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Psychology as a Human Science: A Phenomenologically Based Approach is a classic text in the field of psychology that is as relevant today as it was when it was first published in 1970. Giorgi's text helped establish the philosophical foundation humanistic psychology and the human science approach. He provides an important critique of traditional methods in psychology while providing his alternative. This new version includes a new introduction by Giorgi along with a new Foreword by Rodger Broomé.
In this widely hailed and long out of print classic of twentieth century philosophic commentary, Professor Farber explains the origin, development, and function of phenomenology with a view towards its significance for philosophy in general.The book offers a general account of Husserl and the background of his philosophy. The early chapters are devoted to his mathematical-philosophical and psychological studies. The refutation of psychologism is present in detail, together with the critical reaction to it. The development of his logical theories in the light of contemporary literature at the close of the 19th century is next considered. The main content of the six Logical Investigations follows, which contribute to the phenomenological elucidation of experience and knowledge. The phenomenological philosophy of logic as developed in Husserl's later writings is then introduced, followed by a discussion of the phenomenological method and its proper function. Farber makes clear his preference for phenomenology as a purely descriptive method and his opposition to have it serve as a last stronghold of metaphysics.Indispensable as groundwork for descriptive philosophical study, this book will deeply interest not only serious students of philosophy and psychology, but also those who are concerned with the philosophical aspects of mathematics, social and natural sciences, law and psychiatry.
This book starts with a representation of Husserl's idea of phenomenology as a foundational theory of science. The following essays elucidate the main features of the phenomenological method as worked out by Husserl in the course of the development of his philosophy - starting from merely 'descriptive' and going on to 'transcendental' and 'constitutive' phenomenology - in order to get access to the foundations of knowledge in general and of scientific knowledge in particular. Further essays deal with the Husserlian foundations of natural science, and the relations between phenomenology and psychology, as well as those between phenomenology and history. This second revised and enlarged edition - the first appeared in 1987 and was edited by Lee Hardy - contains two further essays: one deals with Husserl's never abandoned idea of phenomenology as a rigorous science and his further claim to restore phenomenological philosophy as 'First Philosophy', and the other one on the problem of crisis of the Western culture Husserl was concerned with during several periods of his life, demonstrates the actuality of his phenomenology even for philosophy of science in our times.
Philosophy as rigorous science and philosophy and the crisis of European man.
Phenomenology and Psychological Science places phenomenology firmly in the context of psychological tradition. Dispelling widely-held misconceptions, the editors and their seven collaborators trace the evolution of phenomenological philosophy (including the work of Sartre and Heidegger) and its parallel impact on psychological science along a variety of paths. This book is important reading for professionals and advanced students concerned with the search for meaning that unites philosophy and psychology.
In this widely hailed and long out of print classic of twentieth century philosophic commentary, Professor Farber explains the origin, development, and function of phenomenology with a view towards its significance for philosophy in general. The book offers a general account of Husserl and the background of his philosophy. The early chapters are devoted to his mathematical-philosophical and psychological studies. The refutation of psychologism is present in detail, together with the critical reaction to it. The development of his logical theories in the light of contemporary literature at the close of the 19th century is next considered. The main content of the six Logical Investigations follows, which contribute to the phenomenological elucidation of experience and knowledge. The phenomenological philosophy of logic as developed in Husserl's later writings is then introduced, followed by a discussion of the phenomenological method and its proper function. Farber makes clear his preference for phenomenology as a purely descriptive method and his opposition to have it serve as a last stronghold of metaphysics. Indispensable as groundwork for descriptive philosophical study, this book will deeply interest not only serious students of philosophy and psychology, but also those who are concerned with the philosophical aspects of mathematics, social and natural sciences, law and psychiatry. Marvin Farber (1901-1980) taught at the University of Buffalo from 1927-1974. During that time he founded and was the editor of Philosophical and Phenomenological Research. In the early 1920's he received his doctorate at Harvard University and he studied in Germany under Edmund Husserl. He is the author of three major works on phenomenology, Phenomenology as a Method, Naturalism and Subjectivism and this volume.
This comprehensive work from one of the leading thinkers in humanistic psychology provides a thorough discussion of the phenomenological foundations for qualitative research in psychology. Amedeo Giorgi's examination operates out of the intersection of phenomenological philosophy, science, and psychology; such a multidisciplinary approach allows him to challenge several long-standing assumptions about the practice of psychology. Giorgi asserts that empiricism is not the best philosophy for grounding the science of psychology--rather, the broader phenomenological theory of science permits more adequate psychological development. Giorgi draws from Husserl's philosophical principles the reasons for conducting research in psychology, and then offers practical steps for applying a phenomenological method and real examples of applications of the method. In fact, Giorgi proposes a method that is theoretically grounded in phenomenological philosophy and yet treats empirically derived data. This is a rigorous but open qualitative research method that is tolerant of pararational givens as well as one that is supportive of rational criteria. The analyses and methods presented in Phenomenological Method in Psychology will be attractive to psychologists, phenomenologists, and researchers involved in qualitative research throughout social and human science disciplines.
called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path to the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas-as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine 1 science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. And precisely in fulfilling this vocation the Platonic dialectic actually helped create sciences in the pregnant sense, sciences that were consciously sustained by the idea of logical science and sought to actualize it so far as possible. Such were the strict mathematics and natural science whose further developments at higher stages are our modem sciences. But the original relationship between logic and science has undergone a remarkable reversal in modem times. The sciences made themselves independent. Without being able to satisfy completely the spirit of critical self-justification, they fashioned extremely differentiated methods, whose fruitfulness, it is true, was practically certain, but whose productivity was not clarified by ultimate insight. They fashioned these methods, not indeed with the everyday man's naivete, but still with a na!ivete of a higher level, which abandoned the appeal to the pure idea, the justifying of method by pure principles, according to ultimate a priori possibilities and necessities.