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How did the close cooperation between the United States and Israel evolve? Did the Kennedy Administration represent a radical departure from Eisenhower's policies in the region as previously believed? Ben-Zvi provides a significant reevaluation of the nature and origins of the American-Israeli alliance and the shaping of the modern Middle East.
This volume seeks to reconstruct the process by which the Kennedy administration decided to sell to Israel Hawk surface-to-air missiles. It argues that both domestic considerations and political calculations were part of a highly complex decision made by members of Washington's high policy elite.
Originally published in 2007, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, by John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen M. Walt of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, provoked both howls of outrage and cheers of gratitude for challenging what had been a taboo issue in America: the impact of the Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy. A work of major importance, it remains as relevant today as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Israel-Lebanon war of 2006. Mearsheimer and Walt describe in clear and bold terms the remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the United States provides to Israel and argues that this support cannot be fully explained on either strategic or moral grounds. This exceptional relationship is due largely to the political influence of a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. They provocatively contend that the lobby has a far-reaching impact on America's posture throughout the Middle East―in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict―and the policies it has encouraged are in neither America's national interest nor Israel's long-term interest. The lobby's influence also affects America's relationship with important allies and increases dangers that all states face from global jihadist terror. The publication of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy led to a sea change in how the U.S-Israel relationship was discussed, and continues to be one of the most talked-about books in foreign policy.
In October 1963, President Kennedy proposed withdrawing from Vietnam, gaining him a durable reputation as a skeptic on the war. However, drawing on secret White House tapes, Marc Selverstone reveals that JFK never had a firm intention to withdraw. The real value of the proposal lay in obtaining political cover for his open-ended Vietnam policy.
The Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1956–1975 contains a collection of articles that examine select issues between the end of the Suez Campaign in November 1956 and the Sinai II, or Interim Agreement, signed by Israel and Egypt in September 1975. The book provides a comprehensive overview of the struggle between the three superpowers – the UK, the United States and the Soviet Union – and the effects this had on the region. It also explores the circumstances that led to the Six Day War in June 1967, such as the use of air power and the Israeli retaliatory raids. Two chapters look at the two leaders during the war: Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, leader of the Arab world – a charismatic and dominant persona – and Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, considered weak and inconspicuous. Three chapters focus on the period between the two wars – June 1967 and October 1973 – and one explores the aftermath. Emphasis is placed on Israeli policy between 1967 and 1973, which primarily focused on the use of military power and foreign policy inaction. It is argued that it was this policy that hindered all progress in the peace process, and ultimately led, among other factors, to the Yom Kippur War. The final chapter is on Kissinger and the road to the Sinai II Agreement. It discusses the huge shift in American policy – from avoiding a significant role in the prevention of an imminent war during May and June of 1967, to deep involvement in every detail of the dispute during and following the Yom Kippur War. Providing an in-depth examination of this important period of the Arab–Israeli conflict, this book will appeal to students and scholars of Middle Eastern History and Politics, Conflict Studies and International Relations.
Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel seeks to reconstruct and elucidate the processes behind the decisions made by the Johnson Administration during the years 1965-68 to sell Israel M-48 tanks, A-4 Skyhawk planes and F-4 Phantom planes. This examination is based on a distinction between three factions which competed for influence within Washington's high-policy elite: the traditionalists (whose major representative was Secretary of State Dean Rusk); the pragmatists (whose most outspoken representative was Robert Komer of the National Security Council); and the domestically oriented policymakers (the central decision-maker who quintessentially exemplifies this category being President Johnson). This book is a sequel to: John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel, which examined the first arms deal between the US and Israel.
John F. Kennedy entered the White House hoping to make America and the world a better and safer place in which to live. Through diplomacy, he wanted to achieve a settlement of the East-West tensions and to bring about a peaceful resolution to such issues as the Israeli-Arab conflict. Although his provision of defensive HAWK anti-aircraft missiles, in response to Russian, French, and British arms sales to the Arabs, made him the first President to supply arms to Israel, Kennedy feared both exacerbation of the arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While he remained an honest and loyal friend to Israel, he also attempted to further America's relationship with the Arab states and to encourage a settlement of the Arab refugee issue. Kennedy was an independent thinker who learned how to rely upon his own best judgment and intelligence rather than upon his father or officials like Dean Rusk or Allen Dulles. Kennedy ultimately agreed to regular consultations between Israeli and American military personnel, but he would not agree to a dual alliance nor would he allow America to become Israel's main source of military equipment. The author contends that it was this precarious and uncertain diplomatic and military situation that encouraged Israel to develop its own defense industries and to investigate the possibilities of producing its own nuclear weapons systems.
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Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1955 decision to barter Egyptian cotton for Soviet bloc weaponry thrust Egypt onto center stage in the Cold War in the Middle East. What Egypt needed most, and what the United States was uniquely equipped to provide, was economic aid. For the Egyptian government--eager to take rapid strides toward economic development but crippled by a burgeoning population, a paucity of arable land, and a meager reserve of foreign exchange--American economic aid promised to serve as an enormously important crutch. For American policymakers, economic assistance appeared to be an ideal means of developing American influence in Egypt. Few aid relationships in the last three decades can match the drama and significance of the U.S.-Egyptian experience. This study shows how the American government attempted to use its economic aid program to induce or coerce Egypt to support U.S. interests in the Middle East in the quarter century following the 1955 Czech-Egyptian arms agreement. William J. Burns has analyzed recently released government documents and interviews with former policymakers to throw light on the use of aid as a tool of American policy toward the Nasser regime. He also offers valuable observations on the role of the American economic assistance program in the Sadat era.