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Between May 2005 and June 2009, there were over 90 reorganisations to central government. This report finds that these cannot demonstrate value for money, given that most had vague objectives and that costs and benefits were not tracked. The average annual cost of reorganisations is almost £200 million, around 85 per cent of which is for the reorganisation of arms length bodies. Since 1980, 25 central government departments have been created, including 13 which no longer exist. By comparison, in the United States only two new departments have been created over the same period. Central government bodies are weak at identifying and securing the benefits they hope to gain from reorganisation. There is no standard approach for preparing and assessing business cases setting out intended benefits against expected costs. More than half of reorganisations do not compare expected costs and benefits of alternative options, so there can be no certainty that the chosen approaches are the most cost effective. Furthermore, no departments set metrics to track the benefits that should justify reorganisation - making it impossible for them to demonstrate that the eventual benefits outweigh costs. There is no requirement for bodies to disclose the costs of reorganisations after they happen - meaning the true cost of reorganisation is often hidden. The decisions to reorganise departments and arms length bodies are often taken at short notice and with inadequate understanding of what could go wrong.
Through the Public Bodies Reform Programme, run by the Cabinet Office, departments are taking over the functions of 65 public bodies and transferring those of another three to local government. They are also abolishing more than a half of their advisory bodies to strengthen ministers' ultimate responsibility for policy decisions. Departments propose to abolish 262 bodies, by such means as mergers, transfers out of government and ceasing functions. It is also intended to secure a reduction of £2.6 billion over the spending review period 2011-12 to 2014-15 in ongoing funding for administration in public bodies. A third of this (34 per cent or £0.9 billion) comes from just two changes: the closures of the Regional Development Agencies and the education body Becta. Annual estimated savings achieved by 2014-15 are likely to continue at between £800 million and £900 million. According to the National Audit Office, however, departments' estimates of £425 million for transition costs will actually be at least £830 million. Departments will therefore need to find gross savings of around £3.5 billion. There is also concern that there is an insufficient grasp of the ongoing costs of functions transferred to other parts of government. A third of all money spent by bodies in the Programme (£20.6 billion) will be subject to greater accountability to elected politicians, but most (£43.2 billion) will remain at arms-length. Despite greater accountability being the Programme's primary intended benefit, only one of the six departments examined had proposals for a well-defined, though basic, measure of success for it
Under the Public Bodies Reform Programme the Government is reducing the number of its arm's length bodies from 904 to between 632 and 642 by the end of the current Spending Review period and will have a substantial and lasting impact. The Programme is intended to improve accountability for functions currently carried out at arm's length from Ministers. The Cabinet Office says it is on track to make £2.6 billion of administrative savings by 2015. However there are substantial reservations about the robustness of this claim. Key concerns are that: there is a risk departments are claiming savings which are actually cuts to services, when they should be including only genuine savings arising from administrative reorganisations; estimates of transition costs such as redundancy and pension costs are incomplete; the savings estimate does not fully take account of the ongoing costs to other parts of government of taking on functions being transferred from abolished bodies and some departments have wrongly included wider savings from bodies being retained, rather than just administrative savings from bodies being abolished or substantially reformed. The Cabinet Office has accepted that its savings estimate needs to be reassessed and has undertaken to 'rebase' it. Focus now needs to be on managing the Programme effectively. Departments have decided on the form of individual reorganisations themselves without clear direction from the centre, leading in some cases to inconsistent treatment of bodies with similar functions. Furthermore, departments may not be getting the best value for money from the sale or transfer of assets of bodies being abolished
This report by the National Audit Office on progress by central government departments in reducing costs concludes that departments took effective action in 2010-11, cutting spending in real terms by 2.3 per cent or £7.9 billion, compared with 2009-10. The analysis of departments' accounts supports the Efficiency and Reform Group's estimate that Government spending moratoria and efficiency initiatives, including cuts to back-office and avoidable costs, contributed around half of the figure, some £3.75 billion. However, the report warns that departments are less well-placed to make the long-term changes needed to achieve the further 19 per cent over the four years to 2014-15, as required by the spending review. This is partly because of gaps in their understanding of costs and risks, making it more difficult to identify how to deliver activities and services at a permanently lower cost. Fundamental changes will be needed to achieve sustainable reductions on the scale required. It is unclear how far spending reductions represent year-on-year changes in efficiency, or whether front-line services are affected; and the departments' forward plans examined by the NAO are not based on a strategic view. Departments' financial data on basic spending patterns is sufficient to manage budgets in-year, but information about the consequences of changes in spending is less good. Longer term reform is a Cabinet Office priority and departments will need to look beyond short-term cost cutting measures and make major operational change. Cost reduction plans also need to build in contingency measures to cover unexpected risks.
