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. . . it is thanks to works like this one that we can make progress in the understanding of the phenomenon of independent regulatory authorities in Europe and elsewhere. Competition and Regulation in Network Industries When scholars and practitioners want to understand regulation in Europe, this book should be the first place they will turn. Combining innovative data, smart statistical analysis, and an in-depth knowledge of regulatory agencies and processes across a wide range of countries, Gilardi has produced an essential study of regulation and a stellar piece of scholarship. Charles Shipan, University of Michigan, US This is a crucial, important book for the study of independent regulatory agencies, an increasingly prevalent institution at the heart of the governance of markets. Gilardi offers an excellent quantitative analysis of the spread of such agencies. He presents a remarkable dataset and rigourously tests different explanations. His coverage is wide and his methods are first class. His conclusions will interest all scholars who work on the regulatory state. Mark Thatcher, London School of Economics, UK Regulatory agencies are an important aspect of the contemporary regulatory state. Drawing on an extensive body of comparative analysis, Fabrizio Gilardi s book provides a serious contribution that moves the literature forward. This book deserves to be considered carefully. Martin Lodge, London School of Economics, UK Fabrizio Gilardi s book is empirical political science of the regulatory state at its best. It has data of transnational breadth and depth that is diagnosed in a theoretically sophisticated way. The conclusion is that policymakers delegate in order to tighten the credibility of policy commitments and to tie the hands of future ministers who may have different preferences. This will become a building block for future scholarship on regulation and governance. John Braithwaite, Australian National University During the past 25 years, independent regulatory agencies have become widespread institutions for regulatory governance. This book studies how they have diffused across Europe and compares their formal independence in 17 countries and seven sectors. Through a series of quantitative analyses, it finds that governments tend to be more prone to delegate powers to independent regulators when they need to increase the credibility of their regulatory commitments and when they attempt to tie the hands of their successors. The institutional context also matters: political institutions that make policy change more difficult are functional equivalents of delegation. In addition to these factors, emulation has driven the diffusion of independent regulators, which have become socially valued institutions that help policymakers legitimize their actions, and may even have become taken for granted as the appropriate way to organize regulatory policies. Providing a broad comparison of independent regulatory agencies in Europe, Delegation in the Regulatory State will be of great interest to researchers and students in political science, public policy, and public administration.
This book argues that Congress's process for making law is as corrosive to the nation as unchecked deficit spending. David Schoenbrod shows that Congress and the president, instead of making the laws that govern us, generally give bureaucrats the power to make laws through agency regulations. Our elected "lawmakers" then take credit for proclaiming popular but inconsistent statutory goals and later blame the inevitable burdens and disappointments on the unelected bureaucrats. The 1970 Clean Air Act, for example, gave the Environmental Protection Agency the impossible task of making law that would satisfy both industry and environmentalists. Delegation allows Congress and the president to wield power by pressuring agency lawmakers in private, but shed responsibility by avoiding the need to personally support or oppose the laws, as they must in enacting laws themselves. Schoenbrod draws on his experience as an attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council and on studies of how delegation actually works to show that this practice produces a regulatory system so cumbersome that it cannot provide the protection that people need, so large that it needlessly stifles the economy, and so complex that it keeps the voters from knowing whom to hold accountable for the consequences. Contending that delegation is unnecessary and unconstitutional, Schoenbrod has written the first book that shows how, as a practical matter, delegation can be stopped.
Changing Rules of Delegation shows how institutional rules are constantly re-negotiated and may lead to a power-shift between the concerned actors. It particularly shows how the European Parliament has been able to shift the power balance in its own favour.
A less-expensive grayscale paperback version is available. Search for ISBN 9781680923018. Business Law I Essentials is a brief introductory textbook designed to meet the scope and sequence requirements of courses on Business Law or the Legal Environment of Business. The concepts are presented in a streamlined manner, and cover the key concepts necessary to establish a strong foundation in the subject. The textbook follows a traditional approach to the study of business law. Each chapter contains learning objectives, explanatory narrative and concepts, references for further reading, and end-of-chapter questions. Business Law I Essentials may need to be supplemented with additional content, cases, or related materials, and is offered as a foundational resource that focuses on the baseline concepts, issues, and approaches.
