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HLA Hart's The Concept of Law is one of the most influential works of philosophy of the twentieth century, redefining the field of legal philosophy and introducing generations of students to philosophical reflection on the nature of law. Since its publication in 1961 an industry of academic research and debate has grown up around the book, disputing, refining, and developing Hart's work. Under the sheer volume of competing interpretations of the book the original contexts - cultural and intellectual - that shaped Hart's project can be obscured. In this book, renowned legal historian AWB Simpson attempts to sweep aside the volumes of academic criticism and return to 'Troy I', revealing the world of post-war Oxford that produced Hart and his famous book. Drawing on his personal experience of studying and teaching in Oxford at the time Hart developed The Concept of Law, Simpson recreates with characteristic wit the social and intellectual culture of Oxford philosophy and the law faculty in the 1950s. He traces Hart's early work and influences, within and outside Oxford, showing how Hart developed his picture of philosophy and its potential for enriching the understanding of law. He also lays bare the painful shortcomings of post-war Oxford academia, depicting a world of eccentric dons and intellectual Cyclopses - isolated and closed to broad, interdisciplinary exchange - arguing that Hart did not escape from the limitations of his intellectual world. Simpson's entertaining, and controversial, account of the world that produced The Concept of Law will be essential reading for all those engaged in interpreting and teaching the seminal book, and an engaging read for anyone interested in the history of Oxford philosophy and legal education.
HLA Hart developed 'The Concept of Law' while renowned historian AWB Simpson was studying and teaching at Oxford. Simpson wittily recreates the culture of Oxford philosophy in the '50s, providing a new perspective of one of the most famous works of philosophy of the 20th century and casting a satirical eye over the shortcomings of post-war Oxford.
This collection, written by legal scholars from around the world, offers insights into a variety of topics from children’s rights to criminal law, jurisprudence, medical ethics and more. Its breadth reflects the fact that these are all elements of what can broadly be called ‘law and society’, that enterprise that is interested in law’s place or influence in diffferent aspects of real lives and understands law to be simultaneously symbol, philosophy and action. It is also testament to the broad range of vision of Professor Michael Freeman, in whose honour the volume was conceived. The contributions are divided into categories which reflect his distinguished career and publications, over 85 books and countless articles, including pioneering work on children’s rights, domestic violence, religious law, jurisprudence, law and culture, family law and medicine, ethics and the law, as well as his enduring commitment to interdisciplinarity. The volume begins with work on law in its philosophical, cultural or symbolic realm (Part I: Law and Stories: Culture, Religion and Philosophy), including its commitment to the normative ideal of ‘rights’ (Part II: Law and Rights), and then offfers work on law as coercive state action (Part III: Law and the Coercive State) and as regulator of personal relationships (Part IV: Law and Personal Living). It continues with reflections on the importance of globalisation, both of law and of ‘doing family’ in personal and public life (Part V: Law and International Living) before closing with two reflections on Michael Freeman’s body of work generally, including one from Michael himself (Part VI: Law and Michael Freeman).
This 1949 work investigates the arguments and theories of writers on jurisprudence so far as they make contact with positive law.
Written during a period when cultural diversity and pluralism were beginning to have an impact on ethics and politics, these essays provide a defense of natural law and natural right that continues to be timely."--BOOK JACKET.
In Reflections on Judging, Richard Posner distills the experience of his thirty-one years as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Surveying how the judiciary has changed since his 1981 appointment, he engages the issues at stake today, suggesting how lawyers should argue cases and judges decide them, how trials can be improved, and, most urgently, how to cope with the dizzying pace of technological advance that makes litigation ever more challenging to judges and lawyers. For Posner, legal formalism presents one of the main obstacles to tackling these problems. Formalist judges--most notably Justice Antonin Scalia--needlessly complicate the legal process by advocating "canons of constructions" (principles for interpreting statutes and the Constitution) that are confusing and self-contradictory. Posner calls instead for a renewed commitment to legal realism, whereby a good judge gathers facts, carefully considers context, and comes to a sensible conclusion that avoids inflicting collateral damage on other areas of the law. This, Posner believes, was the approach of the jurists he most admires and seeks to emulate: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, Learned Hand, Robert Jackson, and Henry Friendly, and it is an approach that can best resolve our twenty-first-century legal disputes.
