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Each year billions of dollars are diverted by the President and his assistants from the purposes for which Congress intended them. Billions more are used in confidential and covert ways, without the knowledge of Congress and the public. Here is the first account of how this money is actually spent. Louis Fisher writes: "When it comes to the administration of the budget, we find nothing that is obvious, very little that is visible. Our priorities here are peculiar. We fix upon the appropriations process, watching with great fascination as Congress goes about its business of making funds available to agencies. What happens after that point —the actual spending of money—rarely commands our attention." To unravel the mystery, Louis Fisher has investigated different forms of discretionary action: the transfer of funds that initially financed the Cambodian incursion; impoundment during the Nixon administration; covert financing; the reprogramming of funds; and unauthorized commitments. He describes each of these devices in operation and provides the historical background of Presidential spending power. In conclusion Louis Fisher presents a cogent and timely analysis of what can be done to improve Congressional control. Sufficient control, he maintains, cannot be achieved merely through the appropriations process, and he makes important recommendations designed to preserve discretionary authority while improving Congressional supervision. Originally published in 1975. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Presidential earmarks? Perhaps even more so than their counterparts in Congress, presidents have the motive and the means to politicize spending for political power. But do they? In Presidential Pork, John Hudak explains and interprets presidential efforts to control federal spending and accumulate electoral rewards from that power. The projects that members of Congress secure for their constituents certainly attract attention. Political pundits still chuckle about the “Bridge to Nowhere.” But Hudak clearly illustrates that while Congress claims credit for earmarks and pet projects, the practice is alive and well in the White House, too. More than any representative or senator, presidents engage in pork barrel spending in a comprehensive and systematic way to advance their electoral interests. It will come as no surprise that the White House often steers the enormous federal bureaucracy to spend funds in swing states. It is a major advantage that only incumbents enjoy. Hudak reconceptualizes the way in which we view the U.S. presidency and the goals and behaviors of those who hold the nation’s highest office. He illustrates that presidents and their White Houses are indeed complicit in distributing presidential pork—and how they do it. The result is an illuminating and highly original take on presidential power and public policy.
"The extraordinary nature of the Trump presidency has spawned a resurgence in the study of the presidency and a rising concern about the power of the office. In Power Shifts: Congress and Presidential Representation, John Dearborn explores the development of the idea of the representative presidency, that the president alone is elected by a national constituency, and thus the only part of government who can represent the nation against the parochial concerns of members of Congress, and its relationship to the growth of presidential power in the 20th century. Dearborn asks why Congress conceded so much power to the Chief Executive, with the support of particularly conservative members of the Supreme Court. He discusses the debates between Congress and the Executive and the arguments offered by politicians, scholars, and members of the judiciary about the role of the president in the American state. He asks why so many bought into the idea of the representative, and hence, strong presidency despite unpopular wars, failed foreign policies, and parochial actions that favor only the president's supporters. This is a book about the power of ideas in the development of the American state"--
Executive power in the shadow of legislative capacity -- Legislative capacity, executive action, and separation of powers -- 'Outmanned and outgunned' : the historical development of congressional capacity -- Pulling the purse strings : legislative capacity and discretion -- Continuous watchfulness? legislative capacity and oversight -- Presidential unilateral policy making -- Unilateral policy making in the U.S. states -- The future of legislative capacity.
In Defender in Chief, celebrated constitutional scholar John Yoo makes a provocative case against Donald Trump's alleged disruption of constitutional rules and norms. Donald Trump isn't shredding the Constitution—he's its greatest defender. Ask any liberal—and many moderate conservatives—and they'll tell you that Donald Trump is a threat to the rule of law and the U.S. Constitution. Mainstream media outlets have reported fresh examples of alleged executive overreach or authoritarian White House decisions nearly every day of his presidency. In the 2020 primaries, the candidates have rushed to accuse Trump of destroying our democracy and jeopardizing our nation's very existence. Yoo argues that this charge has things exactly backwards. Far from considering Trump an inherent threat to our nation's founding principles, Yoo convincingly argues that Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Hamilton would have seen Trump as returning to their vision of presidential power, even at his most controversial. It is instead liberal opponents who would overthrow existing constitutional understanding in order to unseat Trump, but in getting their man would inflict permanent damage on the office of the presidency, the most important office in our constitutional system and the world. This provocative and engaging work is a compelling defense of an embattled president's ideas and actions.
The federal budget impacts American policies both at home and abroad, and recent concern over the exploding budgetary deficit has experts calling our nation's policies "unsustainable" and "system-dooming." As the deficit continues to grow, will America be fully able to fund its priorities, such as an effective military and looking after its aging population? In this third edition of his classic book The Federal Budget, Allen Schick examines how surpluses projected during the final years of the Clinton presidency turned into oversized deficits under George W. Bush. In his detailed analysis of the politics and practices surrounding the federal budget, Schick addresses issues such as the collapse of the congressional budgetary process and the threat posed by the termination of discretionary spending caps. This edition updates and expands his assessment of the long-term budgetary outlook, and it concludes with a look at how the nation's deficit will affect America now and in the future. "A clear explanation of the federal budget... [Allen Schick] has captured the politics of federal budgeting from the original lofty goals to the stark realities of today."—Pete V. Domenici, U.S. Senate
Traces the course of the constitutional controversy over the spending power and the role of that power in driving an expansion in federal activity and authority from 1787 forward.
Vital perspectives for the divided Trump era on what the Constitution's framers intended when they defined the extent—and limits—of presidential power One of the most vexing questions for the framers of the Constitution was how to create a vigorous and independent executive without making him king. In today's divided public square, presidential power has never been more contested. The President Who Would Not Be King cuts through the partisan rancor to reveal what the Constitution really tells us about the powers of the president. Michael McConnell provides a comprehensive account of the drafting of presidential powers. Because the framers met behind closed doors and left no records of their deliberations, close attention must be given to their successive drafts. McConnell shows how the framers worked from a mental list of the powers of the British monarch, and consciously decided which powers to strip from the presidency to avoid tyranny. He examines each of these powers in turn, explaining how they were understood at the time of the founding, and goes on to provide a framework for evaluating separation of powers claims, distinguishing between powers that are subject to congressional control and those in which the president has full discretion. Based on the Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, The President Who Would Not Be King restores the original vision of the framers, showing how the Constitution restrains the excesses of an imperial presidency while empowering the executive to govern effectively.
How the executive branch—not the president alone—formulates executive orders, and how this process constrains the chief executive's ability to act unilaterally The president of the United States is commonly thought to wield extraordinary personal power through the issuance of executive orders. In fact, the vast majority of such orders are proposed by federal agencies and shaped by negotiations that span the executive branch. By Executive Order provides the first comprehensive look at how presidential directives are written—and by whom. In this eye-opening book, Andrew Rudalevige examines more than five hundred executive orders from the 1930s to today—as well as more than two hundred others negotiated but never issued—shedding vital new light on the multilateral process of drafting supposedly unilateral directives. He draws on a wealth of archival evidence from the Office of Management and Budget and presidential libraries as well as original interviews to show how the crafting of orders requires widespread consultation and compromise with a formidable bureaucracy. Rudalevige explains the key role of management in the presidential skill set, detailing how bureaucratic resistance can stall and even prevent actions the chief executive desires, and how presidents must bargain with the bureaucracy even when they seek to act unilaterally. Challenging popular conceptions about the scope of presidential power, By Executive Order reveals how the executive branch holds the power to both enact and constrain the president’s will.