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In this paper we assess the implications of precautionary savings for global imbalances by considering a world economy model composed by the US, the Euro Area, Japan, China, oil-exporting countries, and the rest of the world. These areas are assumed to differ only with respect to GDP volatility which is calibrated based on the 1980-2008 period. The model predicts a wide dispersion in net foreign asset positions, with the highly volatile oil-exporting countries accumulating very large asset holdings. While heterogeneity in GDP volatility may lead to large imbalances in international investment positions, its impact on current accounts is much weaker. This is because countries are expected to move towards their optimal NFA at a very slow pace.
"Gross stocks of foreign assets have increased rapidly relative to national outputs since 1990, and the short-run capital gains and losses on those assets can amount to significant fractions of GDP. These fluctuations in asset values render the national income and product account measure of the current account balance increasingly inadequate as a summary of the change in a country's net foreign assets. Nonetheless, unusually large current account imbalances, especially deficits, should remain high on policymakers' list of concerns, even for the richer and less credit-constrained countries. Extreme imbalances signal the need for large and perhaps abrupt real exchange rate changes in the future, changes that might have undesired political and financial consequences given the incompleteness of domestic and international asset markets. Furthermore, of the two sources of the change in net foreign assets -- the current account and the capital gain on the net foreign asset position -- the former is better understood and more amenable to policy influence. Systematic government attempts to manipulate international asset values in order to change the net foreign asset position could have a destabilizing effect on market expectations"--NBER website
How does financial integration impact capital accumulation, current-account dynamics, and cross-country inequality? This paper investigates this question within a two-country, general-equilibrium, incomplete-markets model that focuses on the importance of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk -- a risk that introduces, not only a precautionary motive for saving, but also a wedge between the interest rate and the marginal product of capital. This friction provides a simple resolution to the empirical puzzle that capital often fails to flow from the rich or slow-growing countries to the poor or fast-growing ones, and a distinct set of policy lessons regarding the intertemporal costs and benefits of capital-account liberalization. Illus. A print on demand report.
Although Europe in the aggregate is a not a major contributor to global current account imbalances, its trade and financial linkages with the rest of the world mean that it will still be affected by a shift in the current configuration of external deficits and surpluses. We assess the macroeconomic impact on Europe of global current account adjustment under alternative scenarios, emphasizing both trade and financial channels. Finally, we consider heterogeneous exposure across individual European economies to external adjustment shocks.
The world economy is just starting to recover from the most disastrous episode in the history of financial globalisation. Understanding what happened is essential. Anton Brender and Florence Pisani, both economists with Dexia Asset Management and teaching at Paris-Dauphine University, argue in this book that the main problems were deeply rooted and are to be found in two tightly linked developments that for many years were left largely uncontrolled: the increase in the intensity of international transfers of savings - the so-called 'global imbalances' - and a wave of innovations - globalised finance - that have changed the way savings and the risks associated with their investment can be transferred. Globalised finance allowed continuously increasing amounts of emerging countries' savings, invested in 'risk-free' assets, to finance loans that were far from being risk-free. The risks attendant on those loans did not vanish of course: they were carried by the risk-takers of the globalised financial system. Hedge-funds, investment banks, off-balance-sheet vehicles, etc. functioned here as parts of a genuine alternative banking system, taking on the bulk of the liquidity, interest-rate and credit risks generated by the mismatch between the assets that emerging regions' savers were ready to - or could - invest in and the liabilities developed countries' borrowers issued. Unfortunately, no one was in charge of keeping in check either the quantity of risk being accumulated in this way or the quality of the loans generating those risks. The consequence was terrible: the only force that could finally rein in the continuous deepening of the global imbalances was the collapse of globalised finance.
Crafting stimulus packages and financial bailouts to address immediate problems has for many reasons been a priority for policymakers. In this Council Special Report, however, Steven Dunaway argues that policymakers must go beyond these steps and tackle one of the root causes of today's crisis: imbalances between savings and investment in major countries. The report analyzes the nature of these imbalances, which occur when some countries, such as the United States, run large current account (essentially trade) deficits while others, such as China, maintain large surpluses. Dunaway identifies three features of the international financial system that have allowed the imbalances to persist, features that involve both floating and managed exchange rates as well as the issuance of reserve assets. In particular, he notes that the United States' status as an issuer of such assets has enabled it to finance a current account deficit. The report then prescribes a variety of steps to address global imbalances. Beyond stimulus packages around the world, it urges measures to raise savings (principally government savings) in the United States, reform labor and product markets in Europe and Japan to increase competition and flexibility, and boost domestic consumption in China. Finally, the report advocates improving International Monetary Fund (IMF) surveillance of member states' economic policies by reducing the role of the Fund's executive board and depoliticizing the selection of its senior management.
