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This paper uses some of the discrepancies surrounding the shootdown of the Iranian Flight 655, by the Vincennes Aegis cruiser, to illustrate the challenges and difficulties of event reconstruction. Citing the multiple interpretations of this incident in various reports, hearings, and studies, the paper recommends changes to the event reconstruction process to increase our probability of finding the ultimate causes of such disasters.
"Part of The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations Series, Maintaining the High Ground combines discussions and historical case studies from the past seventy-five years to address ethical challenges for the Army Profession. With today's all-volunteer Army, maintaining public trust is critical, and large-scale combat operations require a professional class of leaders and soldiers with strong ethics and the ability to adapt and even shape their own future"--
ADP 3-0, Operations, constitutes the Army's view of how to conduct prompt and sustained operations across multiple domains, and it sets the foundation for developing other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications. It articulates the Army's operational doctrine for unified land operations. ADP 3-0 accounts for the uncertainty of operations and recognizes that a military operation is a human undertaking. Additionally, this publication is the foundation for training and Army education system curricula related to unified land operations. The principal audience for ADP 3-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will use this publication as well.
This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war
Since 2004, the US Army has started a revolution of reorganization and doctrine development throughout its Combat, Combat Support and especially Combat Service Support "logistics" organizations, known as "Transformation." In the logistics or "Sustainment" arena, the Army's concept towards supporting other units has changed from the old "out-stockpile" the enemy concept towards a system used by modern civilian distributors - "Just-In-Time" sustainment, leaving planning and synchronizing throughput of commodities and support to the customer with little margin of error. To successfully accomplish this, Sustainment planners must thoroughly understand the Military Decision Making Process or "MDMP" for short. Conducting a Sustainment oriented MDMP is essential in integrating the Sustainment War Fighting Functional Area into the unit's plan and for ensuring a synchronized and supportable course of action. Successful integration is a result of having the right personnel, available tools, correct MDMP methodology, and synchronized timeline throughout the process. If this guide can assist logistics' planners in accomplishing this process, then it has accomplished its intent and mission.
For the past decade, the U.S. Marine Corps and its sister services have been engaged in what has been termed "hybrid warfare," which ranges from active combat to civilian support. Hybrid warfare typically occurs in environments where all modes of war are employed, such as conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, disruptive technologies, and criminality to destabilize an existing order. In August 2010, the National Research Council established the Committee on Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders to produce Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders. This report examines the operational environment, existing abilities, and gap to include data, technology, skill sets, training, and measures of effectiveness for small unit leaders in conducting enhanced company operations (ECOs) in hybrid engagement, complex environments. Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders also determines how to understand the decision making calculus and indicators of adversaries. Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders recommends operational and technical approaches for improving the decision making abilities of small unit leaders, including any acquisition and experimentation efforts that can be undertaken by the Marine Corps and/or by other stakeholders aimed specifically at improving the decision making of small unit leaders. This report recommends ways to ease the burden on small unit leaders and to better prepare the small unit leader for success. Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders also indentifies a responsible organization to ensure that training and education programs are properly developed, staffed, operated, evaluated, and expanded.
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.