Download Free Peirce On Inference Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Peirce On Inference and write the review.

Above all other titles, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) prized that of logician. He thought of logic broadly, such that it includes not merely formal logic but an examination of the entire process of inquiry. His works are replete with detailed investigations into logical questions. Peirce is especially concerned to show that valid inferential processes, diligently followed, will eventually root out error and alight on the truth. Peirce on Inference draws together diverse strands from Peirce's lifelong reflections on logic in order to develop a comprehensive perspective on Peirce's theory of inference. Peirce argues that each genus of inference--deduction, induction, and abduction--has a different truth-producing virtue. An inference is valid just in case the procedure used in fact has the truth-producing virtue claimed for it and the person making the inference adheres to the procedure. In successive chapters, this book shows how Peirce supports the thesis that these genera of inference have the truth-producing virtues claimed for them and how Peirce responds to objections. Among the objections given consideration are the liar paradox, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's new riddle of induction, that this may be a chance world, and that we are incapable of conceiving the true hypothesis. The book defends several controversial theses, including that Peirce does not so strongly object to Bayesianism as is sometimes claimed and that prior to 1900 Peirce had no explicit theory of abduction. It also proposes a novel account of abduction.
In this book, scholars examine the nature and significance of Peirce’s work on perception, iconicity, and diagrammatic thinking. Abjuring any strict dichotomy between presentational and representational mental activity, Peirce’s theories transform the Aristotelian, Humean, and Kantian paradigms that continue to hold sway today and forge a new path for understanding the centrality of visual thinking in science, education, art, and communication. This book is a key resource for scholars interested in Perice’s philosophy and its relation to contemporary issues in mathematics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of perception, semiotics, logic, visual thinking, and cognitive science.
This monograph attempts to clarify one significant but much neglected aspect of Peirce's contribution to the Philosophy of Science. Peirce claimed that besides deduction and induction there was another type of reasoning which he called abduction. Abduction is the reasoning process by which new ideas, explanatory hypotheses, and scientific theories are engendered. It is the logic of discovery and the essence of Pierce's pragmatism. Peirce returned repeatedly to the investigation of the logic of abduction during his long creative life. His writings on the subject are typically fragmentary and diverse. They fall roughly into two periods. In the early period Peirce treated inference, and hence abduction, as an evidencing process. The three kinds of inference were considered independent forms of reasoning. In the later period the concept of inference was widened to include methodological as well as evidencing process. The three types of reasoning became three stages of inquiry. The author has reconstructed a consistant account of Peirce's theory of abduction. In Part I the attention is focused on the chronological development of Peirce's early theory, so that the later theory may be understood more clearly in the light of the earlier views. Part II contains a systematic presentation of the later theory and a critical analysis of Peirce's contribution to the study of the logic of discovery.
This book is about abduction, 'the logic of Sherlock Holmes', and about how some kinds of abductive reasoning can be programmed in a computer. The work brings together Artificial Intelligence and philosophy of science and is rich with implications for other areas such as, psychology, medical informatics, and linguistics. It also has subtle implications for evidence evaluation in areas such as accident investigation, confirmation of scientific theories, law, diagnosis, and financial auditing. The book is about certainty and the logico-computational foundations of knowledge; it is about inference in perception, reasoning strategies, and building expert systems.
Mounting failures of replication in social and biological sciences give a new urgency to critically appraising proposed reforms. This book pulls back the cover on disagreements between experts charged with restoring integrity to science. It denies two pervasive views of the role of probability in inference: to assign degrees of belief, and to control error rates in a long run. If statistical consumers are unaware of assumptions behind rival evidence reforms, they can't scrutinize the consequences that affect them (in personalized medicine, psychology, etc.). The book sets sail with a simple tool: if little has been done to rule out flaws in inferring a claim, then it has not passed a severe test. Many methods advocated by data experts do not stand up to severe scrutiny and are in tension with successful strategies for blocking or accounting for cherry picking and selective reporting. Through a series of excursions and exhibits, the philosophy and history of inductive inference come alive. Philosophical tools are put to work to solve problems about science and pseudoscience, induction and falsification.
Twenty philosophers offer new essays examining the form of reasoning known as inference to the best explanation - widely used in science and in our everyday lives, yet still controversial. Best Explanations represents the state of the art when it comes to understanding, criticizing, and defending this form of reasoning.
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is rapidly becoming recognized as the greatest American philosopher. At the center of his philosophy was a revolutionary model of the way human beings think. Peirce, a logician, challenged traditional models by describing thoughts not as "ideas" but as "signs," external to the self and without meaning unless interpreted by a subsequent thought. His general theory of signs -- or semiotic -- is especially pertinent to methodologies currently being debated in many disciplines. This anthology, the first one-volume work devoted to Peirce's writings on semiotic, provides a much-needed, basic introduction to a complex aspect of his work. James Hoopes has selected the most authoritative texts and supplemented them with informative headnotes. His introduction explains the place of Peirce's semiotic in the history of philosophy and compares Peirce's theory of signs to theories developed in literature and linguistics.
Charles Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science is an early work in the philosophy of science and the official birthplace of pragmatism. It contains Peirce’s two most influential papers: “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” as well as discussions on the theory of probability, the ground of induction, the relation between science and religion, and the logic of abduction. Unsatisfied with the result and driven by a constant, almost feverish urge to improve his work, Peirce spent considerable time and effort revising these papers. After the turn of the century these efforts gained significant momentum when Peirce sought to establish his role in the development of pragmatism while distancing himself from the more popular versions that had become current. The present edition brings together the original series as it appeared in Popular Science Monthly and a selection of Peirce’s later revisions, many of which remained hidden in the mass of messy manuscripts that were left behind after his death in 1914.
This book ties together the concerns of philosophers of science and AI researchers, showing for example the connections between scientific thinking and medical expert systems. It lays out a useful general framework for discussion of a variety of kinds of abduction. It develops important ideas about aspects of abductive reasoning that have been relatively neglected in cognitive science, including the use of visual and temporal representations and the role of abduction in the withdrawal of hypotheses.