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Most of economics takes politics for granted. Through some (often implausible) assumptions, it seeks to explain away political structures by characterizing them as stable and predictable or as inconsequential in understanding what goes on in an economy. Such attempts are misguided, and this book shows how governments and political institutions are composed of people who respond to incentives and whose behavior and choices can be studied through the lens of economics. This book aims to bridge the gap between economics and politics, and in doing so hopes to instill in the reader a deeper appreciation for social scientific thinking. Opening with a refresher on microeconomics and an introduction to the toolkit of political economy, it ensures that the necessary building blocks are in place before building up from the level of the individual and the firm to show how a political–economic equilibrium can be achieved. The text explores how to separate primitives—the external parts of a model that we cannot affect—from outcomes—the internal parts of a model that we can. Moreover, it demonstrates that economic and political issues alike can be studied within the same general framework of analysis. Political Economy and Policy Analysis offers readers the chance to gain a more sophisticated understanding of political processes, economic processes, and the interplay among them. Adopting an applied microeconomics approach, it will be ideal for upper-level undergraduate or postgraduate courses on political economy, public choice, or policy analysis. A complementary workbook with exercises and solutions that accompanies Political Economy and Policy Analysis is available for download under the eResources tab at: https://www.routledge.com/Political-Economy-and-Policy-Analysis/Merlo/p/book/9781138591783.
Public choice has been one of the most important developments in the social sciences in the last twenty years. However there are many people who are frustrated by the uncritical importing of ideas from economics into political science. Public Choice uses both empirical evidence and theoretical analysis to argue that the economic theory of politics is limited in scope and fertility. In order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of political life, political scientists must learn from both economists and sociologists.
In 1962, economists James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock published The Calculus of Consent, in which they developed the principles of public choice theory. In the fifty years since its publication, the book has defined the field and set the standard for research and analysis. To celebrate a half-century of scholarship in public choice, Dwight Lee has assembled distinguished academics from around the world to reflect on the influence of this monumental publication, and, more broadly, the legacy of its legendary authors. Their essays cover a broad spectrum of topics and approaches, from the impact of public choice theory on foreign policy analysis to personal remembrances of learning from and collaborating with Buchanan and Tullock. The result is a unique collection of insights that celebrate public choice and its visionary proponents, while considering its future directions. ​
Concepts -- Issues -- Interdependence -- Fiscal policy -- Monetary policy -- Financial stability -- International financial integration and foreign-exchange policy -- Tax policy -- Growth policies
Argues that public finance--the study of the government's role in economics--should incorporate principles from behavior economics and other branches of psychology.
This original and insightful book considers the ways in which public law, which emphasises legality (the Demos), and economics, a science oriented towards the markets (the Agora), intertwine. Throughout, George Dellis argues that the concepts of legality and efficiency should not be perceived separately.
This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions to the field of public choice.
Economics: Private and Public Choice is an aid for students and general readers to develop a sound economic reasoning. The book discusses several ways to economic thinking including six guideposts as follows: (i) scarce goods have costs; (ii) Decision-makers economize in their choices; (iii) Incentives are important; (iv) Decision-makers are dependent on information scarcity; (v) Economic actions can have secondary effects; and (vi) Economic thinking is scientific. The book explains the Keynesian view of money, employment, and inflation, as well as the monetarist view on the proper macropolicy, business cycle, and inflation. The book also discusses consumer decision making, the elasticity of demand, and how income influences demand. The text analyzes costs and producer decisions, the firm under pure competition, and how a competitive model functions. The book explains monopoly, and also considers the high barriers that prevent entry such as legal barriers, economies of scale, and control over important resources. The author also presents comparative economic systems such as capitalism and socialism. This book can prove useful for students and professors in economics, as well as general readers whose works are related to public service and planning in the area of economic development.
A selection of essays examining economic policy and politics in the United States.
The Making of Economic Policy begins by observing that most countries' trade policies are so blatantly contrary to all the prescriptions of the economist that there is no way to understand this discrepancy except by delving into the politics. The same is true for many other dimensions of economic policy. Avinash Dixit looks for an improved understanding of the politics of economic policy-making from a transaction cost perspective. Such costs of planning, implementing, and monitoring an exchange have proved critical to explaining many phenomena in industrial organization. Dixit discusses the variety of similar transaction costs encountered in the political process of making economic policy and how these costs affect the operation of different institutions and policies. Dixit organizes a burgeoning body of research in political economy in this framework. He uses U.S. fiscal policy and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as two examples that illustrate the framework, and show how policy often deviates from the economist's ideal of efficiency. The approach reveals, however, that some seemingly inefficient practices are quite creditable attempts to cope with transaction costs such as opportunism and asymmetric information. Copublished with the Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute