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The Evolution of the Trade Regime offers a comprehensive political-economic history of the development of the world's multilateral trade institutions, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO). While other books confine themselves to describing contemporary GATT/WTO legal rules or analyzing their economic logic, this is the first to explain the logic and development behind these rules. The book begins by examining the institutions' rules, principles, practices, and norms from their genesis in the early postwar period to the present. It evaluates the extent to which changes in these institutional attributes have helped maintain or rebuild domestic constituencies for open markets. The book considers these questions by looking at the political, legal, and economic foundations of the trade regime from many angles. The authors conclude that throughout most of GATT/WTO history, power politics fundamentally shaped the creation and evolution of the GATT/WTO system. Yet in recent years, many aspects of the trade regime have failed to keep pace with shifts in underlying material interests and ideas, and the challenges presented by expanding membership and preferential trade agreements.
Drawing together leading scholars, the book provides a revealing new map of the US political economy in cross-national perspective.
The quest for freedom from hunger and repression has triggered in recent years a dramatic, worldwide reform of political and economic systems. Never have so many people enjoyed, or at least experimented with democratic institutions. However, many strategies for economic development in Eastern Europe and Latin America have failed with the result that entire economic systems on both continents are being transformed. This major book analyzes recent transitions to democracy and market-oriented economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Drawing in a quite distinctive way on models derived from political philosophy, economics, and game theory, Professor Przeworski also considers specific data on individual countries. Among the questions raised by the book are: What should we expect from these experiments in democracy and market economy? What new economic systems will emerge? Will these transitions result in new democracies or old dictatorships?
Focusing on the role of finance in the international political economy from an international relations and political science perspective, this work analyzes the economic and political reasons why financial markets have so rapidly become transnational.
This study analyzes the mutual relationships between politics and the economy. Focusing on the experiences of Southern and Eastern Europe, it examines the complex interdependence between democracies, economic growth, social redistribution, and political culture.
When markets work, finding the right economic policy is easy. Government must merely ensure their smooth functioning. But, as Steven M. Sheffrin shows, trouble starts when markets fail to work. Economic failure is too often compounded by political failure in the guise of clumsy partisan regulations. Applying his analysis to seven critical problems - health care, Social Security and Medicare, the environment, the liability crisis, international trade, monetary and international financial policy, and the deficit - Sheffrin pinpoints the market failures at the root of these problems and the heavy-handed regulatory regimes that have exacerbated them, and shows how innovative solutions, sensitive to both market and political failures, can solve them.
In this volume, fourteen distinguished specialists in international political economy thoroughly explore the concept of international regimes--the implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules, and procedures that guide international behavior. In the first section, the authors develop several theoretical views of regimes. In the following section, the theories are applied to specific issues in international relations, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and on the still-enduring postwar regimes for money and security.
Building upon a wide range of literatures this book argues that international regulatory institutions become stronger when oligopolistic institutional arrangements decay and competitive pressures intensify. This is shown to be the case for global finance by careful studies of two inter-state institutions, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and of the international banking and securities industries which they seek to regulate.
The means by which people protest—that is, their repertoires of contention—vary radically from one political regime to the next. Highly capable undemocratic regimes such as China's show no visible signs of popular social movements, yet produce many citizen protests against arbitrary, predatory government. Less effective and undemocratic governments like the Sudan’s, meanwhile, often experience regional insurgencies and even civil wars. In Regimes and Repertoires, Charles Tilly offers a fascinating and wide-ranging case-by-case study of various types of government and the equally various styles of protests they foster. Using examples drawn from many areas—G8 summit and anti-globalization protests, Hindu activism in 1980s India, nineteenth-century English Chartists organizing on behalf of workers' rights, the revolutions of 1848, and civil wars in Angola, Chechnya, and Kosovo—Tilly masterfully shows that such episodes of contentious politics unfold like loosely scripted theater. Along the way, Tilly also brings forth powerful tools to sort out the reasons why certain political regimes vary and change, how the people living under them make claims on their government, and what connections can be drawn between regime change and the character of contentious politics.
October 1995 Authoritarian systems that repress labor are more likely than democratic systems to adopt inefficient labor policies inimical to development. The more open the trade regime, the fewer distortions in the labor market. What, if any, is the link between labor market policies that benefit insiders -- for example, regulations guaranteeing high minimum wages and strict job security -- and political regimes. Is it true that in a democracy outsiders vote and impose limits on what insiders can achieve, whereas in a dictatorship the government need worry only about insiders who have real power? Or are democratic governments more likely to succumb to trade union pressure and use labor policies to give them special privileges? To test these competing hypotheses, Banerji and Ghanem designed a two-sector political economy model that demonstrates that labor market distortions depend directly on the trade regime: The more open the trade regime, the fewer distortions in the labor market. They use cross-country regressions to test the relationship between political and civil liberties and trade and labor policies. Using data for 90 developing countries, they apply existing indices of openness and political freedom and two different constructed measures of labor market distortion. Their conclusion, based on the regression results: Authoritarian systems that repress labor are more likely than democratic systems to adopt inefficient labor policies inimical to development. This paper -- a product of the Office of the Vice President, Development Economics -- was prepared as a background paper for World Development Report 1995 on labor.