“The crisis has deeply impacted virtually every economy in the world, and although growth has returned, much progress in the fight against poverty has been lost. More difficult international conditions in the years to come will mean that developing countries will have to place even more emphasis on improving domestic economic conditions to achieve the kind of growth that can durably eradicate poverty.� —Justin Yifu Lin, Chief Economist and Senior Vice President The World Bank 'Global Economic Prospects 2010: Crisis, Finance, and Growth' explores both the short- and medium-term impacts of the financial crisis on developing countries. Although global growth has resumed, the recovery is fragile, and unless business and consumer demand strengthen, the world economy could slow down again. Even if, as appears likely, a double-dip recession is avoided, the recovery is expected to be slow. High unemployment and widespread restructuring will continue to characterize the global economy for the next several years. Already, the crisis has provoked large-scale human suffering. Some 64 million more people around the world are expected to be living on less than a $1.25 per day by the end of 2010, and between 30,000 and 50,000 more infants may have died of malnutrition in 2009 in Sub-Saharan Africa, than would have been the case if the crisis had not occurred. Over the medium term, economic growth is expected to recover. But increased risk aversion, a necessary and desirable tightening of financial regulations in high-income countries, and measures to reduce the exposure of developing economies to external shocks are likely to make finance scarcer and more costly than it was during the boom period. As a result, just as the ample liquidity of the early 2000s prompted an investment boom and an acceleration in developing-country potential output, higher costs will likely yield a slowing in developing-country potential growth rates of between 0.2 and 0.7 percentage points, and as much as an 8 percent decline in potential output over the medium term. In the longer term, however, developing countries can more than offset the implications of more expensive international finance by reducing the cost of capital channeled through their domestic financial markets. For more information, please visit www.worldbank.org/gep2010. To access Prospects for the Global Economy, an online companion publication, please visit www.worldbank.org/globaloutlook.
This book collects selected articles addressing several currently debated issues in the field of international macroeconomics. They focus on the role of the central banks in the debate on how to come to terms with the long-term decline in productivity growth, insufficient aggregate demand, high economic uncertainty and growing inequalities following the global financial crisis. Central banks are of considerable importance in this debate since understanding the sluggishness of the recovery process as well as its implications for the natural interest rate are key to assessing output gaps and the monetary policy stance. The authors argue that a more dynamic domestic and external aggregate demand helps to raise the inflation rate, easing the constraint deriving from the zero lower bound and allowing monetary policy to depart from its current ultra-accommodative position. Beyond macroeconomic factors, the book also discusses a supportive financial environment as a precondition for the rebound of global economic activity, stressing that understanding capital flows is a prerequisite for economic-policy decisions.
The External Balance Assessment (EBA) methodology has been developed by the IMF’s Research Department as a successor to the CGER methodology for assessing current accounts and exchange rates in a multilaterally consistent manner. Compared to other approaches, EBA emphasizes distinguishing between the positive empirical analysis and the normative assessment of current accounts and exchange rates, and highlights the roles of policies and policy distortions. This paper provides a comprehensive description and discussion of the 2013 version (“2.0”) of the EBA methodology, including areas for its further development.
Using cross-country national accounts and firm-level data, we document a broad-based trend in rising gross saving and net lending of non-financial corporates across major industrialized countries over the last two decades, though most pronounced in countries with persistent current account surpluses. We find that this trend holds consistently across major industries, and is concentrated among large firms, driven by rising profitability, lower financing costs, and reduced tax rates. At the same time, higher gross corporate saving have not supported a commensurate increase in fixed capital investment, but instead led to a build-up of liquid financial assets (cash). The determinants of corporate cash holding and saving are also broad-based across countries, with the growth in assets of large firms, R&D intensity, and lower effective tax rates accounting for most of the increase over the last 15 years.