Download Free Regulation And Market Liquidity Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Regulation And Market Liquidity and write the review.

"The process by which securities are traded is very different from the idealized picture of a frictionless and self-equilibrating market offered by the typical finance textbook. This book offers a more accurate and authoritative take on this process. The book starts from the assumption that not everyone is present at all times simultaneously on the market, and that participants have quite diverse information about the security's fundamentals. As a result, the order flow is a complex mix of information and noise, and a consensus price only emerges gradually over time as the trading process evolves and the participants interpret the actions of other traders. Thus, a security's actual transaction price may deviate from its fundamental value, as it would be assessed by a fully informed set of investors. The book takes these deviations seriously, and explains why and how they emerge in the trading process and are eventually eliminated. The authors draw on a vast body of theoretical insights and empirical findings on security price formation that have come to form a well-defined field within financial economics known as "market microstructure." Focusing on liquidity and price discovery, the book analyzes the tension between the two, pointing out that when price-relevant information reaches the market through trading pressure rather than through a public announcement, liquidity may suffer. It also confronts many striking phenomena in securities markets and uses the analytical tools and empirical methods of market microstructure to understand them. These include issues such as why liquidity changes over time and differs across securities, why large trades move prices up or down, and why these price changes are subsequently reversed, and why we observe temporary deviations from asset fair values"--
Post-crisis capital regulations and new failure-resolution rules increased the funding costs that are borne by bank shareholders, and thus the cost to buy-side firms for access to space on the balance sheets of large banks. A policy implication is the encouragement of market infrastructure and trading methods that reduce the amount of space on bank balance sheets that is needed to conduct a given amount of trade. Using models and evidence, this book addresses the implications for financial-market liquidity of these regulations for systemically important banks and argues that current rules do not allow for potential levels of market efficiency and financial stability. In this insightful analysis of the impact of regulation on financial market efficiency post-2008, the author argues that bank capital levels could actually be pushed higher while still improving the liquidity of markets for safe assets such as low-risk fixed-income instruments by relaxing the leverage-ratio rule and increasing risk-based capital requirements.
The aftermath of the 2008-09 U.S. financial crisis has been characterized by regulatory intervention of unprecedented scale. Although the necessity of a realignment of incentives and constraints of financial markets participants became a shared posterior after the near collapse of the U.S. financial system, considerable doubts have been subsequently raised on the welfare consequences of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and its various subcomponents, such as the Volcker Rule. The possibility of permanently inhibiting the market making capacity of large banks, with dire consequences in terms of under-provision of market liquidity, has been repeatedly raised. This paper presents systematic evidence from four different estimation strategies of the absence of breakpoints in market liquidity for fixed-income asset classes and across multiple liquidity measures, with special attention given to the corporate bond market. The analysis is performed without imposing restrictions on the exact dating of breaks (i.e. allowing for anticipatory response or lagging reactions to regulation) and focusing both on levels and dynamic latent factors. We report both single breakpoint and multiple breakpoint tests and analyze the liquidity of corporate bonds matched to their main underwriters making markets on those assets. Post-crisis U.S. regulatory intervention does not appear to have produced structural deteriorations in market liquidity.
Andria van der Merwe provides a thorough guide to the critical tools needed to navigate liquidity markets and value security pricing in the presence of market frictions and information asymmetries. This is essential reading for anyone with a current or future interest in liquidity models, market structures, and trading mechanisms.
Bachelor Thesis from the year 2020 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: 1,0, University of Mannheim, language: English, abstract: This paper aims to answer the question of whether post-crisis regulatory interventions caused a decline in liquidity. To serve this purpose, it investigates how individual provisions affect the market making business and how the corporate bond market changed in response to regulations. The paper approaches the issue by structuring theoretical and empirical evidence of corporate bond liquidity. It develops regulations impact levels from particular to aggregate, facilitating a perspicacious analysis. Important to note, the study attempts to assess neither welfare effects nor the desirability of regulations. After the financial crisis, regulators intervened to enhance the resilience of the banking system. Their provisions range from capital and liquidity standards to the prohibition of single activities considered too risky. However, concerns arise that post-crisis regulations harm liquidity by imposing constraints on its providers. When liquidity is low, investors that want to trade large volumes must wait for counterparties or accept to trade below market prices. Therefore, in certain financial markets like that for corporate bonds, intermediaries emerged to facilitate market functioning. They enable investors to trade immediately, reconciling imbalances in supply and demand. Illiquidity is costly for the economy as investors require compensation for holding riskier bonds. Amihud and Mendelson provide cross-sectional and time-series evidence of the resulting illiquidity discount. Hence, if regulations reduced liquidity, they would cause a depreciation of prices. Also, lower liquidity implies higher cost of debt and transaction costs, as well as a less efficient resource allocation. The regulatory impact on liquidity is, therefore, highly important for policymakers and investors.
