frameworks for central banks differ depending on their legal and institutional circumstances, central banks’ external audits increasingly follow international standards. Most of them are audited by auditors with international affiliations and embrace modern governance structures that provide for audit oversight. However, the paper also notes that a sizeable number of central banks do not publish the audit results in a timely manner, which leaves room for improvement in transparency practices.
This paper discusses key legal issues in the design of Board Oversight in central banks. Central banks are complex and sophisticated organizations that are challenging to manage. While most economic literature focuses on decision-making in the context of monetary policy formulation, this paper focuses on the Board oversight of central banks—a central feature of sound governance. This form of oversight is the decision-making responsibility through which an internal body of the central bank—the Oversight Board—ensures that the central bank is well-managed. First, the paper will contextualize the role of Board oversight into the broader legal structure for central bank governance by considering this form of oversight as one of the core decision-making responsibilities of central banks. Secondly, the paper will focus on a number of important legal design issues for Board Oversight, by contrasting the current practices of the IMF membership’s 174 central banks with staff’s advisory practice developed over the past 50 years.