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Due to the financial crisis around the world, stability of the banking sector is critical. Several rounds of banking reforms in China have aimed to improve performance and competition, and Performance, Risk and Competition in the Chinese Banking Industry provides a comprehensive analysis of performance, risk, competition and their relationships in Chinese banking industry. The book consists of seven chapters: the first chapter gives an introduction, followed by an overview of the Chinese banking sector in chapter two. Chapter three discusses corporate governance in the Chinese banking sector. The fourth and fifth chapters investigate risk, performance, competition, and their relationships. Chapter six outlines future development of the Chinese banking sector, and finally, chapter seven provides a conclusion. - Provides a comprehensive analysis of risk conditions in the Chinese banking sector - A detailed investigation on the performance of the Chinese banking sector - Examines the state of competition
The Chinese financial sector, despite having been developed at a much later stage compared with other developed nations, has achieved substantial progresses over the past decades. By the end of 2014, a total of 16 commercial banks had been listed on the stock exchanges, exerting strong impact onto the market indices and contributing significantly to the country's sustained economic growth. This book reviews the evolution of the Chinese financial system, examining the effectiveness of reform strategies made by the government over the last ten years. The first chapter offers a comprehensive review of the development of the Chinese banking sector and the state-owned banks (SOBs). The second chapter focuses on the efficiency of the Chinese banking sector. Employing data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), the author tests the change of efficiency within the Chinese banking sector over the past decade. It also looks at the strategy adopted by the Chinese government as the final attempt in reforming its troublesome SOBs and the effectiveness of such a reform strategy. The next chapter examines the corporate governance practise of the Chinese commercial banks, and the author follows by investigating the effect of the 2007 US credit crunch on Chinese banks and the country's wider economy. Other chapters survey the influence of foreign entry to the Chinese domestic banking sector, and the development of shadow banking in China. The author concludes by discussing the role of the central bank, namely the People's Bank of China (PBOC), and its role in implementing effective policies to promote economic growth.
China's banking system has been gradually transformed from a centralized, government-owned and government-controlled provider of loans into an increasingly competitive market in which different types of banks, including several U.S. banks, strive to provide a variety of financial services. Only three banks in China remain fully government-owned; most banks have been transformed into mixed ownership entities in which the central or local government may or may not be a major equity holder in the bank.
Table of contents
This book applies econometric techniques to test the relationship between efficiency and risk within the banking industry in China. Chapters examine how efficiency has been affected by different types of risk-taking behaviour and how risk has been an important determinant of bank efficiency in the context of the series of reforms impacting banks in China since 1978. The author begins by unpacking these reforms and proceeds to explain relevant theories of efficiency and bank risk before reviewing empirical literature in evaluating risk and efficiency in the banking industry. He then investigates the issues of efficiency and risk in the Chinese banking industry using a number of modern econometric techniques. The final chapters present the results of original empirical research conducted by the author, and provide valuable implications to Chinese government as well as banking regulatory authorities to make relevant policies.
Efficiency and Competition in Chinese Banking gives a comprehensive analysis of the industry, including cost, technical, profit, and revenue efficiency. The Chinese banking industry is of global importance. The book estimates the competitive condition of the sector using the Boone indicator, Panzar-Rosse Histatistic, Lerner index, and concentration ratio. The author investigates the impact of competition on efficiency in Chinese banking while controlling for comprehensive determinants of bank efficiency. This title complements Yong Tan’s previous book, Performance, Risk, and Competition in the Chinese Banking Sector, also published by Chandos. Analyzes efficiency in the Chinese banking industry Presents a robust analysis of competition in the Chinese banking sector, using four competition indicators Considers the impact of competition on efficiency Explores the competitive conditions of different banking markets including deposit market, loan market, and non-interest income market
We use data for more than 2,600 European banks to test whether increased competition causes banks to hold higher capital ratios. Employing panel data techniques, and distinguishing between the competitive conduct of small and large banks, we show that banks tend to hold higher capital ratios when operating in a more competitive environment. This result holds when controlling for the degree of concentration in banking systems, inter-industry competition, characteristics of the wider financial system, and the regulatory and institutional environment.
This paper discusses the impact of the rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in the financial sector. It highlights the benefits these technologies bring in terms of financial deepening and efficiency, while raising concerns about its potential in widening the digital divide between advanced and developing economies. The paper advances the discussion on the impact of this technology by distilling and categorizing the unique risks that it could pose to the integrity and stability of the financial system, policy challenges, and potential regulatory approaches. The evolving nature of this technology and its application in finance means that the full extent of its strengths and weaknesses is yet to be fully understood. Given the risk of unexpected pitfalls, countries will need to strengthen prudential oversight.
This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.
Using a large panel dataset of Chinese industrial firms, the authors examine the determinants of access to loans from formal financial intermediaries and extension of trade credit. Poorly performing state-owned enterprises were more likely to redistribute credit to firms with less privileged access to loans through trade credit, a pattern consistent with some of the extension of trade credit being involuntary. By contrast, profitable private domestic firms were more likely to extend trade credit than unprofitable ones. Trade credit likely provided a substitute for loans for these private firms' customers that were shut out of formal credit markets. As biases in lending became less severe, the amount of trade credit extended by private firms declined.