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This book reconstructs the Stoic doctrine of prolepsis. Prolepses are conceptions that develop naturally from ordinary experience. They are often identified with preconceptions (i.e. the first conceptions one unconsciously forms of something). However, this is inconsistent with the Stoics’ claim that prolepseis are criteria of truth. Rather, prolepseis are analytically true claims embedded within one’s ordinary conceptual scheme (e.g. the good is beneficial). When they have been articulated and systematized, prolepseis can be used to judge conceptual claims that go beyond the scope of sense-perceptual knowledge (e.g. pleasure is the good). The Stoics often refer to prolepseis as “common conceptions” to emphasize that they are shared by everyone, although in most people they remain unarticulated. This reconstruction suggests that Chrysippus was influenced by Platonic recollection to a greater extent than previously recognized. It supports the orthodoxy of Epictetus’ statements about prolepsis and suggests that later authors who assimilate the Epicurean and Stoic doctrines were misled by the polemical attacks of Carneades. The argument of the book is supported by a comprehensive collection of fragments relating to prolepsis in Epicurus, the early Stoa, Cicero, Epictetus, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Alexander of Aphrodisias.
This book offers a reconstruction of the early Stoic doctrine of prolepsis, revealing it to be much closer to Platonic recollection in certain respects than previously thought. The standard interpretation of prolepsis as preconceptions is inconsistent with their status as criteria of truth. Rather, prolepsis is a form of tacit knowledge that requires articulation and systematization. This reconstruction is supported by a comprehensive collection of texts relating to prolepsis from Epicurus to Alexander of Aphrodisias.
This volume examines modern scepticism in all main philosophical areas: epistemology, science, metaphysics, morals, and religion. It features sixteen essays that explore its importance for modern thought. The contributions present diverse, mutually enriching interpretations of key thinkers, from Montaigne to Nietzsche. The book includes a look both at the relationship between Montaigne and Pascal and at Montaigne’s criticism of religious rationalism. It turns its attention to an investigation into the links between ancient scepticism and Bacon’s Doctrine of the Idols, as well as into the ancient problem of the criterion in Cartesian philosophy. Next, three essays focus on more general topics, like modern sceptical disturbances, clandestine literature and irreligion. Two essays investigate the role of scepticism in Bayle’s moral thinking and his theory of religious toleration. Hume’s sceptical philosophy is the subject of two papers by distinguished scholars. In addition, many contributors address the presence of scepticism in Kant and in the German Idealism, such as the role of Schulze's scepticism in the works of the young Hegel. The book closes with a paper on Nietzsche and scepticism, and an essay on the role of Popkin’s and Schmitt’s works on modern scepticism. This collection continues along a rich, fruitful path opened by Richard H. Popkin and pursued by many important scholars, like Gianni Paganini, John-Christian Laursen, and José Raimundo Maia Neto. It re-establishes that necessary dialogue between researchers of scepticism from all over the Americas, which began with Popkin, Oswaldo Porchat and Ezequiel de Olaso long ago. This insightful reflection on modern European scepticism will also serve as an important resource in the history of modern philosophy.
This volume gathers a collection of fourteen original articles discussing the concept of drive in classical German philosophy. Its aim is to offer a comprehensive historical overview of the concept of drive at the turn of the 19th century and to discuss it both historically and systematically. From the 18th century onward, the concept of drive started to play an important role in emerging disciplines such as biology, anthropology, and psychology. In these fields, the concept of drive was used to describe the inner forces of organic nature, or, more particularly, human urges and desires. But it was in the period of classical German philosophy that this concept developed into an important philosophical concept crucial to Kant’s and post-Kantian idealistic systems. Reflecting the complexity of this concept, the volume first discusses historical sources of drive theories in Leibniz, Reimarus, and Blumenbach. Afterwards, the volume presents the philosophical accounts of drives in Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and also gives a systematic overview of other important drive theories that were formed around 1800 by Herder, Goethe, Jacobi, Novalis, Reinhold, Schiller, and Schopenhauer.
This handbook provides a wide-ranging, authoritative, and cutting-edge overview of language and persuasion. Featuring a range of international contributors, the handbook outlines the basic materials of linguistic persuasion – sound, words, syntax, and discourse – and the rhetorical basics that they enable, such as appeals, argument schemes, arrangement strategies, and accommodation devices. After a comprehensive introduction that brings together the elements of linguistics and the vectors of rhetoric, the handbook is divided into six parts. Part I covers the basic rhetorical appeals to character, the emotions, argument schemes, and types of issues that constitute persuasion. Part II covers the enduring effects of persuasive language, from humor to polarization, while a special group of chapters in Part III examines figures of speech and their rhetorical uses. In Part IV, contributors focus on different fields and genres of argument as entry points for research into conventions of arguing. Part V examines the evolutionary and developmental roots of persuasive language, and Part VI highlights new computational methods of language analysis. This handbook is essential reading for those researching and studying persuasive language in the fields of linguistics, rhetoric, argumentation, communication, discourse studies, political science, psychology, digital studies, mass media, and journalism.
Stoicism is a logical philosophy. Herein, one may learn to reason like a Stoic, which leads to making progress toward living in accord with nature, and from which an abiding happiness is produced. Secundum Naturam is an exploration of Stoicism, given the thesis that the philosophical doctrines derive from Stoic logic. Itself, Stoic logic derives from one, first principle: contradiction does not exist in nature, although we contradict nature when we err. The connectives, modalities, and argument resolutions are all defined with respect to contradiction as conflict (between Both p and Not p). And when your will contradicts nature, you are living contrary to nature, while the goal is to live secundum naturam, according to nature. Best of all, learn how to improve yourself with Stoic logic, according to reason, according to nature, only with Secundum Naturam.
Basil of Caesarea’s debate with Eunomius of Cyzicus in the early 360s marks a turning point in the fourth-century Trinitarian controversies. It shifted focus to methodological and epistemological disputes underlying theological differences. This monograph explores one of these fundamental points of contention: the proper theory of names. It offers a revisionist interpretation of Eunomius’s theory as a corrective to previous approaches, contesting the widespread assumption that it is indebted to Platonist sources and showing that it was developed by drawing upon proximate Christian sources. While Eunomius held that names uniquely predicated of God communicated the divine essence, in response Basil developed a “notionalist” theory wherein all names signify primarily notions and secondarily properties, not essence.
The so-called eighth Stromateus (‘liber logicus’) by Clement of Alexandria (d. before 221 C.E.) is an understudied source for ancient philosophy, particularly the tradition of the Aristotelian methodology of science, scepticism, and the theories of causation. A series of capitula dealing with inquiry and demonstration, it bears but few traces of Christian interests. In this volume, Matyáš Havrda provides a new edition, translation, and lemmatic commentary of the text. The vexing question of the origin of this material and its place within Clement’s oeuvre is also addressed. Defending the view of ‘liber logicus’ as a collection of excerpts made or adopted by Clement for his own (apologetic and exegetical) use, Havrda argues that its source could be Galen’s lost treatise On Demonstration.