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The contributions to this edited volume engage with John Gardner's philosophical work on private law. The content is divided into three parts. The first part gathers contributions on general theoretical issues that bear upon private law. The second part is concerned with Gardner's well-known views on responding to wrongs and the justification of reparative duties - an issue that spans all of private law. The third part turns to theoretical issues within particular areas of private law. Its focus is Gardner's focus: tort law, but it also includes chapters on contract law and equity. The primary aim of Private Law and Practical Reason is to facilitate a critical assessment of the private law thinking of one of the most important legal philosophers of the last fifty years. Gardner's contributions to private law theory are recognised to be amongst the most significant and philosophically rich. This work assembles a group of contributors with diverse theoretical commitments, many of whom have not directly engaged previously with Gardner's work, and is intended to act as a reference point for central debates in private law theory, such as the role of moral duties, the justification of reparative obligations, and, more broadly, the role of reasons in private law.
This book investigates law's interaction with practical reasons. What difference can legal requirements-e.g. traffic rules, tax laws, or work safety regulations-make to normative reasons relevant to our action? Do they give reasons for action that should be weighed among all other reasons? Or can they, instead, exclude and take the place of some other reasons? The book critically examines some of the existing answers and puts forward an alternative understanding of law's interaction with practical reasons. At the outset, two competing positions are pitted against each other: Joseph Raz's view that (legitimate) legal authorities have pre-emptive force, namely that they give reasons for action that exclude some other reasons; and an antithesis, according to which law-making institutions (even those that meet prerequisites of legitimacy) can at most provide us with reasons that compete in weight with opposing reasons for action. These two positions are examined from several perspectives, such as justified disobedience cases, law's conduct-guiding function in contexts of bounded rationality, and the phenomenology associated with authority. It is found that, although each of the above positions offers insight into the conundrum at hand, both suffer from significant flaws. These observations form the basis on which an alternative position is put forward and defended. According to this position, the existence of a reasonably just and well-functioning legal system constitutes a reason that fits neither into a model of ordinary reasons for action nor into a pre-emptive paradigm-it constitutes a reason to adopt an (overridable) disposition that inclines its possessor towards compliance with the system's requirements.
This revised edition of The Idea of Private Law makes one of the major works of modern legal theory accessible to a new generation of lawyers and students. It includes a new introduction by the author, looking back at the work, its origins, and its aspirations.
This volume brings together essays by scholars from around the world covering issues in general private law theory as well as specific fields including the theoretical analysis of tort law, property law, and contract law.
The concept of practical reason is central to contemporary thought on ethics and the philosophy of law - acting well means acting for good reasons. Explaining this requires several stages. How do reasons relate to actions at all, as incentives and in explanations? What are values, how do they relate to human nature, and how do they enter practical reasoning? How do the concepts of 'right and wrong' fit in, and in what way do they involve questions of mutual trust among human beings? How does our moral freedom - our freedom to form our own moral commitments - relate to our responsibilities to each other? How is this final question transposed into law and legal commitments? This book explores these questions, vital to understanding the nature of law and morality. It presents a clear account of practical reason, valuable to students of moral philosophy and jurisprudence at undergraduate or postgraduate levels. For more advanced scholars it also offers a reinterpretation of Kant's views on moral autonomy and Smith's on self-command, marrying Smith's 'moral sentiments' to Kant's 'categorical imperative' in a novel way. The book concludes and underpins the author's Law, State and Practical Reason series. Taken together the books offer an overarching theory of the nature of law and legal reason, the role of the State, and the nature of moral reason and judgement.
Some say that private law ought to correct wrongs or to protect rights. Others say that private law ought to maximise social welfare or to minimise social cost. In this book, Emmanuel Voyiakis claims that private law ought to make our responsibilities to others depend on the opportunities we have to affect how things will go for us. Drawing on the work of HLA Hart and TM Scanlon, he argues that private law principles that require us to bear certain practical burdens in our relations with others are justified as long as those principles provide us with certain opportunities to choose what will happen to us, and having those opportunities is something we have reason to value. The book contrasts this 'value-of-choice' account with its wrong- and social cost-based rivals, and applies it to familiar problems of contract and tort law, including whether liability should be negligence-based or stricter; whether insurance should matter in the allocation of the burden of repair; how far private law should make allowance for persons of limited capacities; when a contract term counts as 'unconscionable' or 'unfair'; and when tort law should hold a person vicariously liable for another's mistakes.
Methodology in Private Law Theory: Between New Private Law and Rechtsdogmatik represents a first-of-its-kind dialogue between leading lights in German and American private law theory. The chapters in this volume build upon established traditions of scholarship in German private law and harness resurgent scholarly interest in private law in the United States, inviting readers to question how private law functions on both sides of the Atlantic. In the context of the cross-fertilization of legal scholarship, the transnationalization of law, and the historical ties between US and German debates on methodology, the volume encourages reasoned engagement with private law doctrines and institutions. It further invites reflexive consideration of diverse ways in which methods of legal analysis influence social practices where law is given, received, asserted, and negotiated. Leading methodologies of the past and present are subject to fresh elucidation and insightful criticism, including those of legal formalism, legal conceptualism, legal realism, law and economics, legal philosophy, legal history, empirical jurisprudence, Rechtsdogmatik, and other varieties of doctrinal scholarship. Providing the necessary background for understanding different legal cultures and traditions in private law, Methodology in Private Law Theory is a must-read for anyone working within the field.
On what basis does tort law hold us responsible to those who suffer as a result of our carelessness? Why, when we breach our contracts, should we make good the losses of those with whom we contracted? In what sense are our torts and our breaches of contract 'wrongs'? These two branches of private law have for centuries provided philosophers and jurists with grounds for puzzlement. This book provides an outline of, and intervention in, contemporary jurisprudential debates about the nature and foundation of liability in private law. After outlining the realm of the philosophy of private law, the book divides into two. Part I examines the various components of liability responsibility in private law, including the notions of basic responsibility, conduct, causation and wrongfulness. Part II considers arguments purporting to show that private law does and should embody a conception of either distributive or corrective justice or some combination of the two. Throughout the book a number of distinctions - between conceptual and normative argument, between jurisprudential 'theory' and private law 'practice', between legal obligation and moral obligation - are analyzed, the aim being to give students an informed grasp of both the limits and possibilities of the philosophy of private law.
'This is an outline of a coherence theory of law. Its basic ideas are: reasonable support and weighing of reasons. All the rest is commentary.’ These words at the beginning of the preface of this book perfectly indicate what On Law and Reason is about. It is a theory about the nature of the law which emphasises the role of reason in the law and which refuses to limit the role of reason to the application of deductive logic. In 1989, when the first edition of On Law and Reason appeared, this book was ground breaking for several reasons. It provided a rationalistic theory of the law in the language of analytic philosophy and based on a thorough understanding of the results, including technical ones, of analytic philosophy. That was not an obvious combination at the time of the book’s first appearance and still is not. The result is an analytical rigor that is usually associated with positivist theories of the law, combined with a philosophical position that is not natural law in a strict sense, but which shares with it the emphasis on the role of reason in determining what the law is. If only for this rare combination, On Law and Reason still deserves careful study. On Law and Reason also foreshadowed and influenced a development in the field of Legal Logic that would take place in the nineties of the 20th century, namely the development of non-monotonic (‘defeasible’) logics for the analysis of legal reasoning. In the new Introduction to this second edition, this aspect is explored in some more detail.