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Provides an account, from the point of view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition forces from southeastern Iraq. It focuses on the Army's part in this war, particularly the activities of the Headquarters, Third Army, and the Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT). It looks especially at the activities of the VII Corps, which executed ARCENT's main effort in the theater ground force schwerpunkt -- General Schwarzkopf's "Great Wheel." This is not an official history; the author speaks in his own voice and makes his own judgments. Maps.
"This monograph is a preliminary accounting of the role of the U.S. Marine Corps' senior command in the Persian Gulf conflict from 8 August 1990 to 16 April 1991. It is one of a series covering the operations of the 1st Marine Division; the 2nd Marine Division; the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing; Combat Service Support Element, comprised of 1st and 2nd Force Service Support Groups units; Marines afloat in Desert Shield and Desert Storm; and humanitarian relief operations in northern Iraq and Turkey." -- Amazon
Army engineer support to U.S. Central Command's joint maneuver force during the Persian Gulf War was massive and critical. Over 100 active and reserve component engineer units contributed significantly to the success of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. These contributions are well documented in Supporting the Troops: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Persian Gulf War. The Gulf War dramatically demonstrated the need to deploy engineers early so that they can determine the engineer requirements, communicate those requirements to the maneuver commanders, and take appropriate steps to bed down and sustain U.S. forces. The delayed flow of engineers and their equipment into Southwest Asia directly affected the ability of the maneuver units to sustain themselves and operate effectively. We are now moving toward a smaller, quality Army with rapidly deployable forces. There are fewer engineer units than in 1990, and a larger proportion of the engineer force is in the reserve components. As the active component force continues to shrink, we must insure that the reserve component engineer forces are well trained and ready to deploy on short notice. During the Gulf War engineers provided the model for the Total Army concept, successfully blending Active Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Department of Defense civilian engineer capabilities. U.S. forces could not have succeeded in the Gulf without the assistance of the reserve components and civilians. The force structure of today's Active Army does not include a number of specialized engineer units needed to support a large-scale deployment. Nor do operational engineer units have all the special expertise that can be found inthe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. As Supporting the Troops vividly illustrates, the contributions of the Corps' military and civilian members were diverse and significant. Over 160 Corps civilians, who voluntarily deployed to Southwest Asia, provided procurement, design, construction, and real estate support. Corps members worked diligently, often in difficult conditions, to provide for the well-being and safety of tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers. They devised creative solutions to the problems they, encountered, whether implementing new policies or developing new project designs. It was my privilege to serve with them in the Persian Gulf. Pat M. Stevens IV Major General, USA Acting Chief of Engineers
For nearly two decades the United States Air Force (USAF) oriented the bulk of its thinking, acquisition, planning, and training on the threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg across the inter German border. The Air Force fielded a powerful conventional arm well rehearsed in the tactics required to operate over a central European battlefield. Then, in a matter of days, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait altered key assumptions that had been developed over the previous decade and a half. The USAF faced a different foe employing a different military doctrine in an unexpected environment. Instead of disrupting a fast paced land offensive, the combat wings of the United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were ordered to attack a large, well fortified, and dispersed Iraqi ground force. The heart of that ground force was the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). CENTAF's mission dictated the need to develop an unfamiliar repertoire of tactics and procedures to meet theater objectives. How effectively did CENTAF adjust air operations against the Republican Guard to the changing realities of combat? Answering that question is central to this study, and the answer resides in evaluation of the innovations developed by CENTAF to improve its operational and tactical performance against the Republican Guard. Effectiveness and timeliness are the primary criteria used for evaluating innovations.
United States Air Force in the Persian Gulf War. Part of a series of five works dealing with various aspects of the Air Force’s participation in Desert Shield and Storm. This volume focuses on the Air Force’s role in the opposing Iraqi forces in the "Kuwaiti theater of operations," a relatively small region in souther Iraq and Kuwait, where Iraqi Republican Guard were concentrated.
Doctrine provides a military organization with unity of effort and a common philosophy, language, and purpose. This manual, "Theater Army Operations" (FM3-93), discusses the organization and operations of the theater army headquarters, including its role as the Army Service component command (ASCC) to the geographic combatant commander (GCC) and the relationships between the theater army headquarters and the theater enabling commands. The manual also discusses theater army responsibilities for setting the theater, Title 10 functions and responsibilities, generally referred to as the combatant commander's daily operations requirements, as well as the operational employment of the theater army's contingency command post (CCP) to directly mission command limited types of operations.