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FRONTOVIK was the name that the veterans who served in the Soviet Armed Forces across the Great Patiotic War, between 1941 and 1945, were knowed. The purpose of this FRONTOVIK is to reflect the structure and deployment of the Red Army throughout the year 1942. This work is part of a global montly study from June 1941 to September 1945. The main sources for this study were the documents published by the Department of Military History of the Ministry of Defence of the Soviet Union in 1966, containing data from January 1 to December 1, 1942, and the works of Colonel David M. Glantz, along with numerous secondary sources. All the images, illustrations, tactical symbols and maps were made by the author as a personal tribute to the veterans that served in those units.
FRONTOVIK was the name that the veterans who served in the Soviet Armed Forces across the Great Patiotic War, between 1941 and 1945, were knowed. The purpose of this FRONTOVIK is to reflect the structure and deployment of the Red Army throughout the year 1942. This work is part of a global montly study from June 1941 to September 1945. The main sources for this study were the documents published by the Department of Military History of the Ministry of Defence of the Soviet Union in 1966, containing data from January 1 to December 1, 1942, and the works of Colonel David M. Glantz, along with numerous secondary sources. All the images, illustrations, tactical symbols and maps were made by the author as a personal tribute to the veterans that served in those units.
A groundbreaking and comprehensive order of battle for German ground troops in WWII, from the invasion of Poland to the final defeat in Berlin. An indispensable reference work for Second World War scholars and enthusiasts, German Ground Forces of World War II captures the continuously changing character of Nazi ground forces throughout the conflict. For the first time, readers can follow the career of every German division, corps, army, and army group as the German armed forces shifted units to and from theaters of war. Organized by sections including Theater Commands, Army Groups, Armies, and Corps Commands, it presents a detailed analysis of each corresponding order of battle for every German field formation above division. This innovative resource also describes the orders of battle of the myriad German and Axis satellite formations assigned to security commands throughout occupied Europe and the combat zones, as well as those attached to fortress commands and to the commanders of German occupation forces across Europe. An accompanying narrative describes the career of each field formation and includes the background and experience of many of their most famous commanding officers.
In his classic work, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.” A generation of nineteenth century officers, nurtured on the study of the experiences of Napoleon and conditioned by the wars of German unification, had little reason to accept that view. The offensive spirit swept through European armies and manifested itself in the regulations, plans, and mentality of those armiehe events of 1939, 1940, and 1941 in Poland, France, and Russia respectively again challenged Clausewitz’ claim of the superiority of the defense and prompted armies worldwide to frantically field large armored forces and develop doctrines for their use. While blitzkrieg concepts ruled supreme, it fell to that nation victimized most by those concepts to develop techniques to counter the German juggernaut. The Soviets had to temper a generation of offensive tradition in order to marshal forces and develop techniques to counter blitzkrieg. In essence, the Soviet struggle for survival against blitzkrieg proved also to be a partial test of Clausewitz’ dictum. In July 1943, after arduous months of developing defensive techniques, often at a high cost in terms of men and material, the Soviets met blitzkrieg head-on and proved that defense against it was feasible. The titanic, grinding Kursk operation validated, in part, Clausewitz’ views. But it also demonstrated that careful study of force organization and employment and application of the fruits of that study can produce either offensive or defensive victory. While on the surface the events of Kursk seemed to validate Clausewitz’ view, it is often forgotten that, at Kursk, the Soviets integrated the concept of counteroffensive into their grand defensive designs. Thus the defense itself was meaningless unless viewed against the backdrop of the renewed offensive efforts and vice versa. What Kursk did prove was that strategic, operational, and tactical defenses could counter blitzkrieg.
Discusses the Allied invasion of Normandy, with extensive details about the planning stage, called Operation Overlord, as well as the fighting on Utah and Omaha Beaches.
Contents: The Prewar Experience; Evolution of Airborne Forces During World War II; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, January-February 1942; Operational Employment: Vyaz'ma, February-June 1942; Operational Employment: On the Dnepr, September 1943; Tactical Employment; The Postwar Years.