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Peter Munz, a former student of both Popper and Wittgenstein, begins his comparison of the two great twentieth-century philosophers, by explaining that since the demise of positivism there have emerged, broadly speaking, two philosophical options: Wittgenstein, with the absolute relativism of his theory that meaning is a function of language games and that social configurations are determinants of knowledge; and Popper’s evolutionary epistemology – conscious knowledge is a special case of the relationship which exists between all living beings and their environments. Professor Munz examines and rejects the Wittgensteinian position. Instead, Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge, first published in 1985, elaborates the potentially fruitful link between Popper’s critical rationalism and Neo-Darwinism. Read in the light of the latter, Popper’s philosophy leads to the transformation of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism into ‘Hypothetical Realism’, whilst the emphasis on the biological orientation of Popper’s thought helps to illumine some difficulties in Popper’s ‘falsificationism’.
Peter Munz, a former student of both Popper and Wittgenstein, begins his comparison of the two great twentieth-century philosophers, by explaining that since the demise of positivism there have emerged, broadly speaking, two philosophical options: Wittgenstein, with the absolute relativism of his theory that meaning is a function of language games and that social configurations are determinants of knowledge; and Popper’s evolutionary epistemology – conscious knowledge is a special case of the relationship which exists between all living beings and their environments. Professor Munz examines and rejects the Wittgensteinian position. Instead, Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge, first published in 1985, elaborates the potentially fruitful link between Popper’s critical rationalism and Neo-Darwinism. Read in the light of the latter, Popper’s philosophy leads to the transformation of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism into ‘Hypothetical Realism’, whilst the emphasis on the biological orientation of Popper’s thought helps to illumine some difficulties in Popper’s ‘falsificationism’.
An argument that the development of scientific practice and growth of scientific knowledge are governed by Darwin’s evolutionary model of descent with modification. Although scientific investigation is influenced by our cognitive and moral failings as well as all of the factors impinging on human life, the historical development of scientific knowledge has trended toward an increasingly accurate picture of an increasing number of phenomena. Taking a fresh look at Thomas Kuhn’s 1962 work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, in How Knowledge Grows Chris Haufe uses evolutionary theory to explain both why scientific practice develops the way it does and how scientific knowledge expands. This evolutionary model, claims Haufe, helps to explain what is epistemically special about scientific knowledge: its tendency to grow in both depth and breadth. Kuhn showed how intellectual communities achieve consensus in part by discriminating against ideas that differ from their own and isolating themselves intellectually from other fields of inquiry and broader social concerns. These same characteristics, says Haufe, determine a biological population’s degree of susceptibility to modification by natural selection. He argues that scientific knowledge grows, even across generations of variable groups of scientists, precisely because its development is governed by Darwinian evolution. Indeed, he supports the claim that this susceptibility to modification through natural selection helps to explain the epistemic power of certain branches of modern science. In updating and expanding the evolutionary approach to scientific knowledge, Haufe provides a model for thinking about science that acknowledges the historical contingency of scientific thought while showing why we nevertheless should trust the results of scientific research when it is the product of certain kinds of scientific communities.
Intriguingly different in approach from conventional works in the same area of inquiry, this study deals with the central problems and concerns of the sociology of knowledge as it has traditionally been conceived of. In other words, it is concerned with the relationship of knowledge, social interests and social structure, and with the various attempts which have been made to analyse the relationship. Barry Barnes takes the classic writings in the sociology of knowledge – by Marx, Lukács, Weber, Mannheim, Goldmann, Habermas and others – and uses them as resources in coming to grips with what he regards as the currently most interesting and significant questions in this area. This approach reflects one of the principal themes of the book itself. Knowledge, it is argued, is best treated as a resource available to those possessing it. This is the best perspective from which to understand its relationship to action and its historical significance; it is a perspective which avoids the problems of holding that knowledge is derivative, as well as those generated by the view that knowledge is a strong determinant of consciousness. the result is an unusual textbook, particularly valuable when read in conjunction with the original works it discusses.
Two books have been particularly influential in contemporary philosophy of science: Karl R. Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery, and Thomas S. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Both agree upon the importance of revolutions in science, but differ about the role of criticism in science's revolutionary growth. This volume arose out of a symposium on Kuhn's work, with Popper in the chair, at an international colloquium held in London in 1965. The book begins with Kuhn's statement of his position followed by seven essays offering criticism and analysis, and finally by Kuhn's reply. The book will interest senior undergraduates and graduate students of the philosophy and history of science, as well as professional philosophers, philosophically inclined scientists, and some psychologists and sociologists.
