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The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was just the latest in a series of Pentagon studies, including the 1991 Base Force Study and the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), designed to reevaluate strategy and force structure. Dissatisfied with the BUR, Congress established a Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) with the 1994 Defense Authorization Act. The CORM recommended instituting a strategy review at four-year intervals; in response, Congress passed the Armed Forces Force Structure Act of 1996 (as part of Public Law 104-201, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997), mandating the first QDR. Congress felt the end of the Cold War required a fundamental defense review. The QDR itself was specifically tasked to prepare, by 15 May 1997, a "comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a revised defense program through the year 2005."
As an After-action report, this documented briefing summatizes analysis performed for the Joint STaff in preparation for and in support of the second Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR). The authors concluded that QDR 2001 like QDR 1997, was useful inproviding information on requirements for military capabilties and resource. The report recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff use existing processes to routinely address cross-cutting issues from a military perpective.
This paper was prepared to present an approach to managing Joint Staff preparations for the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2001), which we developed in working with the staff of the Studies and Analysis Management Division (SAMD) of the Joint Staff G-8). The lessons learned from the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 1997) included the need for leadership guidance and integration of analytic activities to sort through the myriad issues that are always confronting the Department of Defense. The "Goldwater-Nichols"legislative changes to Title X statutes expanded the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and tasked him with the formal responsibilities of reviewing and commenting on defense matters that require analytic support as well as military judgment. The J-8 should assist the Chairman by managing a process that can provide credible and timely analysis to support high- level review of important issues.
This paper was prepared to present an approach to managing Joint Staff preparations for the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2001), which we developed in working with the staff of the Studies and Analysis Management Division (SAMD) of the Joint Staff G-8). The lessons learned from the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 1997) included the need for leadership guidance and integration of analytic activities to sort through the myriad issues that are always confronting the Department of Defense. The "Goldwater-Nichols"legislative changes to Title X statutes expanded the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and tasked him with the formal responsibilities of reviewing and commenting on defense matters that require analytic support as well as military judgment. The J-8 should assist the Chairman by managing a process that can provide credible and timely analysis to support high- level review of important issues.
Congress mandated that every 4 years the Dept. of Defense (DoD) conduct a review to examine the national defense strategy and its implications for force structure, modernization, infrastructure and the budget. Because the 2001 review, which was issued on Sept. 30, 2001, will have a significant impact on the DoD's planning and budget, the General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to assess: (1) the strengths and weaknesses of DoD's conduct and reporting of the review, and (2) whether changes in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) legislation could improve the usefulness of future reviews. Charts and tables.
This paper was prepared to summarize lessons learned from the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2001). RAND has been supporting the Joint Staff through the most recent defense reviews. Our research has examined the first QDR conducted in 1997 but also Included analysis of the less-formal Base Force Review in 1992. Our long-term involvement provides a unique perspective on how the Joint Staff has evolved in supporting the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) in his expanded role mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols legislative changes to Title X statutes. This and subsequent changes to Title X, U.S. Code, include formal responsibilities to review and comment on defense matters that require analytic support as well as military judgment.
The above quote, taken from Secretary of Defense William Cohen's cover letter that accompanied the May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, might leave one with the impression that those responsible for that undertaking were driven by purely noble motives. Rather than accepting such a lofty notion at face value, we must probe more deeply to reveal the process at work during the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This is especially appropriate since more than a year has passed since the completion of the QDR and the follow-on report by the National Defense Panel (NDP). We can now view the results with some perspective. In addition, lessons learned from the 1997 reviews can help guide the next review cycle, scheduled for 2001. While many in Congress may have held out high hopes that the QDR and NDP would produce meaningful recommendations for change to meet the nation's future security requirements, the results have been disappointing. This paper will seek to explain that the shortcomings in the products from the QDR and NDP were, perhaps predictably, largely a result of the bureaucratic structure of the process used to conduct these two much-publicized defense reviews. Furthermore, this paper will offer recommendations for an alternative structure for the next QDR to increase the freedom and independence of its operations. This will improve the chances that the next review will take a truly "fresh look" at defense and yield a more relevant report.
Summary of the analysis and insights of the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group, a project of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.
Between November 1996 and May 1997, DoD conducted a wide-ranging review of strategy, programs, and resources, entitled the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). While the QDR was ultimately mandated by Congress, senior DoD leadership had already been planning such a review, having earlier accepted a recommendation along these lines by the 1994-95 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces of the United States (CORM). This paper was commissioned by OSD (A & T) and OSD (PA & E) after QDR-97 was completed in order to provide DoD with an independent review of that process and to identify lessons to strengthen the next review, tentatively scheduled for 2001. Through an analysis of ODR documents, confidential interviews with over 60 QDR participants from very senior levels to study panel members, and discussions with nearly as many other experts in defense and process management, 8 lessons are derived for DoD to consider: (1) prepare early and broadly for the next QDR; (2) engage major players early; (3) seek ways for the Secretary to lead from the start; (4) establish a small, strong leadership/integration group from the start of the QODR; (5) provide early, clear guidance; (6) establish vigorous but fair competition of ideas and approaches; (7) focus on capabilities as much as possible; (8) link the QDR to the PPBS in three major ways. Specific implementing recommendations accompany these lessons.
Between November 1996 and May 1997, DoD conducted a wide-ranging review of strategy, programs, and resources, entitled the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). While the QDR was ultimately mandated by Congress, senior DoD leadership had already been planning such a review, having earlier accepted a recommendation along these lines by the 1994-95 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces of the United States (CORM). This paper was commissioned by OSD (A & T) and OSD (PA & E) after QDR-97 was completed in order to provide DoD with an independent review of that process and to identify lessons to strengthen the next review, tentatively scheduled for 2001. Through an analysis of ODR documents, confidential interviews with over 60 QDR participants from very senior levels to study panel members, and discussions with nearly as many other experts in defense and process management, 8 lessons are derived for DoD to consider: (1) prepare early and broadly for the next QDR; (2) engage major players early; (3) seek ways for the Secretary to lead from the start; (4) establish a small, strong leadership/integration group from the start of the QODR; (5) provide early, clear guidance; (6) establish vigorous but fair competition of ideas and approaches; (7) focus on capabilities as much as possible; (8) link the QDR to the PPBS in three major ways. Specific implementing recommendations accompany these lessons.