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Recently there has been a surge in international empirical evidence that national policymakers allocate resources across regions based on political considerations, in addition to any normative considerations of equity and efficiency. In order to mitigate these political compulsions, several federations around the world have attempted to create independent constitutional bodies that are responsible for determining federal transfers to subnational jurisdictions. The author tests whether constitutional rules indeed make a difference in curbing political influence by contrasting the impact of political variables on two types of intergovernmental transfers to states in the Indian federation over a period of time, 1972-95. The pattern of evidence shows that transfers, whose regional distribution is determined by political agents, usually provide greater resources to state governments that are politically affiliated with the national ruling party and are important in maximizing the party's representation in the national legislature. But the political effect on statutory transfers, determined by an independent agency with constitutional authority, is strikingly contrary, with greater resources going to unaffiliated state governments. The author argues that this contrasting evidence indicates that constitutional rules indeed restrict the extent to which partisan politics can affect resources available to subnational governments.
Recently there has been a surge in international empirical evidence that national policymakers allocate resources across regions based on political considerations, in addition to any normative considerations of equity and efficiency. In order to mitigate these political compulsions, several federations around the world have attempted to create independent constitutional bodies that are responsible for determining federal transfers to subnational jurisdictions. Khemani tests whether constitutional rules indeed make a difference in curbing political influence by contrasting the impact of political variables on two types of intergovernmental transfers to states in the Indian federation over a period of time, 1972-95. The pattern of evidence shows that transfers, whose regional distribution is determined by political agents, usually provide greater resources to state governments that are politically affiliated with the national ruling party and are important in maximizing the party's representation in the national legislature. But the political effect on statutory transfers, determined by an independent agency with constitutional authority, is strikingly contrary, with greater resources going to unaffiliated state governments. The author argues that this contrasting evidence indicates that constitutional rules indeed restrict the extent to which partisan politics can affect resources available to subnational governments.This paper - a product of Public Services, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the impact of public spending programs.
Intergovernmental Transfers in Federations presents a synthesis of international experience of large federations in the most recent times in addressing the most fundamental issue of horizontal and vertical imbalances in their countries through the prism of intergovernmental transfers. Contributors delve into the various aspects of policy making as well as policy choices in selecting an efficiency path for a meaningful fiscal devolution aimed at integrating performance and incentives to reach an expenditure mix that facilitates better service delivery.
This is a comprehensive work on India's fiscal federalism. The book surveys and analyses the evolution of fiscal federalism from the angle of political economy and brings to bear analytical skills of a very high order to assess and relate the political and administrative dimensions of India's federal system to fiscal federal issues. The authors present a synthesized framework, combining both economic and political elements in a political economy prism such as the Cente–State relations with not only the political perspectives but also the economic ones with the belief that only such a framework can provide a useful guide to implementable reform of policies.
Development’s current focus – poverty reduction and good governance – signals a turn away from the older neoliberal preoccupation with structural adjustment, privatization and downsizing the state. For some, the new emphases on empowering and securing the poor through basic service delivery, local partnership, decentralization and institution building constitute a decisive break with the past and a whole set of new development possibilities beyond neoliberalism. Taking a wider historical perspective, this book charts the emergence of poverty reduction and governance at the centre of development. It shows that the Poverty Reduction paradigm does indeed mark a shift in the wider liberal project that has underpinned development: precisely what is new, and what this means for how the poor are governed, are described here in detail. This book provides a compelling history of development doctrine and practice, and in particular offers the first comprehensive account of the last twenty years, and development’s shift towards a new political economy of institution building, decentralized governance and local partnerships. The story is illustrated with extensive case studies from first hand experience in Vietnam, Uganda, Pakistan and New Zealand.
This lively collection of essays by Ashutosh Varshney analyses the deepening of Indian democracy since 1947 and the challenges this has created. It examines concerns ranging from federalism and Hindu nationalism to caste conflict and civil society, the north–south economic divide, and politics of economic reforms. Accompanied by a substantial overview tracing the forging and consolidation of India’s improbable democracy, the book, full of original insights, portrays the successes and failures of our experience in a new comparative perspective, enriching our understanding of the idea of democracy.
"Analyses of how coveted central-government resources in Africa are shared have shown widespread patronage, ethnic cronyism, and pork-barrel politics. While some governments have attempted to rectify the situation by establishing revenue-sharing formulas, a key unanswered question is whether such institutions are able to achieve this goal. This paper presents an empirical investigation of a pioneering formula-based system of resource allocation from the central government to local governments in Ghana--the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF). The evidence is consistent with governments being able to politically manipulate resource allocation within the confines of the formula-based system. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that the DACF completely fails to limit political influence. It indicates that other guiding structures of a formula-based system--in particular, how and when the formula can be altered--are important determinants of how well a program such as the DACF is able to resist political pressures."--Authors' abstract.
Contemporary political parties often use state resources to win elections. In this context, electoral clientelism evolved from the straightforward vote buying to sophisticated exchanges in which the relationship between patrons (parties or candidates) and clients (voters) is sometimes difficult to grasp. We address the question how do the distributive politics and electoral clientelism interact, how these forms of interactions differ across various context, and what implications they bring for the functioning of political systems. The special issue provides theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the burgeoning literature about the multi-faceted feature of electoral clientelism. It unfolds the complex relationship between distributive politics and clientelism, and conceptualizes electoral clientelism as a dynamic process that occurs through different sequences. It enriches the methodological tools aimed at investigating electoral clientelism. Finally, the special issue approaches clientelism from several perspectives and brings together substantive empirical evidence about the varieties of clientelism around the world.
The design of intergovernmental fiscal transfers has a strong bearing on efficiency and equity of public service provision and accountable local governance. This book provides a comprehensive one-stop window/source of materials to guide practitioners and scholars on design and worldwide practices in intergovernmental fiscal transfers and their implications for efficiency, and equity in public services provision as well as accountable governance.