Download Free Political Change In Europe And The Future Of United States Military Presence In Germany Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Political Change In Europe And The Future Of United States Military Presence In Germany and write the review.

This thesis analyzes American basing structure in Germany, in a new political environment at the beginning of the 21st century. The end of the Cold War changed the political and strategic situation in Europe and the substance of American military presence in Europe. The War on Terrorism suggests that the current threats are dynamic and unpredictable and the idea of a permanent U.S. basing structure in the heart of Europe should be reconsidered. Specifically, this thesis describes the reasons for restructuring the large and expensive base structure in Germany and the impact of American withdrawal to the German society. Moreover, this thesis presents new challenges and opportunities for American military presence in other parts of European continent. Finally, this thesis reviews the development of U.S. policy concerning present and future base structure in Europe.
Discussing why the U.S. will remain in the FRG for the foreseeable future, this book examines the U.S. military presence in Germany. It shows how that presence has affected the development of the political and diplomatic relationship between the two countries.
The post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan set standards for postconflict nation-building that have not since been matched. Only in recent years has the United States has felt the need to participate in similar transformations, but it is now facing one of the most challenging prospects since the 1940s: Iraq. The authors review seven case studies--Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan--and seek lessons about what worked well and what did not. Then, they examine the Iraq situation in light of these lessons. Success in Iraq will require an extensive commitment of financial, military, and political resources for a long time. The United States cannot afford to contemplate early exit strategies and cannot afford to leave the job half completed.
At the EU's Helsinki summit in 1999, European leaders took a decisive step toward the development of a new Common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) aimed at giving the EU a stronger role in international affairs backed by a credible military force. This report analyzes the processes leading to the ESDP by examining why and how this new European consensus came about. It touches upon the controversies and challenges that still lie ahead. What are the national interests and driving forces behind it, and what steps need to be taken to realize Europe's ambitions to achieve a workable European crisis mgmt. capability?
This study examines the sources and character of U.S. policy that have maintained United States military forces in Germany from 1944 until the present, despite the multiform changes of the international political environment and the consistent global restructuring of U.S. troops in these decades. From the moment the decision was taken to transform the occupying forces in West Germany into stationed forces in the late 1940s until 2003 the presence of such forces has been the subject and debate about policy and strategy of remarkable consistency. Despite outward appearances of continuity in U.S. garrisons on the Rhine and Palatine Forest, however, U.S. force reductions in Germany have been discussed and attempted in varying degrees by numerous administrations since the end of the Second World War. This record is less evident to a new generation of men and women charged with thinking about the posture of U.S. forces deployed across the face of the globe, especially in the wake of the upheaval connected with the present decade. The specific aim of this study is to explore the balance between international and domestic pressures; bureaucratic infighting and politics; and the general conditions within what was long West Germany and, later, in a united Germany, that makers of foreign and military policy struggled with and that has led to the maintenance of the U.S. presence in the region. The ability of policy makers to successfully balance these factors in any given time period accounts for the presence of American troops in Germany for more than 60 years.
Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: USA, grade: 2, University of Wyoming (Political Science), course: Psychology of war and conflicts, language: English, abstract: The United States of America under President John F. Kennedy showed almost no military reaction after the raising of the Berlin Wall. They sent more troops together with Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to West Berlin, but there was no intention to reopen the border. Instead the US Government tried to get into negotiations with the Soviet Union about the status of West Berlin. This decision avoided transforming the Cold War into a Hot War, but it also manifested the separation of East and West Germany and made the unification in the near future less likely. The decision helped to establish another socialist state in Europe and locked up 17 million Germans within the borders of East Germany. This paper will focus on the question why President Kennedy and his main advisers decided the way they did. Did they fear the military strength and the use of the Soviet nuclear arsenal? Or did they think they could reach better results by negotiating? Or did they just trade the eastern part of Germany against a secure status quo for West Berlin? Maybe the situation was seen more as a chance for stability than as a threat? The basic information for this research will come from the Digital National Security Archive. The original documents should show who gave information to President Kennedy and his advisers. Who were the talking heads during the decision-making process? Who had the most influence? Was it only an inner-American process or were other allies involved, too? An interesting question is, if there is a change between the evaluation of the situation before and after the raising of the Berlin Wall. So this research will compare some documents before and after the crisis.
Humanitarian military intervention and muscular peace operations have been partially effective in recent years in saving thousands of lives from the Balkans to Haiti to Somalia to Cambodia to Mozambique. However, success has often been mitigated by the international community's unwillingness or inability to quickly send enough forces capable of dealing with a situation decisively. In other cases, the international community has essentially stood aside as massive but possibly preventable humanitarian tragedies took place — for instance, in Angola and Rwanda in the mid-1990s and in Congo as this book goes to press. Sometimes these failures have simply been the result of an insufficient pool of available military and police forces to conduct the needed intervention or stabilization missions. In this timely new book, Michael O'Hanlon presents a blueprint for developing sufficient global intervention capacity to save many more lives with force. He contends, at least for now, that individual countries rather than the United Nations should develop the aggregate capacity to address several crises of varying scale and severity, and that many more countries should share in the effort. The United States' role is twofold: it must make slight redesigns to its own military and, even more important, encourage other nations to join it in this type of intervention, including training and support of troops in countries, such as those in Africa, that are willing to take the necessary steps to prevent humanitarian disaster but lack the resources.
This thesis examines the sources and character of U.S. policy that have maintained United States military forces in Germany from 1944 until the present, despite the multiform changes of the international political environment and the consistent global restructuring of U.S. troops in these decades. From the moment the decision was taken to transform the occupying forces in West Germany into stationed forces in the late 1940s until 2003 the presence of such forces has been the subject and debate about policy and strategy of remarkable consistency. Despite outward appearances of continuity in U.S. garrisons on the Rhine and Palatine Forest, however, U.S. force reductions in Germany have been discussed and attempted in varying degrees by numerous administrations since the end of the Second World War. This record is less evident to a new generation of men and women charged with thinking about the posture of U.S. forces deployed across the face of the globe, especially in the wake of the upheaval connected with the present decade. The specific aim of this thesis is to explore the balance between international and domestic pressures; bureaucratic infighting and politics; and the general conditions within what was long West Germany and, later, in a united Germany, that makers of foreign and military policy struggled with and that has led to the maintenance of the U.S. presence in the region. The ability of policy makers to successfully balance these factors in any given time period accounts for presence of American troops in Germany for more than 60 years.