Download Free Partisan Politics And Credibility In Government Bond Markets Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Partisan Politics And Credibility In Government Bond Markets and write the review.

Increasingly integrated global financial markets have been shaken by a series of severe shocks in recent decades, from Mexico’s Tequila crisis to the upheavals in the Eurozone. These crises have demonstrated that signs of uncertain local economic and political conditions can result in market fluctuations which in turn cause economic, social, and political instability. Such instability is particularly severe for developing countries that rely heavily on international financial markets for their financial needs. Building credibility in these markets is therefore important for national governments who wish to prevent market panic and capital flight and, ultimately, to achieve stable economic growth. Earlier studies have argued that institutional arrangements that constrain governments and commit them to protecting private property rights and market-friendly policies can send a strong positive signal to the markets about a given country’s sovereign credibility. This book argues, however, that the market perception of such credibility-building institutions is significantly contingent on which party governs the country. Formal institutions confer significant credibility-building effects on left-wing governments, whereas less or no significant effects are enjoyed by right-wing governments. And beyond that, any significant changes in a country’s institutional landscape—such as a breakdown of democracy or joining an international organization that can influence domestic politics—have particularly strong impact on the credibility of left-wing governments. This argument is supported by a quantitative analysis of sovereign credit ratings data collected from around 90 developing countries from 1980 to 2007, by case studies from South Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, and by face-to-face interviews with 24 financial market experts based in Hong Kong, Seoul, and Paris.
This guidance note was prepared by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Group staff under a project undertaken with the support of grants from the Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening Initiative, (FIRST).The aim of the project was to deliver a report that provides emerging market and developing economies with guidance and a roadmap in developing their local currency bond markets (LCBMs). This note will also inform technical assistance missions in advising authorities on the formulation of policies to deepen LCBMs.
Political scientists have long painted American voters' dependence on partisan cues at the ballot box as a discouraging consequence of their overall ignorance about politics. Taking on this conventional wisdom, Jeffrey D. Grynaviski advances the provocative theory that voters instead rely on these cues because party brand names provide credible information about how politicians are likely to act in office, despite the weakness of formal party organization in the United States. Among the important empirical implications of his theory, which he carefully supports with rigorous data analysis, are that voter uncertainty about a party's issue positions varies with the level of party unity it exhibits in government, that party preferences in the electorate are strongest among the most certain voters, and that party brand names have meaningful consequences for the electoral strategies of party leaders and individual candidates for office.
A data-driven investigation of the interaction between politics and finance in emerging markets, focusing on Latin America. Politics matter for financial markets and financial markets matter for politics, and nowhere is this relationship more apparent than in emerging markets. In Banking on Democracy, Javier Santiso investigates the links between politics and finance in countries that have recently experienced both economic and democratic transitions. He focuses on elections, investigating whether there is a “democratic premium”—whether financial markets and investors tend to react positively to elections in emerging markets. Santiso devotes special attention to Latin America, where over the last three decades many countries became democracies, with regular elections, just as they also became open economies dependent on foreign capital and dominated bond markets. Santiso's analysis draws on a unique set of primary databases (developed during his years at the OECD Development Centre) covering an entire decade: more than 5,000 bank and fund manager portfolio recommendations on emerging markets. Santiso examines the trajectory of Brazil, for example, through its presidential elections of 2002, 2006, and 2010 and finds a decoupling of financial and political cycles that occurred also in many other emerging economies. He charts this evolution through the behavior of brokers, analysts, fund managers, and bankers. Ironically, Santiso points out, while some emerging markets have decoupled politics and finance, in the wake of the 2008–2012 financial crisis many developed economies (Europe and the United States) have experienced a recoupling between finance and politics.
The 2009 edition of the Latin American Economic Outlook shows that governments in the region could do much more to exploit the ability of fiscal policy to boost economic growth and combat poverty and inequality.
Geoffrey Garrett challenges the conventional wisdom about the domestic effects of the globalization of markets in the industrial democracies: the erosion of national autonomy and the demise of leftist alternatives to the free market. He demonstrates that globalization has strengthened the relationship between the political power of the left and organized labour and economic policies that reduce market-generated inequalities of risk and wealth. Moreover, macroeconomic outcomes in the era of global markets have been as good or better in strong left-labour regimes ('social democratic corporatism') as in other industrial countries. Pessimistic visions of the inexorable dominance of capital over labour or radical autarkic and nationalist backlashes against markets are significantly overstated. Electoral politics have not been dwarfed by market dynamics as social forces. Globalized markets have not rendered immutable the efficiency-equality trade-off.
This paper applies the “market microstructure” literature to the specific features of government securities markets and draws implications for the strategy to develop government securities markets. It argues for an active role of the authorities in fostering the development of efficient market structures.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.