The total costs of central government staff grew by 10 per cent in real terms in the ten years to 2009-10, with current costs totalling £16.4 billion. Over the same period, staff numbers fell by 1 per cent, from 497,000 full time equivalents to 493,000. The growth in staff costs is largely the result of an unplanned increase in the number of staff in higher grades. Between March 2001 and March 2010, the number of administrative grade staff declined. But all higher grades grew in number, with Civil Service management grades 6 and 7 showing a 67 per cent increase (around 14,000 posts). This change in grade mix accounts directly for approximately 50 per cent of the staffing cost increase. Some 35 per cent of the real terms increase in staff costs is due to increases in salaries and performance-related pay. A range of immediate central actions in response to spending pressures has been announced, including freezes on pay and recruitment. But the longer term reductions in staff costs required by the 2010 Spending Review will be the responsibility of departments and agencies, and many do not have a comprehensive understanding of their own staff costs or skills in order to support this cost reduction activity adequately. The scale of staff cost reductions is unlikely to be achieved by natural turnover alone. Despite proposed changes to the Civil Service Compensation Scheme, the up-front costs of voluntary or compulsory redundancy schemes and early retirements will be significant.
Discusses the nature, extent and appropriateness of government intervention in the bankruptcy of listed companies in China.
Accountability is regarded as a central feature of modern constitutionalism. At a general level, this prominence is perhaps unsurprising, given the long history of the idea. However, in many constitutional democracies, including the UK and the USA, it has acquired a particular resonance in contemporary circumstances with the declining power of social deference, the expanding reach of populist accountability mechanisms, and the increasing willingness of citizens to find mechanisms for challenging official decision-making. These essays, by public law scholars, seek to explore how ideas of and mechanisms associated with accountability play a part in the contemporary constitution. While the majority of contributors concentrate on the United Kingdom, others provide comparative discussion with particular reference to the United States and aspects of European Union law. The main focus of the volume is the contemporary UK constitution. Chapters are included which analyse the historical context (including the role of Dicey), common law constitutionalism, the constitutional role of Parliament, the constitutional role of the courts, judicial accountability, human rights protection under the constitution and the contribution of non-judicial accountability mechanisms. Further chapters explore the public service principle, the impact of new public management on public service delivery, and the relationship between accountability and regulation. Finally accountability is discussed in the light of constitutional reform including the challenges posed by the 'multi-layered' government at the supra national level of EU membership and sub-national national levels of devolution and local government.
The future of educational systems is a topic which impacts a great many people Fits in well with Headship qualifications and advanced professional development courses Addresses the issues in a global context Prestigious research report illustrates hot issues Well-respected authors
Reorganising Power in Indonesia is a new and distinctive analysis of the dramatic fall of Soeharto, the last of the great Cold War capitalist dictators, and of the struggles that reshape power and wealth in Indonesia. The dramatic events of the past two decades are understood essentially in terms of the rise of a complex politico-business oligarchy and the ongoing reorganisation of its power through successive crises, colonising and expropriating new political and market institutions. With the collapse of authoritarian rule, the authors propose that the way was left open for this oligarchy to reconstitute its power within society and the institutions of newly democratic Indonesia.