This open access book addresses four standard business school subjects: microeconomics, macroeconomics, finance and information systems as they relate to trading, liquidity, and market structure. It provides a detailed examination of the impact of trading costs and other impediments of trading that the authors call rictions It also presents an interactive simulation model of equity market trading, TraderEx, that enables students to implement trading decisions in different market scenarios and structures. Addressing these topics shines a bright light on how a real-world financial market operates, and the simulation provides students with an experiential learning opportunity that is informative and fun. Each of the chapters is designed so that it can be used as a stand-alone module in an existing economics, finance, or information science course. Instructor resources such as discussion questions, Powerpoint slides and TraderEx exercises are available online.
A collection of essays from an impressive group of scholars, this volume disseminates the type of regulation that can be devised and implemented to respond to systemic risk as well as how systemic risk can be regulated in both a domestic and international market.
"In the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 2008, offers a systematic overview of recent developments in regulatory frameworks in advanced and emerging-market countries, outlining challenges to improving regulation, markets, and access in developing economies"--Provided by publisher.
Since the 2007 2008 global financial crisis, there has been much debate about the role of financial regulation and the causes of financial instability in the industry. Where studies commonly question the value of a regulated rather than free market , this book focuses on the differentiation of 'good regulation' and 'bad regulation'. This book highlights the need for financial regulation to combat corruption, and the integral link that exists between corruption and financial instability. The author evaluates the benefits and shortcomings of specific types of regulation, drawing on recent examples to illustrate each argument. The book presents compelling arguments for the regulation of leverage, liquidity, payday loans and securitisation; and debates the negative aspects of the regulation of short selling, and high-frequency trading, and of Basel-style banking regulation. The author argues that there is no free-market solution to financial instability, and rejects the idea of 'too big to fail'.
Master's Thesis from the year 2011 in the subject Business economics - Banking, Stock Exchanges, Insurance, Accounting, University of Applied Sciences Essen, course: General economics, language: English, abstract: The global financial crisis which began in mid-2007 revealed the significant risks posed by large, complex and interconnected institutions and the fault-lines in the regulatory and oversight systems. The drying up of market liquidity caused lacks of funding for financial institutions and their reactions to the market stress increased the market tensions which highlighted the strong link between banks funding liquidity and market liquidity. Over the past two decades preceding the crisis, banks in advanced countries significantly expanded in size and increased their outreach globally. In many cases, they moved away from the traditional banking model towards globally active large and complex financial institutions. The majority of cross-border finance was intermediated by some of these institutions with growing interconnections within and across borders. The result were trends in the banking industry which include a sharp rise in leverage, significant reliance on short-term funding, significant off-balance sheet activities, maturity mismatches and increased share of revenues from complex products and trading activities. This development has moved on to a systematic risk and it has been identified a need in the financial sector to measure those aspects, to assess the resilience of the financial sector to liquidity shocks and give guidance to the policy of central banks and regulators. At the same time, the financial industry has started a fast process of consolidation worldwide. Regulators, organized in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) have responded to the financial crisis by proposing new regulation which is known as “Basel III”. The reform program leads to fundamental changes and implements capital and liquidity reforms. The liquidity reform represents the first attempt by international regulators to introduce harmonized liquidity minimum standards for financial institutions. Extensive efforts through the Basel Committee, with the “Basel III” program, are being considered internationally and domestically to revise these deficiencies and failures, in order to safeguard the stability of the financial system. The key objective is to promote a less leveraged, less risky, and thus a more resilient financial system that supports strong and sustainable economic growth. The bulk of the proposals have focused on revising existing regulations applicable to financial institutions and to influence the extent and consequences of their risk taking.