Preface1: Learning from Error 2: Ducks, Rabbits, and Normal Science: Recasting the Kuhn's-Eye View of Popper 3: The New Experimentalism and the Bayesian Way 4: Duhem, Kuhn, and Bayes 5: Models of Experimental Inquiry 6: Severe Tests and Methodological Underdetermination7: The Experimental Basis from Which to Test Hypotheses: Brownian Motion8: Severe Tests and Novel Evidence 9: Hunting and Snooping: Understanding the Neyman-Pearson Predesignationist Stance10: Why You Cannot Be Just a Little Bit Bayesian 11: Why Pearson Rejected the Neyman-Pearson (Behavioristic) Philosophy and a Note on Objectivity in Statistics12: Error Statistics and Peircean Error Correction 13: Toward an Error-Statistical Philosophy of Science ReferencesIndex Copyright © Libri GmbH. All rights reserved.
‘This important new book provides a penetrating, novel analysis of the key role played by knowledge when viewed through the lens of Schumpeterian economics. It is loaded with important insights that highlight the primacy of knowledge and innovation to unleash economic growth.’ —David B. Audretsch, Indiana University Bloomington, USA This book combines the tools elaborated by the economics of knowledge and the legacy of Joseph Schumpeter to explore the emergence of the new knowledge economy and the shift away from the manufacturing industries. Antonelli analyzes the characteristics of the innovation process as a creative response based upon the accumulation, generation and exploitation of knowledge. He highlights the new structure of advanced economies, where knowledge is at the same time the prime input and output. With special attention to the limits of the new knowledge growth regime, raised by the role of finance, income distribution and intellectual property rights, this Palgrave Pivot recommends appropriate economic policies based upon an Open Technology approach.
A rigorous, pathbreaking analysis demonstrating that a country's prosperity is directly related in the long run to the skills of its population. In this book Eric Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann make a simple, central claim, developed with rigorous theoretical and empirical support: knowledge is the key to a country's development. Of course, every country acknowledges the importance of developing human capital, but Hanushek and Woessmann argue that message has become distorted, with politicians and researchers concentrating not on valued skills but on proxies for them. The common focus is on school attainment, although time in school provides a very misleading picture of how skills enter into development. Hanushek and Woessmann contend that the cognitive skills of the population—which they term the “knowledge capital” of a nation—are essential to long-run prosperity. Hanushek and Woessmann subject their hypotheses about the relationship between cognitive skills (as consistently measured by international student assessments) and economic growth to a series of tests, including alternate specifications, different subsets of countries, and econometric analysis of causal interpretations. They find that their main results are remarkably robust, and equally applicable to developing and developed countries. They demonstrate, for example, that the “Latin American growth puzzle” and the “East Asian miracle” can be explained by these regions' knowledge capital. Turning to the policy implications of their argument, they call for an education system that develops effective accountability, promotes choice and competition, and provides direct rewards for good performance.
"Essays ... written by Peter Munz's friends and colleagues to celebrate his 75th birthday ... themes ... [include] history, the philosophy of history, the philosophy of science and the problems of knowledge ... reflect[ing] ... Munz's intellectual interests and achievements"--Back cover.
John H. Sceski argues that Karl Popper's philosophy offers a radical treatment of objectivity that can reconcile freedom and progress in a manner that preserves the best elements of the Enlightenment tradition. His book traces the development of Popper's account of objectivity by examining his original contributions to key issues in the philosophy of science. Popper's early confrontation with logical positivism, his rarely discussed four-fold treatment of the problem of induction, and his theory of propensities and evolutionary epistemology are linked in a novel way to produce a coherent and philosophically relevant picture of objectivity. Sceski also explores and clarifies many central issues in the philosophy of science such as probabilistic support, verisimilitude, and the relationship between special relativity and indeterminism. He concludes that Popper's account of objectivity can best bridge the gap between Enlightenment aims for science and freedom and post-modern misgivings about 'truth', by developing a philosophy that is non-foundationalist yet able to account for the growth of knowledge.