In a concise, compelling argument, one of the founders and most influential advocates of the law and economics movement divides the subject into two separate areas, which he identifies with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. The first, Benthamite, strain, “economic analysis of law,” examines the legal system in the light of economic theory and shows how economics might render law more effective. The second strain, law and economics, gives equal status to law, and explores how the more realistic, less theoretical discipline of law can lead to improvements in economic theory. It is the latter approach that Judge Calabresi advocates, in a series of eloquent, thoughtful essays that will appeal to students and scholars alike.
Constitutional scholar George Anastaplo believes that many judges and lawyers draw upon a skimpy, if not simply unreliable, knowledge of history. He proposes that in order to write reliable opinions, these men and women must have a deeper understanding of the enduring principles upon which the law naturally tends to draw. In the study of constitutional law, Anastaplo argues that it is more important to weigh what the Supreme Court has said and how that is said—what considerations it weighed and how—than it is to know what it is recorded that the Court “decided.” In Reflections on Constitutional Law, Anastaplo makes the case for a renewed focus on a now often-overlooked aspect of the study of law. He emphasizes the continuing significance and importance of the Constitution by thoroughly examining the most important influences on the American constitutional system, including the Magna Carta and the Declaration of Independence.
Are legislatures able to form and act on intentions? The question matters because the interpretation of statutes is often thought to centre on the intention of the legislature and because the way in which the legislature acts is relevant to the authority it does or should enjoy. Many scholars argue that legislative intent is a fiction: the legislative assembly is a large, diverse group rather than a single person and it seems a mystery how the intentions of the individual legislators might somehow add up to a coherent group intention. This book argues that in enacting a statute the well-formed legislature forms and acts on a detailed intention, which is the legislative intent. The foundation of the argument is an analysis of how the members of purposive groups act together by way of common plans, sometimes forming complex group agents. The book extends this analysis to the legislature, considering what it is to legislate and how members of the assembly cooperate to legislate. The book argues that to legislate is to choose to change the law for some reason: the well-formed legislature has the capacity to consider what should be done and to act to that end. This argument is supported by reflection on the centrality of intention to the nature of language use. The book then explains in detail how members of the assembly form and act on joint intentions, which do not reduce to the intentions of each member, before outlining some implications of this account for the practice of statutory interpretation. Developing a robust account of the nature and importance of legislative intention, the book represents a significant contribution to the literature on deliberative democracy that will be of interest to all those thinking about legal interpretation and constitutional theory.
We are said to face a crisis of over-criminalization: our criminal law has become chaotic, unprincipled, and over-expansive. This book proposes a normative theory of criminal law, and of criminalization, that shows how criminal law could be ordered, principled, and restrained. The theory is based on an account of criminal law as a distinctive legal practice that functions to declare and define a set of public wrongs, and to call to formal public account those who commit such wrongs; an account of the role that such practice can play in a democratic republic of free and equal citizens; and an account of the central features of such a political community, and of the way in which it constitutes its public realm-its civil order. Criminal law plays an important, but limited, role in such a political community in protecting, but also partly constituting, its civil order. On the basis of this account, we can see how such a political community will decide what kinds of conduct should be criminalized - not by applying one or more of the substantive master principles that theorists have offered, but by considering which kinds of conduct fall within its public realm (as distinct from the private realms that are not the polity's business), and which kinds of wrong within that realm require this distinctive kind of response (rather than one of the other kinds of available response). The outcome of such a deliberative process will probably be a more limited, and a more rational and principled, criminal law.