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In this classic portrait of Dwight D. Eisenhower the soldier, bestselling historian Stephen E. Ambrose examines the Allied commander’s leadership during World War II. Ambrose brings Eisenhower’s experience of the Second World War to life, showing in vivid detail how the general’s skill as a diplomat and a military strategist contributed to Allied successes in North Africa and in Europe, and established him as one of the greatest military leaders in the world. Ambrose, then the Associate Editor of the General’s official papers, analyzes Eisenhower’s difficult military decisions and his often complicated relationships with powerful personalities like Churchill, de Gaulle, Roosevelt, and Patton. This is the definitive account of Eisenhower’s evolution as a military leader—from its dramatic beginnings through his time at the top post of Allied command.
The privilege of commanding an Air Force squadron, despite its heavy responsibilities and unrelenting challenges, represents for many Air Force officers the high point of their careers. It is service as a squadron commander that accords true command authority for the first time. The authority, used consistently and wisely, provides a foundation for command. As with the officer's commission itself, command authority is granted to those who have earned it, both by performance and a revealed capacity for the demands of total responsibility. But once granted, it much be revalidated every day. So as one assumes squadron command, bringing years of experience and proven record to join with this new authority, one might still need a little practical help to success with the tasks of command. This book offers such help. “Commanding an Air Force Squadron” brings unique and welcome material to a subject other books have addressed. It is rich in practical, useful, down-to-earth advice from officers who have recently experienced squadron command. The author does not quote regulations, parrot doctrine, or paraphrase the abstractions that lace the pages of so many books about leadership. Nor does he puff throughout the manuscript about how he did it. Rather, he presents a digest of practical wisdom based on real-world experience drawn from the reflection of many former commanders from any different types of units. He addresses all Air Force squadron commanders, rated and nonrated, in all sorts of missions worldwide. Please also see a follow up to this book entitled “Commanding an Air Force Squadron in the Twenty-First Century (2003)” by Jeffry F. Smith, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF.
The Commanding Performance Workbook is specifically designed to teach you the necessary mental skills to play your best on a consistent basis. It also specifically focuses on teaching you how to practice these mental skills through a series of mental conditioning drills, so you can develop them for stronger performances.
In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.
Few American presidents have exercised their constitutional authority as commander in chief with more determination than Franklin D. Roosevelt. He intervened in military operations more often and to better effect than his contemporaries Churchill and Stalin, and maneuvered events so that the Grand Alliance was directed from Washington. In this expansive history, Eric Larrabee examines the extent and importance of FDR's wartime leadership through his key military leaders—Marshall, King, Arnold, MacArthur, Vandergrift, Nimitz, Eisenhower, Stilwell, and LeMay. Devoting a chapter to each man, the author studies Roosevelt's impact on their personalities, their battles (sometimes with each other), and the consequences of their decisions. He also addresses such critical subjects as Roosevelt's responsibility for the war and how well it achieved his goals. First published in 1987, this comprehensive portrait of the titans of the American military effort in World War II is available in a new paperback edition for the first time in sixteen years.
Command is the ultimate service. It is a time when we have the singular responsibility to create and lead strong Air Force units. A time when our passion for our Air Force and our vision for its future must be overwhelmingly clear. Early in the "Developing Aerospace Leaders" initiative, we began to focus on the way in which the institution teaches leadership and prepares airmen for command. What we found was a wide range of practices and a wide range of expectations - a complicating factor in today's Expeditionary Aerospace Force. We realize that preparing our officers to command effective, mission-oriented units must be a deliberate process. It must develop our unique airman perspective, creating commanders who are able to communicate the vision, have credibility in the mission area, and can lead our people with inspiration and heart. The foundation of our institution's effectiveness has always been its leaders. Colonel Goldfein's work provides valuable lessons learned and serves as a worthwhile tool to optimize your effectiveness as a squadron commander. This book is a must-read, not only for those selected to command a squadron but for all our young officers, helping them understand what the requirements of squadron command will be. Remember, command is a unique privilege - a demanding and crucial position in our Air Force. "Sharing Success - Owning Failure" takes you a step closer to successfully meeting that challenge.
The U. S. Secretary of the Army appointed the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee(FHIRC or Committee) and directed it to "conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Fort Hoodcommand climate and culture, and its impact, if any, on the safety, welfare and readiness of ourSoldiers and units." In addressing this mandate, the FHIRC determined that during the time periodcovered by the Review, the command climate relative to the Sexual Harassment/Assault Responseand Prevention (SHARP) Program at Fort Hood was ineffective, to the extent that there was apermissive environment for sexual assault and sexual harassment.As set forth in this Report, specific Findings demonstrate that the implementation of theSHARP Program was ineffective. During the review period, no Commanding General or subordinateechelon commander chose to intervene proactively and mitigate known risks of high crime, sexualassault and sexual harassment. The result was a pervasive lack of confidence in the SHARP Programand an unacceptable lack of knowledge of core SHARP components regarding reporting and certainvictim services. Under a structurally weak and under-resourced III Corps SHARP Program, theSexual Assault Review Board (SARB) process was primarily utilized to address administrative and notthe actual substantive aspects of the Program. While a powerful tool by design, the SARB processbecame a missed opportunity to develop and implement proactive strategies to create a respectfulculture and prevent and reduce incidents of sexual assault and sexual harassment. From the III Corpslevel and below, the SHARP Program was chronically under-resourced, due to understaffing, lack oftraining, lack of credentialed SHARP professionals, and lack of funding. Most of all, it lackedcommand emphasis where it was needed the most: the enlisted ranks.A resonant symptom of the SHARP Program's ineffective implementation was significantunderreporting of sexual harassment and sexual assault. Without intervention from the NCOs andofficers entrusted with their health and safety, victims feared the inevitable consequences of reporting: ostracism, shunning and shaming, harsh treatment, and indelible damage to their career. Many haveleft the Army or plan to do so at the earliest opportunity.As part of the command climate, the issues of crime and Criminal Investigation Division(CID) operations were examined. The Committee determined that serious crime issues on and offFort Hood were neither identified nor addressed. There was a conspicuous absence of an effectiverisk management approach to crime incident reduction and Soldier victimization. A militaryinstallation is essentially a large, gated community. The Commander of a military installation possessesa wide variety of options to proactively address and mitigate the spectrum of crime incidents. Despitehaving the capability, very few tools were employed at Fort Hood to do so. Both the Directorate ofEmergency Services (DES) and the CID have a mandate and a role to play in crime reduction.Each contributed very little analysis, feedback and general situational awareness to the command towardfacilitating and enabling such actions. This was another missed opportunity.The deficient climate also extended into the missing Soldier scenarios, where no onerecognized the slippage in accountability procedures and unwillingness or lack of ability of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to keep track of their subordinates. The absence of any formalprotocols for Soldiers who fail to report resulted in an ad hoc approach by units and Military Police(MP) to effectively address instances of missing Soldiers during the critical first 24 hours, again withadverse consequences.Consistent with the FHIRC Charter, this Report sets forth nine Findings and offers seventyRecommendations.