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It is hardly possible to overrate the Pacific Basin in its economic and political importance. Currently, it is one of the economic regions with the highest dynamic growth throughout the world. Economically this region is sometimes considered to be the future centre of the world econom- often with reference to well-known authors such as Arnold Toynbee and Herman Kahn who predicted the inevitable approach of a Pacific century. The economic development of the Pacific Basin has proceeded far already following Japan's ascent into the position of an economic superpower. Considering the concentration of East and South-East Asian dynamic developing countries the Pacific Basin has meanwhile developed into a regional centre of economic activities. Furthermore the ambitions and in terests of three nuclear powers - the USA, the Soviet Union and China - collide in this region. Obviously these countries increasingly perceive and take into account the political and strategic importance of this region.
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
The present study is a preliminary draft on nonlinear economic dynamics, with which the author has been concerned the last years. It grew out from the joint work by Professor Martin Beckmann and the present author on nonlinear statics in spatial economics, Beckmann and Puu, "Spatial Economics" (North-Holland 1985). The monograph mentioned contains sections on price waves and business cycles, but in a linear format. The rest is static theory. The author has finally come to the conviction that linear dynamic modelling has very little to yield. This is due to the poor set of alternatives -decay or explosion of motion -pertinent to linear models. Therefore, the present work centres on non-linearity. Another distinction is that only purely causal models are dealt with, as those formatted as inter-temporal equilibria hardly belong to the more restricted field of dynamics. The spatial origin is visible in the choice of models. Chapter 2 summarizes the work by the author on the structural stability of continuous spatial market equilibrium models. Chapter 3 deals with a re-fonnulation of the ingenious population growth and diffusion model invented by the young Hotelling in 1921. Chapter 4 is a detailed digression on business cycle models in a continuous spatial format with inter-regional trade.
Japan and Asia Pacific Integration is a study of regional integration in the greater Pacific area during 1968-1996. It examines the political rationale of such international organisations as the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, and the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). There is a focus on Japanese conceptions of regionalism and integration, but the attitudes of other countries such as the United States, Australia, Malaysia and China are also explored.
Attempts to integrate the Pacific regional economy accelerated sharply with the formation of the regionwide, official Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in 1989. This book probes into the distinctive process of regional cooperation in Asia-Pacific by focusing on the roles and perspectives of China, Japan, and Southeast Asian states. Asian developments shaping the new post-hegemonic global political economy challenge traditional models in international relations, which is here challenged to take East Asia seriously.
Economical and political aspects of information technology in Europe and Japan are dealt with in this book. European and Japanese technology policies, the possibilities of cooperation on all economic and business levels as well as future perspectives on world information markets from the Japanese and European points of view form the priority areas of the book. Special attention is given to - the case study of a Swiss-Japanese business cooperation with many practical references, - an analysis of East European information markets and, - the relations between Europe and Japan from the viewpoint of the USA. The reader is given an insight into new developments in the information technology markets in Europe and Japan as well as into the economic and political framework within which the developments are taking place.
For the United States, full involvement in World War II began and ended in the Pacific Ocean. Although the accepted grand strategy of the war was the defeat of Germany first, the sweep of Japanese victory in the weeks and months after Pearl Harbor impelled the United States to move as rapidly as it could to stem the enemy tide of conquest in the Pacific. Shocked as they were by the initial attack, the American people were also united in their determination to defeat Japan, and the Pacific war became peculiarly their own affair. In this great theater it was the United States that ran the war, and had the determining voice in answering questions of strategy and command as they arose. The natural environment made the prosecution of war in the Pacific of necessity an interservice effort, and any real account of it must, as this work does, take into full account the views and actions of the Navy as well as those of the Army and its Air Forces. These are the factors-a predominantly American theater of war covering nearly one-third the globe, and a joint conduct of war by land, sea, and air on the largest scale in American history-that make this volume on the Pacific war of particular significance today. It is the capstone of the eleven volumes published or being published in the Army's World War II series that deal with military operations in the Pacific area, and it is one that should command wide attention from the thoughtful public as well as the military reader in these days of global tension.
The IBSS is the essential tool for librarians, university departments, research institutions and any public or private institution whose work requires access to up-to-date and comprehenisve knowledge of the social sciences.
A groundbreaking history that considers the attack on Pearl Harbor from the Japanese perspective and is certain to revolutionize how we think of the war in the Pacific. When Japan launched hostilities against the United States in 1941, argues Eri Hotta, its leaders, in large part, understood they were entering a war they were almost certain to lose. Drawing on material little known to Western readers, and barely explored in depth in Japan itself, Hotta poses an essential question: Why did these men—military men, civilian politicians, diplomats, the emperor—put their country and its citizens so unnecessarily in harm’s way? Introducing us to the doubters, schemers, and would-be patriots who led their nation into this conflagration, Hotta brilliantly shows us a Japan rarely glimpsed—eager to avoid war but fraught with tensions with the West, blinded by reckless militarism couched in traditional notions of pride and honor, tempted by the gambler’s dream of scoring the biggest win against impossible odds and nearly escaping disaster before it finally proved inevitable. In an intimate account of the increasingly heated debates and doomed diplomatic overtures preceding Pearl Harbor, Hotta reveals just how divided Japan’s leaders were, right up to (and, in fact, beyond) their eleventh-hour decision to attack. We see a ruling cadre rich in regional ambition and hubris: many of the same leaders seeking to avoid war with the United States continued to adamantly advocate Asian expansionism, hoping to advance, or at least maintain, the occupation of China that began in 1931, unable to end the second Sino-Japanese War and unwilling to acknowledge Washington’s hardening disapproval of their continental incursions. Even as Japanese diplomats continued to negotiate with the Roosevelt administration, Matsuoka Yosuke, the egomaniacal foreign minister who relished paying court to both Stalin and Hitler, and his facile supporters cemented Japan’s place in the fascist alliance with Germany and Italy—unaware (or unconcerned) that in so doing they destroyed the nation’s bona fides with the West. We see a dysfunctional political system in which military leaders reported to both the civilian government and the emperor, creating a structure that facilitated intrigues and stoked a jingoistic rivalry between Japan’s army and navy. Roles are recast and blame reexamined as Hotta analyzes the actions and motivations of the hawks and skeptics among Japan’s elite. Emperor Hirohito and General Hideki Tojo are newly appraised as we discover how the two men fumbled for a way to avoid war before finally acceding to it. Hotta peels back seventy years of historical mythologizing—both Japanese and Western—to expose all-too-human Japanese leaders torn by doubt in the months preceding the attack, more concerned with saving face than saving lives, finally drawn into war as much by incompetence and lack of political will as by bellicosity. An essential book for any student of the Second World War, this compelling reassessment will forever change the way we remember those days of infamy.