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The Air Force and U.S. Space Command have long-range plans to demonstrate the technologies necessary to execute prompt global strikes with precision conventional weapons through space launched from the U.S. homeland to any point on the globe in 90 minutes or less. While the Space Operations Vehicle concept is the postulated delivery vehicle early in the 2010 decade, long-range conventional ballistic missiles could provide an initial capability as early as 2005. In light of the potentially aggressive use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue adversaries in future wars, this paper explores the potential benefits and drawbacks of a capability to conduct prompt global strikes through space with conventional ballistic missiles and the Space Operations Vehicle. Political and military factors involved in the strategic decision to acquire, deploy, and employ such a capability are also examined, with emphasis on the Air Force's role.
The purpose of this study is to examine the concept of prompt space-based global strikes. In order to contribute to the debate about its potential benefits and problems, this study addresses the effects of cultural mindsets and institutional preferences on decisions about future military strategy and forces. It examines how prompt precision strikes through space could provide an important set of options in future crises that are beyond the capabilities of current U, S military forces.
The Air Force and U.S. Space Command have long-range plans to demonstrate the technologies necessary to execute prompt global strikes with precision conventional weapons through space launched from the U.S. homeland to any point on the globe in 90 minutes or less. While the Space Operations Vehicle concept is the postulated delivery vehicle early in the 2010 decade, long-range conventional ballistic missiles could provide an initial capability as early as 2005. In light of the potentially aggressive use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue adversaries in future wars, this paper explores the potential benefits and drawbacks of a capability to conduct prompt global strikes through space with conventional ballistic missiles and the Space Operations Vehicle. Political and military factors involved in the strategic decision to acquire, deploy, and employ such a capability are also examined, with emphasis on the Air Force's role.
This book explores conventional prompt global strike and long-range ballistic mission options. Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or "fleeting targets" at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs. Many analysts believe that the United States should use long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads for the PGS mission. These weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons in the U.S. war plan but would, instead, provide a "niche" capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets which might expand the range of U.S. conventional options.
This book explores conventional prompt global strike and long-range ballistic mission options. Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or fleeting targets at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs. Many analysts believe that the United States should use long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads for the PGS mission. These weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons in the U.S. war plan but would, instead, provide a niche capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets which might expand the range of U.S. conventional options. (Imprint: Nova)
Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) is a military option under consideration by the U.S. Department of Defense. This book, the final report from the National Research Council’s Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, analyzes proposed CPGS systems and evaluates the potential role CPGS could play in U.S. defense. U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike provides near-, mid-, and long-term recommendations for possible CPGS development, addressing the following questions: Does the United States need CPGS capabilities? What are the alternative CPGS systems, and how effective are they likely to be if proposed capabilities are achieved? What would be the implications of alternative CPGS systems for stability, doctrine, decision making, and operations? What nuclear ambiguity concerns arise from CPGS, and how might they be mitigated? What arms control issues arise with CPGS systems, and how might they be resolved? Should the United States proceed with research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) of the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) program5 and, ultimately, with CTM production and deployment? Should the United States proceed with the development and testing of alternative CPGS systems beyond CTM?
This study offers a broad conceptual and operational framework for a prompt global strike capability. It begins by establishing the historical context through the examination of preceding efforts to develop systems and technologies that could have supported prompt global strike operations. Next, it examines the capabilities of current and future systems including Conventional Ballistic Missiles, the Space Operations Vehicle, and hypersonic aircraft to conduct prompt global strike missions in order to develop a useful operational framework. Using this framework, the thesis then focuses on the broader implications of a rapid global strike capability. Specifically, it examines how well prompt global strike systems fit into existing Air Force doctrine and operational concepts. This study then examines some of the larger, strategic benefits of a prompt global strike system to include the potential coercive effects on adversaries. Finally, the thesis concludes with a summary of the major findings and conclusions and a series of recommendations on the next steps to take on the evolutionary path to a space and air force.
This thesis examines the potential destabilizing implications of conventional prompt global strike capabilities that operate from or through space. Existing material on this subject is largely limited to debates over the merits of terrestrial verses space basing and arguments against deployment over perceived increases in the likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war. This thesis addresses these issues, but takes the next step and analyzes the root causes and proposes possible solutions to the "security dilemma" these weapons may create. The central finding is that in order to fully exploit the predicted advantages of conventional prompt global strike capabilities, significant changes to the enduring Cold War nuclear postures of the United States and Russia are necessary.
Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or "fleeting targets" at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs.
Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or “fleeting targets” at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs. CPGS weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons, but would supplement U.S. conventional capabilities. They would provide a “niche” capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities. The Air Force and Navy have both considered deploying conventional warheads on their long-range ballistic missiles. The Navy sought to deploy conventional warheads on a small number of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In FY2008, Congress rejected the requested funding for this program, but the Navy has continued to consider the possibility of deploying intermediate-range technologies for the prompt strike mission. The Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) are developing a hypersonic glide delivery vehicle that could deploy on a modified Peacekeeper land-based ballistic missile—a system known as the conventional strike missile (CSM). In FY2008, Congress created a single, combined fund to support research and development for the CPGS mission. Congress appropriated $65.4 million for this program in FY2014 and $95.6 million in FY2015; the Obama Administration has requested $78.8 million for FY2016. When Congress reviews the budget requests for CPGS weapons, it may question DOD's rationale for the mission, reviewing whether the United States might have to attack targets promptly at the start of or during a conflict, when it could not rely on forward-based land or naval forces. It might also review whether this capability would reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons or whether, as some critics have asserted, it might upset stability and possibly increase the risk of a nuclear response to a U.S. attack. This risk derives, in part, from the possibility that nations detecting the launch of a U.S. PGS weapon would not be able to determine whether the weapon carried a nuclear or conventional warhead. Congress has raised concerns about this possibility in the past. While most analysts expected the Air Force to take the lead in deploying a hypersonic delivery system on a modified ballistic missile—a concept known as the conventional strike missile (CSM)—tests of the hypersonic vehicle known as the HTV-2 have not succeeded. An alternative glider, known as the AHW, may be deployed on missiles based at sea. Congress may review other weapons options for the CPGS mission, including bombers, cruise missiles, and possibly scramjets or other advanced technologies. Warheads deployed on boost-glide systems would not be affected by the 2010 New START Treaty because these are new types of strategic offensive arms. But those deployed in existing types of reentry vehicles on existing types of ballistic missiles would count against the treaty limits. This report will be updated as needed.