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ORTSBESTIMMUNG DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN GRAMMATIK I. Absicht dieser Arbeit ist es, ein wenig Licht in die teils komischen, teils lebensgefahrlichen Aspekte der Aufsplitterung unseres Lebens in h eines vor und in eines nach 17 zu bringen, und zwar anhand des Ent wicklungsgangs der Wittgensteinschen Philosophischen Grammatik. Das aufgezeigte Problem kursiert unter vielen Titeln und Etiketten: Theorie und Praxis, Wissen und Glauben, Beruf und Freizeit o. a. Diese Auf zahlungen mochten allerdings kein Unvermogen des Verfassers andeuten, sich auf einen Titel festzulegen. Vielmehr ist es ein wichtiges Resultat Wittgensteinschen Philosophierens, dass verschiedene Sinne nicht selbiges vermeinen, insofern sie denselben Gegenstand meinen, sondern sofern sich der Sinn als Sinn durchhalt, d. i. als Gebrauch im umlaufist. Insofern der Verfasser mit Wittgenstein die Partikel {raquo}d. h. {laquo}, {raquo}d. i. {laquo}, {raquo}m. a. W. {laquo} und ahnliche flir das Philosophieren flir konstitutiv und eigentlimlich halt, also, mithin die Bestimmung {raquo}Sinn ist Sinn als Sinn{laquo}l zu erfiillen ver sucht (trotz der penetranten Haufung in einer derartigen Exposition), konnen die Untersuchungen zunachst als {raquo}subjektiv{laquo}, bzw. {raquo}transzen dental{laquo} bezeichnet werden. Die nahere Lokalisierung des Themas wird in drei Zligen vorgenommen: das populare Gegensatzpaar {raquo}Ideologie{laquo} und {raquo}Wissenschaft{laquo} fiihrt uns zu den in einer bestimmten philosophischen Tradition fixierten Begriffen {raquo}Lebenswelt{laquo} und {raquo}technische Welt{laquo}, deren Widerstreit wiederum von L. £ley auf das ungeklarte Verhaltnis von Phanomenologie und Logik zurlickgefUhrt worden ist. Nach dieser Orts bestimmung wird hoffentlich einigermassen verstandlich, dass die Kenn zeichnung Wittgensteins als eines Aufldarers nicht nur nicht logische Untersuchungen verbietet, sondern sie vielmehr notwendig macht.
Wittgenstein wrote the Philosophical Grammar during the years 1931 to 1934 - the period just before he began to dictate the Blue Book. Although it is close to the Investigations in some points, and to the Phiosophische Bemerkungen at others, the Philosophical Grammar is an independent work which covers new ground. It is Wittgenstein's fullest treatment of logic and mathematics in their connection with his later understanding of 'proposition', 'sign', and 'system'. He also discusses inference and generality - critisizing views of Frege and Russell as well as earlier views of his own - and the treatment of mathematical proof in this book, especially of inductive or recursive proofs, is deeper and more extensive than previously.
Wittgenstein wrote the Philosophical Grammar during the years 1931 to 1934 - the period just before he began to dictate the Blue Book. Although it is close to the Investigations in some points, and to the Phiosophische Bemerkungen at others, the Philosophical Grammar is an independent work which covers new ground. It is Wittgenstein's fullest treatment of logic and mathematics in their connection with his later understanding of 'proposition', 'sign', and 'system'. He also discusses inference and generality - critisizing views of Frege and Russell as well as earlier views of his own - and the treatment of mathematical proof in this book, especially of inductive or recursive proofs, is deeper and more extensive than previously.
How does God talk to us? The image of the speaking God offers a profound insight into the nature of communication. The idea of the God’s Word runs like a red thread through the entire Bible. Few theologians, however, have interpreted the concept “Word of God” as a linguistic phenomenon, but Augustine, Luther, and Barth are among those who have. What sets this study apart from others is its emphasis on the aspects of semiotics (Augustine), semantics (Luther), and pragmatics (Barth). Hofmann then places these three theologians in the context of the linguistic analytical philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ian Ramsey, and John L. Austin. This work carries forward the dialogue between theology and modern philosophy of language, while at the same time opening up the Word of God for human reality. It also touches on the fields of the doctrine of God and Christology, attempting nothing less than a comprehensive language theory of the Word of God.
