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This book examines the various philosophical influences contained in the ancient description of the noun. According to the traditional view, grammar adopted its philosophical categories in the second century B.C. and continued to make use of precisely the same concepts for over six hundred years, that is, until the time of Priscian (ca. 500). The standard view is questioned in this study, which investigates in detail the philosophy contained in Priscian’s Institutiones grammaticae. This investigation reveals a distinctly Platonic element in Priscian’s grammar, which has not been recognised in linguistic historiography. Thus, grammar manifestly interacted with philosophy in Late Antiquity. This discovery led to the reconsideration of the origin of all the philosophical categories of the noun. Since the authenticity of the Techne, which was attributed to Dionysius Thrax, is now regarded as uncertain, it is possible to speculate that the semantic categories are derived from Late Antiquity.
Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938) is the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School with its strong tradition in logic and its scientific approach to philosophy. Twardowski’s unique way of doing philosophy, his method, is of central importance for understanding his impact as a teacher. This method can be understood as a philosophical grammar, which is also how Leibniz conceived his universal language of thought. Analytic philosophy in the twentieth century can be characterized by its opposition to psychologism, on the one hand, and its opposition to metaphysics, on the other. This is changing now, as questions within the philosophy of mind and metaphysics are raised by analytic philosophers today. Maria van der Schaar shows in her book that we can improve our analytic methods by making use of Twardowski’s philosophical grammar. Twardowski’s positive attitude to psychology and metaphysics may also help us to develop an analytic metaphysics and to get a better understanding of the relation between psychology and philosophy.
The shaping of complex meanings depends on punctual and relational coding and inferencing. Coding is viewed as a vector which can run either from expression to content or from concepts to (linguistic) forms to mark independent conceptual relations. While coding relies on systematic resources internal to language, inferencing essentially depends on a layered system of autonomous shared conceptual structures, which include both cognitive models and consistency criteria grounded in a natural ontology. Inference guided by coding is not a residual pragmatic device but it is a direct way to long-term conceptual structures that guide the connection of meanings. The interaction of linguistic forms and concepts is particularly clear in conceptual conflict where conflictual complex meanings provide insights into the roots of significance and the linguistic structure of metaphors. Complementing a formal analysis of linguistic structures with a substantive analysis of conceptual structures, a philosophical grammar provides insights from both formal and functional approaches toward a more profound understanding of how language works in constructing and communicating complex meanings. This monograph is ideally addressed to linguists, philosophers and psychologists interested in language as symbolic form and as an instrument of human action rooted in a complex conceptual and cognitive landscape.
Wittgenstein wrote this book during 1932-1934 - the period just before he began to dictate the Blue Book. In Part I he discusses the notions of "proposition," "sense," "language," "grammar"; what "saying something" is, what distinguishes signs form random marks or noises. Must we start with "primary" signs which need no explanation? In what sense have we a general concept of proposition or of language? The phrases "family of cases" and "family similarities," which the Investigations use, are here; and comparison brings out what is special in the later development. But although it is close to the Investigations at some points, and to the Philosophische Bemerkungen at others, the Philosophical Grammar is an independent work and discusses much that is not in either of them. It is Wittgenstein's fullest treatment of logic and mathematics in their connection with his later understanding of "proposition," "sign," and "system." In Part II he writes on logical inference and generality - criticizing views of Frege and Russell and earlier views of his own, developing his conception of "law of a series" and of " ... and so on"--Leading to his discussion of mathematics, which fills two fifths of the volume: the ideas of "foundations of mathematics," of cardinal numbers, of mathematical proof, and especially of inductive or recursive proofs (with reference to Skolem), which he treats to a depth and extent beyond anything he said of them elsewhere.