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This monograph addresses doctrinal considerations for power projection in a predominately CONUS bases military. It will examine the concept of deployment from the perspective of the operational level of war. There appears to be a void in deployment doctrine as assumptions for deployment of U.S. forces focus on either end of the scale of potential conditions for extra-theater movement (forced entry or strategic buildup). Contemporary deployment doctrine may not address an operational deployment in a relatively immature theater. 1965 was a seminal year for power projection for the United States. Not since the Korean War 15 years earlier, and Desert Shield 15 years later, would this nation deploy large formations of its armed forces from CONUS in circumstances that potentially would require immediate synchronized and sequential combat actions. In Korea and in 1965, the deployment of the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to Vietnam, forces were deployed and immediately employed in campaigns designed to achieve operational objectives critical to the strategic end state. This monograph will analyze the operational design and considerations for the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Benning, GA to Central Highlands of the Republic of Vietnam. It will use the criteria of the TRADOC Pam 11-9 Operational Operating Systems, the establishment of the lodgement, and the integration of joint and combined forces during this deployment and apply those observations in analysis of current and evolving deployment doctrine. This monograph concludes that current and evolving deployment doctrine is beginning to embrace the experiences of the deployment to the Vietnamese Central Highlands particularly in terms of the concept of tailoring the deployment force at the Corps level. However, the doctrine focuses too much on the mechanics of moving the force and too little on the demanding planning aspects of deploying operational forces. Given a continued shortage of assets in the strategic mobility triad of sealift, airlift and prepositioning, doctrine falls short in establishing a critical imperative. This is that operational planners must consider the sequence and detailed composition of the deploying force, the role of the lodgement, and potential contributions of other services or allies in the context of the operational design. The success of a future power projection will probably not hinge significantly on hostile entry or will be given six months to build forces in theater. Deployment and employment may be seamless. Therefore, success will depend on the ability of planners to make operational deployment a fundamental building block of the campaign.
This monograph addresses doctrinal considerations for power projection in a predominately CONUS based military. It will examine the concept of deployment from the perspective of the operational level of war. There appears to be a void in deployment doctrine as assumptions for deployment of U.S. forces focus on either end of the scale of potential conditions for extra-- theater movement (forced entry or strategic buildup). Contemporary deployment doctrine may not address an operational deployment in a relatively immature theater. 1965 was a seminal year for power projection for the United States. Not since the Korean 15 years earlier, and Desert Shield 15 Years later, would this nation deploy large formations of its armed forces from CONUS in circumstances that potentially would require immediate synchronized and sequential combat actions. In Korea and in 1965-- the deployment of the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) to Vietnam-forces were deployed and immediately employed in campaigns designed to achieve operational objectives critical to the strategic end state. This monograph will analyze the operational design and considerations for the movement of the 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Benning, GA to Central Highlands of the Republic of Vietnam. It will use the criteria of the TRADOC Pam 11-9 Operational Operating Systems, the establishment of the lodgement and the integration of joint and combined forces during this deployment and apply those observations in analysis of current and evolving deployment doctrine. The monograph concludes that current and evolving deployment doctrine is beginning to embrace the experiences of the deployment to the Vietnamese Central Highlands.
This study concludes airpower will play an increasingly dominant role in future US contingency responses. Power projection is defined as the finite application of military power by national command authority to achieve discrete political ends outside the borders of the United States, its territories, and possessions. Power projection contingencies are characterized as wars and operations short of war, but not conflicts that are global or total in nature. Future contingencies that demand a US response may occur without warning, be time sensitive, and require short duration deployments. US forces may not have immediate access to or a previously established presence in potential theaters of operation. Due to the changing nature of the international environment and domestic priorities, the President defined a new National Secunty Strategy that emphasizes projecting military forces in response to regional conflicts. The military services are currently modifying their doctrine and force structures to reflect the shift towards power projection. The services agree power projection forces must be lethal, flexible, deployable, mobile, and capable of surviving an increasingly hostile threat environment. Comparing force characteristics reveals airpower has greater flexibility, deployability, mobility, and is better able to survive future threat environments than surface forces. New domestic imperatives have also forced the services to engage in a healthy competition to preserve their share of a shrinking defense budget. In terms of efficiency, apportioning resources according to an arcane formula that does not reflect force capabilities or the future utility of primary service functions is illogical. Building a strong power projection capability requires a thorough evaluation of the relative efficacy of air, land, and sea power to perform the power projection mission.
ADP 3-0, Operations, constitutes the Army's view of how to conduct prompt and sustained operations across multiple domains, and it sets the foundation for developing other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications. It articulates the Army's operational doctrine for unified land operations. ADP 3-0 accounts for the uncertainty of operations and recognizes that a military operation is a human undertaking. Additionally, this publication is the foundation for training and Army education system curricula related to unified land operations. The principal audience for ADP 3-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will use this publication as well.
This book, Space Capstone Publication Spacepower: Doctrine for Space Forces, is capstone doctrine for the United States Space Force and represents our Service's first articulation of an independent theory of spacepower. This publication answers why spacepower is vital for our Nation, how military spacepower is employed, who military space forces are, and what military space forces value. In short, this capstone document is the foundation of our professional body of knowledge as we forge an independent military Service committed to space operations. Like all doctrine, the SCP remains subject to the policies and strategies that govern its employment. Military spacepower has deterrent and coercive capacities - it provides independent options for National and Joint leadership but achieves its greatest potential when integrated with other forms of military power. As we grow spacepower theory and doctrine, we must do so in a way that fosters greater integration with the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It is only by achieving true integration and interdependence that we can hope to unlock spacepower's full potential.
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 3, Expeditionary Operations, establishes doctrine for the conduct of military operations by the U.S. Marine Corps. It describes the Marine Corps as an expeditionary force-in-readiness that is manned, trained, and equipped specifically to respond quickly to a broad variety of crises and conflicts across the full range of military operations anywhere in the world. It emphasizes the naval character of Marine Corps forces. This naval expeditionary character provides capabilities both to forward-deploy forces near the scene of potential crises as well as to deploy sustainable, combined arms teams rapidly by sea and air. With reduced overseas presence in terms of force levels and bases, these capabilities have become essential elements of our national military strategy. This publication also underscores the value of Marine Corps forces as a highly cost-effective option in a wide range of situations, including crises requiring forcible entry. Importantly, this publication establishes versatility and adaptability as critical capabilities in a broad range of circumstances for expeditionary forces in an uncertain world. Finally, this publication describes the Marine Corps' key expeditionary concepts. This publication is compatible with the Marine Corps' capstone doctrinal publication, MCDP 1, Warfighting.Warfighting provides the broad institutional and operating philosophy that underlies all Marine Corps expeditionary operations, regardless of echelon of command or operating setting. This publication applies that philosophy more specifically to the operations of Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) and to the types of expeditionary settings in which these forces will likely be required to operate. Where MCDP 1 describes the Marine Corps' philosophy of warfighting, this publication describes the types of operations of which Marine Corps forces must be capable.