The present publication is a continuation of two earlier series of chronicles, Philosophy in the Mid-Century (Firenze 1958/59) and Contemporary Philosophy (Firenze 1968), edited by Raymond KJibansky. As with the earlier series the present chronicles purport to give a survey of significant trends in contemporary philosophi cal discussion. The time space covered by the present series is (approximately) 1966-1978. The need for such surveys has, I believe, increased rather than decreased over the last years. The philosophical scene appears, for various reasons, more complex than ever before. The continuing process of specialization in most branches, the emergence of new schools of thought, particularly in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language, the convergence of interest (though not necessarily of opinion) of different traditions upon certain prob lems, and the increasing attention being paid to the history of philosophy in discussions of contemporary problems are the most important contributory factors. Surveys of the present kind are a valuable source of knowledge of this complexity and may as such be an assistance in renewing the understanding of one's own philosophical problems. The surveys, it is to be hoped, may also help to strengthen the Socratic element of modem philosophy, the dialogue or Kommu nikationsgemeinschajt. So far, four volumes have been prepared for the new series. The present chronicles in the Philosophy of Language and Philosophi cal Logic (Vol. I), are followed by chronicles in the Philosophy of Science (Vol. II), and Philosophy of Action (Vol.
Even if the width and the depth of Brentano’s intellectual legacy are now quite well known, those asked to list the principal philosophers of the 19th century, very rarely do mention his name. We may call this puzzle the problem of Brentano’s 'invisibility'. One component of the Brentano’s puzzle is that a number of Brentano’s outstanding pupils achieved their own success and founded their own schools. Suffice to mention Husserl’s phenomenology, Twardowski’s Lvov-Warsaw school and Meinong’s Graz school. The personal success and academic recognition attained by these exponents of Brentano’s school (in the broad sense) have come to obscure their common origins. The oblivion into which Franz Brentano’s thought fell was in part due also to the subsequent split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology. The book reconstructs elements of the 'map' of the Brentanists, revitalizing knowledge of the theoretical complexity of their debates, of their unitariness, and of their style. Last but not least, analyses of the relevance of those discussions for contemporary philosophical and scientific debate are also considered.
Whenever one attempts to write about a philosopher whose native tongue is not English the problem of translations is inevitable. For the sake of simplicity and accuracy we have translated all of our quotations from the German unless otherwise noted. But for the sake of easy reference we have included the page numbers of the English translations as well as the German texts. Because there is a new translation forthcoming, we have not included references to the English translation of Ideen I. Since the German texts are readily available, we did not reproduce them in the footnotes. All quotations translated from Husserl's unpublished manuscripts, however, do include the German text in the footnotes. This work is greatly indebted to the criticism and help of Professor Ludwig Landgrebe, whose support made possible two years at the UniversiHit Koln. Garth Gillan and Lothar Eley also have contributed much to the basic direction ofthis work. Others such as Edward Casey, Claude Evans, Irene Grypari, Don Ihde, Grant Johnson, Martin Lang, J. N. Mohanty, Robert Ray and Susan Wood have been more than helpful in their discussions with me on these topics and in their criticisms of some of the ambiguities of an earlier draft. Likewise a special word of thanks to Reto Parpan whose insightful corrections were most valuable and to Nancy Gifford for her discussions on matters epistemolo gical and for her help in the final preparation of the book.
Making extensive use of unique archival resources this collection presents, for the first time, an in-depth study of the work and influence of Wittgenstein's original literary heirs, Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright as editors of Wittgenstein's posthumous writings. Presenting philosophical portraits of Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright, a team of international contributors provide a history of their collaboration and discuss how the individual philosophical views of the literary heirs shaped what we now know as the works of Wittgenstein. They consider the link between philosophically relevant aspects of their biography, their friendship with Wittgenstein and the development of their philosophical personalities, offering us a new appreciation of the dynamics of their editorial collaboration and how each of the heirs worked individually as an editor to create Wittgenstein's philosophy. Each chapter reveals what the editors did to enrich and shape our understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical contribution on topics such as rule-following, logical necessity, aesthetics and the methods and aims of philosophy. This thorough critical analysis of the editorial history of Wittgenstein's works allows us to finally appreciate the profound impact the editors have had on our understanding of his philosophy, his views and his cultural significance.