Download Free Price And Quantity Competition In Homogeneous Duopoly Markets Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Price And Quantity Competition In Homogeneous Duopoly Markets and write the review.

Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.
We consider the endogenous choice of strategic variable (price or quantity) in a duopoly market for differentiated goods in the presence of network externalities. We show that if the rival goods are substitutes in demand, but the degree of network compatibility is large enough to outweigh the substitution effects, each firm chooses price as its strategic variable. This finding is a rare exception to the usual result that if the goods are substitutes, each firm would choose quantity as its strategic variable. Moreover, we show that two non-standard results hold when the above condition is satisfied and the efficiency difference between the two firms is large. First, the price of the less efficient firm is higher under price competition than under quantity competition. Second, in a situation where one firm sets quantity and the other firm sets price, the profit of the more efficient firm is higher when it is the quantity-setter than when it is the price-setter, and the opposite is true for the less efficient firm.
Several studies on mixed oligopoly indicate that the ownership pattern of firms does not affect the equilibrium price. This idea often suggests that ownership is irrelevant. In a mixed duopoly under price competition, firm ownership is irrelevant. This study reveals that ownership is irrelevant in a single publicly owned firm and in any positive number of privately owned firms. However, if two or more publicly owned firms exist, then ownership becomes relevant in a homogeneous good market with a strictly increasing convex cost schedule and a downward sloping demand curve. If firms set the price sequentially and if the lone public firm is a price leader, then social welfare is constantly greater than when the latter is a price follower. The unique price is the competitive price when the public firm moves first in the sequential game.
Assuming identical firms, a linear market demand function and a single factor of production, labour, we analyse the existence and stability of a homogeneous Cournot duopoly facing imperfect competition in both product and factor markets. Under the assumption of a fairly general wage function we are able to demonstrate local stability of the unique equilibrium, and global stability under the assumption of a convex reaction function.
New York Times bestseller! "Few are better positioned to illuminate the vagaries of this transformation than Galloway, a tech entrepreneur, author and professor at New York University’s Stern School. In brisk prose and catchy illustrations, he vividly demonstrates how the largest technology companies turned the crisis of the pandemic into the market-share-grabbing opportunity of a lifetime." --The New York Times "As good an analysis as you could wish to read." --The Financial Times From bestselling author and NYU Business School professor Scott Galloway comes a keenly insightful, urgent analysis of who stands to win and who's at risk to lose in a post-pandemic world The COVID-19 outbreak has turned bedrooms into offices, pitted young against old, and widened the gaps between rich and poor, red and blue, the mask wearers and the mask haters. Some businesses--like home exercise company Peloton, video conference software maker Zoom, and Amazon--woke up to find themselves crushed under an avalanche of consumer demand. Others--like the restaurant, travel, hospitality, and live entertainment industries--scrambled to escape obliteration. But as New York Times bestselling author Scott Galloway argues, the pandemic has not been a change agent so much as an accelerant of trends already well underway. In Post Corona, he outlines the contours of the crisis and the opportunities that lie ahead. Some businesses, like the powerful tech monopolies, will thrive as a result of the disruption. Other industries, like higher education, will struggle to maintain a value proposition that no longer makes sense when we can't stand shoulder to shoulder. And the pandemic has accelerated deeper trends in government and society, exposing a widening gap between our vision of America as a land of opportunity, and the troubling realities of our declining wellbeing. Combining his signature humor and brash style with sharp business insights and the occasional dose of righteous anger, Galloway offers both warning and hope in equal measure. As he writes, "Our commonwealth didn't just happen, it was shaped. We chose this path--no trend is permanent and can't be made worse or corrected."
Undergraduate economic students usually learn different models of duopoly competition: Cournot, Bertrand, Cournot-Stackelberg, Bertrand-Stackelberg and joint profit maximization. While the textbooks usually claim that different models lead to different levels of competitiveness, there does not exist comprehensive comparison of five cases with asymmetric firms. This paper fills this gap, and shows a clear price (output) ranking among these five markets when goods are substitutes (complements). The rankings are linked to the levels of conjectural variation associated with each duopoly market outcome.
This book has its focus on the dynamics of oligopoly games. Several contributions show how easily the unique Nash equilibria in some most traditional oligopoly models may lose stability, giving way to complex phenomena, such as periodic/chaotic processes, and to multi stability of coexistent attractors. The bifurcations producing these phenomena are studied by means of recently accumulated global methods, based on the use of critical curves. These tools are explained in a separate methodological chapter. The book also contains some historical background of the present theory. In this way the book becomes suitable also as an advanced text for industrial organisation courses. The various models presented in the book focus both classical Cournot types, and Hotelling`s "ice cream vendor" problems, including location choice. The author list comprises some of the most prolific contributors to current dynamic oligopoly modelling.
In a monopoly, the equilibrium outcome is the same no matter if firms compete on price or on quantity. However, lots of firms have visible rivals with whom strategic interaction is a fact of life. This is known as imperfect competition. With imperfect competition, competing on price will lead to a different outcome than competing on quantity. Each firm needs to analyze what strategy, price or quantity, brings the highest profit for the firm and the highest surplus for the consumer. In order to compare and contrast price and quantity competition, two classical models of duopoly, the Cournot and the Bertrand model, are introduced. These two models can be analyzed according to different setups. Homogeneous and heterogeneous goods are considered. Also, it is important to distinguish between simultaneous and sequential move of the firms in their strategic interaction. The sequential choosing of actions makes the game dynamic and is known as the Stackelberg game. Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between exogenous and endogenous moving time decision of the firms. This analysis should be especially useful to students and researchers in Microeconomics.