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Presidents are uniquely positioned to promote themselves and their polices directly to the public. Using sympathetic crowds as a backdrop, a president can rally public opinion to his side, along the way delivering a subtle yet unmistakable message to his intended audience in Congress. Samuel Kernell shows how "going public" remains a potent weapon in the president’s arsenal, both for advancing his own agenda and blocking initiatives from his political adversaries in Congress. In his highly anticipated fourth edition, Kernell delivers thorough analysis and detailed background on how this strategy continues to evolve given the intense polarization of Congress and the electorate as well as changes in communications technology. He considers the implications of both factors—especially in combination—on the future of presidential leadership and weighs the lessons of 9/11 on "going public" in foreign affairs.
The cornerstone of the public presidency is the ability of the White House to influence, shape, and even manipulate public opinion. Ultimately, although much has been written about presidential leadership of opinion, we are still left with many questions pertaining to the success of presidential opinion leadership efforts throughout the modern presidency. What is still missing is a systematic, sequential approach to describe empirical trends in presidential leadership of public opinion in order to expand on important scholarly queries, to resolve empirical disputes in the literature, and to check the accuracy of conventional political wisdom on how, when, and under what conditions presidents lead public opinion. In The Provisional Pulpit, Brandon Rottinghaus develops a simple theory of presidential leadership, arguing that presidential messages are more likely to be received if there are fewer countervailing agents or messages to contradict the president’s message. He concludes, based upon the findings presented in this book, that the “bully pulpit” is largely provisional for modern presidents. The more the president can avoid the political echo chamber associated with partisan battles or communications, the better the chance the president has to lead public opinion. The Provisional Pulpit adds an important layer of understanding to the issue of how and under what conditions presidents lead public opinion. All modern presidents clearly attempt to lead public opinion; often, due to factors outside their control, they fail. This book is an exploration into how and when they succeed.
America’s model of representational government rests on the premise that elected officials respond to the opinions of citizens. This is a myth, however, not a reality, according to James N. Druckman and Lawrence R. Jacobs. In Who Governs?, Druckman and Jacobs combine existing research with novel data from US presidential archives to show that presidents make policy by largely ignoring the views of most citizens in favor of affluent and well-connected political insiders. Presidents treat the public as pliable, priming it to focus on personality traits and often ignoring it on policies that fail to become salient. Melding big debates about democratic theory with existing research on American politics and innovative use of the archives of three modern presidents—Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan—Druckman and Jacobs deploy lively and insightful analysis to show that the conventional model of representative democracy bears little resemblance to the actual practice of American politics. The authors conclude by arguing that polyarchy and the promotion of accelerated citizen mobilization and elite competition can improve democratic responsiveness. An incisive study of American politics and the flaws of representative government, this book will be warmly welcomed by readers interested in US politics, public opinion, democratic theory, and the fecklessness of American leadership and decision-making.
With engaging, new contributions from major figures in the field, 'The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency' provides the key point of reference for anyone working in American politics today.
Although presidents may have a difficult time actually leading the public and Congress, voters still desire strong leadership from their commander in chief. In Presidential Leadership in Public Opinion, Jeffrey E. Cohen argues that the perception of presidential leadership in American politics is affected not so much by what presidents accomplish but by whether voters think their president is a good leader. When assessing whether a president is a good leader, voters ask two questions: does the president represent me and the nation? And, is the president strong? Cohen shows that presidential interactions with Congress affect voter perceptions of presidential representation and strength. These perceptions have important implications for public attitudes about American politics. They affect presidential approval ratings, the performance of candidates in presidential elections, attitudes toward Congress, and trust in government. Perceptions of presidential leadership qualities have implications not only for the presidency but also for the larger political system.
Going public to gain support, especially through reliance on national addresses and the national news media, has been a central tactic for modern presidential public leadership. In Going Local: Presidential Leadership in the Post-Broadcast Age, Jeffrey E. Cohen argues that presidents have adapted their going-public activities to reflect the current realities of polarized parties and fragmented media. Going public now entails presidential targeting of their party base, interest groups, and localities. Cohen focuses on localities and offers a theory of presidential news management that is tested using several new data sets, including the first large-scale content analysis of local newspaper coverage of the president. The analysis finds that presidents can affect their local news coverage, which, in turn, affects public opinion toward the president. Although the post-broadcast age presents hurdles to presidential leadership, Going Local demonstrates the effectiveness of targeted presidential appeals and provides us with a refined understanding of the nature of presidential leadership.