This reference book is primarily a procedural work which examines the many forms, customs, and practices which have been developed and established for the House of Commons since Confederation in 1867. It provides a distinctive Canadian perspective in describing procedure in the House up to the end of the first session of the 36th Parliament in Sept. 1999. The material is presented with full commentary on the historical circumstances which have shaped the current approach to parliamentary business. Key Speaker's rulings and statements are also documented and the considerable body of practice, interpretation, and precedents unique to the Canadian House of Commons is amply illustrated. Chapters of the book cover the following: parliamentary institutions; parliaments and ministries; privileges and immunities; the House and its Members; parliamentary procedure; the physical & administrative setting; the Speaker & other presiding officers; the parliamentary cycle; sittings of the House; the daily program; oral & written questions; the process of debate; rules of order & decorum; the curtailment of debate; special debates; the legislative process; delegated legislation; financial procedures; committees of the whole House; committees; private Members' business; public petitions; private bills practice; and the parliamentary record. Includes index.
This book addresses the regulatory capacity of the EU as it responds to the huge challenge of realizing the single market. It explores its weaknesses, the EU regulatory networks, expert committees and EU agencies formed in response, and the exceptionally large and complex transnational regulatory system which has resulted. It defines the EU regulatory space as a multi-faceted phenomenon of institutional expansion whose shape varies across sectors and changes over time. Empirically based on the exploration of how regulatory delegation has emerged and evolved in three key EU policies (food safety, electricity, and telecommunications), the book disentangles and links together the functional, institutional and power-distributional factors and their interplay over time into a unified explanation of the many faces of the EU regulatory space.
Do you know what work you can, or should, delegate? What tasks can you assign to patient care assistants (PCA), or to unlicensed assistive personnel (UAP)? Can licensed practical nurses (LPNs) and licensed vocational nurses (LVNs) delegate responsibilities? Since the final professional decision to proceed with delegation to UAPs ultimately rests with the RN, you need to be vigilant and understand the proper delegation process. Delegation and You, the latest YOU! series publication, provides an explanation of principles and relevant strategies for practice in situations in which RNs delegate tasks to UAPs. Written by two experienced nurses who served as educators, mentors and preceptors in many practice settings, this is a handy guide to the essentials of delegation and related decision-making. It includes the following: - The six criteria that every nurse must consider before delegating - An easy-to-follow illustrated example of "A Decision Tree for - Delegation" just for nurses - The 11 essential principles of delegation - A criteria-based process model of critical thinking skills to assist with delegation decisions - The key barriers to delegation and how to overcome them Delegation and You is for all clinical nurses, nurse managers and other RNs who lead care teams and delegate activities or tasks.
The existing literature emphasizes and contrasts the role of political checks and balances and legal origin in determining the pace of financial sector development. This paper expands substantially on one aspect of this debate: the fact that government actions that promote financial sector development, whether prudent financial regulation or secure property and contract rights, are public goods and sensitive to political incentives to provide public goods. Tests of hypotheses emanating from this argument yield four new conclusions. First, two key determinants of those incentives-the credibility of pre-electoral political promises and citizen information about politician decisions-systematically promote financial sector development. Second, these political factors, along with political checks and balances, operate in part through their influence on the security of property rights, an argument asserted but not previously tested. Third, contrary to findings elsewhere in the literature, the political determinants of financial sector development are significant even in the presence of controls for legal origin. Finally, and again in contrast to the literature, the evidence here suggests that legal origin primarily proxies for political phenomena. Legal origin is a largely insignificant determinant of financial sector development when those phenomena are fully taken into account.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
Tucker presents guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good.