Download Free Private Sector Information Sharing Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Private Sector Information Sharing and write the review.

Government agencies, businesses, and individuals alike have become more dependent on technology, and the desire and need for interconnectedness has led to increasing network vulnerability affecting both government and private sectors. Recognizing both government and private sector agencies individually lack the capabilities to defend against cyber threats, President Obama has called for a more robust and resilient cybersecurity alliance that encourages information-sharing partnerships with private sector owners and operators in charge of protecting U.S. critical infrastructure. Despite the recent drive for cyber legislation and policies, government agencies and private companies have seemed reluctant to share information related to cyber-attacks and threats with one another. To discover the deeper underlying issues that inhibit public-private cooperation, and to evaluate the effectiveness of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to advance cyber information sharing, this thesis examines the banking and finance sector of U.S. critical infrastructure sector. In doing so, it identifies reasons why information-sharing problems exist between government agencies and private companies; investigates how PPPs satisfy national cybersecurity needs; and, in turn, reveals issues for policymakers to consider when shaping policies that encourage an open dialog between the public and private sector.
Private sector information sharing : what it is, who does it, and what's working at DHS? : hearing before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, July 26, 2007.
This is the 33rd volume in the Occasional Paper series of the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). This paper, along with Occasional Paper 32, Richard Aldrich's "Cyberterrorism and Computer Crimes: Issues Surrounding the Establishment of an International Legal Regime,"address the context surrounding the question of how the U.S. military responds to the cyber threat facing the American military and society today. The U.S. military has become increasingly dependent upon the nation's information and communications infrastructures. Concurrently, threats to and vulnerabilities in these infrastructures are expanding, in large part due to structural factors not likely to disappear in the future. To prevail against the increasing threat, the military -- and, more broadly, the government -- needs to adopt a risk reduction and management program. A crucial element of this risk management program is information sharing with the private sector. However, substantial barriers threaten to block information exchanges between the government and private sector. These barriers include concerns over release of sensitive material under Freedom of Information Act requests, antitrust actions, protection of business confidential and other private material, possible liability due to shared information, disclosure of classified information, and burdens entailed with cooperating with law enforcement agencies. There is good cause to believe that the government and private sector can overcome these barriers, guided by lessons learned from numerous successful government-private sector information-sharing mechanisms. This analysis concludes with actions the government should undertake to develop an information-sharing mechanism with the private sector. Key among them are actively engaging the private sector from the onset, determining information requirements, and fostering a partnership based on trust.
Contents: (1) The Need for a Nat. Strategy; Guiding Principles; Linkage with Other Nat. Strategies; (2) Background and the Current Environment: What Has Been Accomplished Since 9/11?; Continuing Challenges; Legislative and Regulatory Background; (3) Sharing Info. at the Fed. Level; (4) Sharing Info. with State and Local Gov¿ts.; Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group; State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers; (4) Sharing Info. with the Private Sector; (5) Sharing Info. with Foreign Partners; (6) Protecting Privacy and Other Legal Rights in the Sharing of Info.: Core Privacy Principles; Privacy Governance; (7) Institutionalizing the Strategy for Long-Term Success: Protecting the Info. Privacy and Legal Rights of Amer.
Executive Summary The National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) set out to determine whether the right people are receiving the right intelligence information at the right time to support robust protection and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure. More than 200 interviews and extensive open-source research uncovered a wealth of insights on this complex problem. First, there have been marked improvements in the sharing of intelligence information within the Federal Intelligence Community, and between the Federal Government and regions, States, and municipalities. However, this level of improvement has not been matched in the sharing of intelligence information between the Federal Government and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure. Despite some notable successes, this bi-directional sharing is still relatively immature, leaving a large gap between current practices and an optimal system of effective public-private intelligence information sharing. We observe that trust is the essential glue to make this public-private system work. Trust results when partner capabilities are understood and valued, processes are tailored to leverage these capabilities, and these processes are tested and proven valuable to all partners. When breakdowns in information sharing occur, it erodes trust and is counterproductive to risk management. Information sharing is perhaps the most important factor in the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure. Information on threats to infrastructure and their likely impact underlies nearly every security decision made by owners and operators, including which assets to protect, how to make operations more resilient, how to plan for potential disasters, when to ramp up to higher levels of security, and how to respond in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. We looked at intelligence information flowing from the Federal Government to critical infrastructure owners and operators as well as risk information flowing from critical infrastructure owners and operators to the government. Our study reveals the complex ways information is gathered, analyzed, packaged, and shared among government and the owners and operators of critical infrastructures. In tackling this complex subject, we examined the different stages of the intelligence cycle, including requirements generation, information collection, analysis, and dissemination. To gather a variety of perspectives, we conducted extensive interviews with security directors, chief executives, subject matter experts, and government executives and managers. Recognizing that distinct sector characteristics shape information sharing needs, we conducted case studies of five sectors: Commercial Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Energy (Oil and Natural Gas), Banking and Finance, and Chemical. While we found some information sharing approaches to be effective, others were not. As a result, we adopted a “capability maturity approach,” which acknowledges that different Federal agencies have different abilities to share information effectively, and we sought to build on what is working.
Private sector information sharing: what it is, who does it, and what's working at DHS?: hearing before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, July 26, 2007.