Despite popular perceptions, presidents rarely succeed in persuading either the public or members of Congress to change their minds and move from opposition to particular policies to support of them. As a result, the White House is not able to alter the political landscape and create opportunities for change. Instead, successful presidents recognize and skillfully exploit the opportunities already found in their political environments. If they fail to understand their strategic positions, they are likely to overreach and experience political disaster. Donald Trump has been a distinctive president, and his arrival in the Oval Office brought new questions. Could someone with his decades of experience as a self-promoter connect with the public and win its support? Could a president who is an experienced negotiator obtain the support in Congress needed to pass his legislative programs? Would we need to adjust the theory of presidential leadership to accommodate a president with unique persuasive skills? Building on decades of research and employing extensive new data, George C. Edwards III addresses these questions. He finds that President Trump has been no different than other presidents in being constrained by his environment. He moved neither the public nor Congress. Even for an experienced salesman and dealmaker, presidential power is still not the power to persuade. Equally important was the fact that, as Edwards shows, Trump was not able to exploit the opportunities he had. In fact, we learn here that the patterns of the president’s rhetoric and communications and his approach to dealing with Congress ultimately lessened his chances of success. President Trump, it turns out, was often his own agenda’s undoing.
How do presidents lead? If presidential power is the power to persuade, why is there a lack of evidence of presidential persuasion? George Edwards, one of the leading scholars of the American presidency, skillfully uses this contradiction as a springboard to examine--and ultimately challenge--the dominant paradigm of presidential leadership. The Strategic President contends that presidents cannot create opportunities for change by persuading others to support their policies. Instead, successful presidents facilitate change by recognizing opportunities and fashioning strategies and tactics to exploit them. Edwards considers three extraordinary presidents--Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan--and shows that despite their considerable rhetorical skills, the public was unresponsive to their appeals for support. To achieve change, these leaders capitalized on existing public opinion. Edwards then explores the prospects for other presidents to do the same to advance their policies. Turning to Congress, he focuses first on the productive legislative periods of FDR, Lyndon Johnson, and Reagan, and finds that these presidents recognized especially favorable conditions for passing their agendas and effectively exploited these circumstances while they lasted. Edwards looks at presidents governing in less auspicious circumstances, and reveals that whatever successes these presidents enjoyed also resulted from the interplay of conditions and the presidents' skills at understanding and exploiting them. The Strategic President revises the common assumptions of presidential scholarship and presents significant lessons for presidents' basic strategies of governance.
In this book George Edwards seeks a deeper understanding of the relationship between the president and Congress, exploring how and under what conditions presidents lead Congress, what we can reasonably expect of them, and how we should evaluate their performance. He makes a persuasive case for his thesis that presidential leadership of Congress is typically at the margins, not the core, of policymaking. Edwards focuses on three important resources for presidential leadership: party, public opinion, and legislative skills. For each source of influence he analyzes the president's strategic position, the theoretical potential of the resource as an instrument of leadership. He then examines presidents' attempts to employ each resource to obtain support in Congress, showing that they are rarely able to expand their resource base or manipulate their resources reliably. Integrating quantitative analysis with documentary and historical research, Edwards argues that the effective leader is not the dominant chief executive of political folklore who restructures the contours of the political landscape to pave the way for change but is rather a facilitator who works at the margins of coalition building to exploit opportunities presented by a favorable configuration of political forces in his environment. Presidents are not by themselves going to bring about major changes in public policy, says Edwards, and we must adjust accordingly our expectations of their leadership. The implications of his book are broad, and his findings are an important corrective for those who personalize politics and attribute more influence to a single person or strategy than is usually merited.
Do presidents inevitably lose support the longer they are in office? Does the public invariably rally behind presidents during international crises? What are the criteria by which the public forms its judgment about whether or not the president is doing a good job? And what is the role of daily news reporting and elite opinion in shaping the public's perception of the president's performance? This book addresses these questions and many others surrounding the dynamics of fluctuating public support for the president of the United States. Drawing its case material from the modern presidency from Kennedy through Reagan, with looks backward as far as Truman, this innovative work shows how the standing of the president with the American people has come to have a political life of its own. The author first examines two seemingly distinctive periods of opinion formation: the 'honeymoon' at the beginning of a presidential term and the 'rally' of presidential support that accompanies international crises. He then analyzes two previous explanations of public support - length of term in office and the state of the economy - and concludes that these explanations are, respectively, incorrect and incomplete. The author presents a model of information processing that ties public support to indications of policy success or failure brought to the attention of the public through daily news reporting by the media. The model is tested initially for the presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford; it is then refined and tested further for the Carter and Reagan presidencies.