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In this timely and thorough volume, Michael Semple analyzes the rationale and effectiveness post-2001 attempts at reconciliation in Afghanistan. He explains the poor performance of these attempts and argues that rethinking is necessary if reconciliation is to help revive prospects for peace and stability in Afghanistan.
Heela Najibullah analyzes the Afghan reconciliation processes through the lenses of transrational peace philosophy and Elicitive Conflict Transformation. The research highlights two Afghan governments reconciliation processes in 1986 and 2010 and underlines the political events that shaped the 1986 National Reconciliation Policy, drawing lessons for future processes. The author points out the historical and geopolitical patterns indicating regional and global stakeholders involvement in Afghan politics. Social healing through a middle-out approach is the missing and yet crucial component to achieve sustainable reconciliation in Afghanistan
"The analysis and conclusions drawn in this report are based on the author?s wide range of discussions with ordinary Afghans (men and women), senior government officials, and members of the international community working in or on Afghanistan. Over the course of years, the author has traveled to many places inside Afghanistan and participated in numerous meetings and conferences centered on peace, stability, and reconstruction."--Publisher description.
THERE HAS BEEN much discussion as of late about reintegration and reconciliation in Afghanistan and the impact it will have on ending the current conflict. Reintegration is defined as the operational and tactical level efforts to assimilate insurgents and low- to mid-level commanders peacefully into Afghan society. More specifically, reintegration occurs when individuals or groups of commanders and fighters lay down their arms and inform the Afghan government or the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan (ISAF) of their desire to return to their communities. Reconciliation, on the other hand, involves higher-level political dialogue with senior commanders of major insurgent groups (e.g., the Taliban). The goal of these efforts is to persuade insurgent leaders and groups to terminate their armed resistance and assume a legitimate role in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Reintegration and reconciliation are a part of the natural cycle of armed conflict. Eventually, insurgents grow weary of fighting, and only the most extreme elements see no end to war. As happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Cambodia, Somalia, and the Philippines, Afghanistan now faces the challenge of how to reintegrate and reconcile with the enemies it has been fighting over the last nine years.
Building an enduring and stable political consensus in Afghanistan's complex, multiactor environment requires clear analysis of the conflict. Getting It Right in Afghanistan addresses the real drivers of the insurgency, how Afghanistan's neighbors can contribute to peace in the region, and the need for more inclusive political arrangements in peace and reconciliation processes.
The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and non-partisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse "the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation." Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. --Book Jacket.
This report examines how the U.S. government -- primarily the Departments of Defense (DOD), State, Treasury, and Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) -- understood the risks of corruption in Afghanistan, how the U.S. response to corruption evolved, and the effectiveness of that response. The report identifies lessons to inform U.S. policies and actions at the onset of and throughout a contingency operation and makes recommendations for both legislative and executive branch action. This analysis reveals that corruption substantially undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan from the very beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. It concludes that failure to effectively address the problem means that U.S. reconstruction programs, at best, will continue to be subverted by systemic corruption and, at worst, will fail. Figures and tables.. This is a print on demand report.