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This course book contains 32 case studies that expose students to the interchange between the courts and the elected branches. Each case study begins with a detailed introductory essay followed by edited primary-source materials, including legislative debates, presidential signing statements, and correspondence between justices. The fifth edition includes a new case study on enemy combatants, as well as significant revisions to case studies on gay rights, abortion, affirmative action, and women in the military.
Comparative scholarship on judicial review has paid a lot of attention to the causal impact of politics on judicial decision-making. However, the slower-moving, macro-social process through which judicial review influences societal conceptions of the law/politics relation is less well understood. Drawing on the political science literature on institutional change, The Politico-Legal Dynamics of Judicial Review tests a typological theory of the evolution of judicial review regimes - complexes of legitimating ideas about the law/politics relation. The theory posits that such regimes tend to conform to one of four main types - democratic or authoritarian legalism, or democratic or authoritarian instrumentalism. Through case studies of Australia, India, and Zimbabwe, and a comparative chapter analyzing ten additional societies, the book then explores how actually-existing judicial review regimes transition between these types. This process of ideational development, Roux concludes, is distinct both from the everyday business of constitutional politics and from changes to the formal constitution.
For nearly three decades, scholars and policymakers have placed considerable stock in judicial reform as a panacea for the political and economic turmoil plaguing developing countries. Courts are charged with spurring economic development, safeguarding human rights, and even facilitating transitions to democracy. How realistic are these expectations, and in what political contexts can judicial reforms deliver their expected benefits? This book addresses these issues through an examination of the politics of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, the most important experiment in constitutionalism in the Arab world. The Egyptian regime established a surprisingly independent constitutional court to address a series of economic and administrative pathologies that lie at the heart of authoritarian political systems. Although the Court helped the regime to institutionalize state functions and attract investment, it simultaneously opened new avenues through which rights advocates and opposition parties could challenge the regime. The book challenges conventional wisdom and provides insights into perennial questions concerning the barriers to institutional development, economic growth, and democracy in the developing world.
This book shows that constitutional courts exercise direct and indirect power on political branches through decision-making. The first face of judicial power is characterized by courts directing political actors to implement judicial decisions in specific ways. The second face leads political actors to anticipate judicial review and draft policies accordingly. The judicial–political interaction originating from both faces is herein formally modeled. A cross-European comparison of pre-conditions of judicial power shows that the German Federal Constitutional Court is a well-suited representative case for a quantitative assessment of judicial power. Multinomial logistic regressions show that the court uses directives when evasion of decisions is costly while accounting for the government’s ability to implement decisions. Causal analyses of the second face of judicial power show that bills exposed to legal signals are drafted accounting for the court. These findings re-shape our understanding of judicialization and shed light on a silent form of judicialization.
Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution challenges the prevailing account of the Supreme Court of the New Deal era, which holds that in the spring of 1937 the Court suddenly abandoned jurisprudential positions it had staked out in such areas as substantive due process and commerce clause doctrine. In this view, the impetus for such a dramatic reversal was provided by external political pressures manifested in FDR's landslide victory in the 1936 election, and by the subsequent Court-packing crisis. Author Barry Cushman, by contrast, discounts the role that political pressure played in securing this "constitutional revolution." Instead, he reorients study of the New Deal Court by focusing attention on the internal dynamics of doctrinal development and the role of New Dealers in seizing opportunities presented by doctrinal change. Recasting this central story in American constitutional development as a chapter in the history of ideas rather than simply an episode in the history of politics, Cushman offers a thoroughly researched and carefully argued study that recharacterizes the mechanics by which laissez-faire constitutionalism unraveled and finally collapsed during FDR's reign. Identifying previously unseen connections between various lines of doctrine, Cushman charts the manner in which Nebbia v. New York's abandonment of the distinction between public and private enterprise hastened the demise of the doctrinal structure in which that distinction had played a central role.
DIVProfiles a watershed year (2002-2003) in the life of the U.S. Supreme Court, with contributions by journalists and Court advocates that discuss critical rulings on gay rights, affirmative action, hate speech, federal-state relations, and criminal law./div
Analyzes the political roots of the systems of constitutional justice in Latin America, tracing their development over the last 40 years.
Should a president be immune from civil lawsuits? Can the federal government force local governments to enforce the Brady bill gun control law?Analyzes the institutional authority of government as it is interpreted in important Court decisions, including nation-state relations and economic liberties.
This book offers a new theory of federalism. The work critically discusses traditional federal theories and builds on theories that focus on the dynamics of federalism. It offers a definition of federalism and federal organizations that encompasses both new and old types of multi-tiered system. Unlike traditional federal theory, it is well-suited to research both multinational and mononational systems. It also takes into account the complexity of these systems, with bodies of governance at the local, regional, national, and supranational level. The book is divided into three parts: the first part outlines the contours of dynamic federalism, based on a critical overview of traditional federal theory; the second part develops comprehensive indexes to measure autonomy and cohesion of multi-tiered systems; and the third part focuses on the dynamics of federal organizations, with a special focus on institutional hubs for change. Dynamic Federalism will be an essential resource for legal, social, economic, and political scholars interested in federalism, regionalism, and de/centralization.