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The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for securing and managing the nation's borders. Over the past decade, DHS has dramatically stepped up its enforcement efforts at the U.S.-Mexico border, increasing the number of U.S. Border patrol (USBP) agents, expanding the deployment of technological assets, and implementing a variety of "consequence programs" intended to deter illegal immigration. During this same period, there has also been a sharp decline in the number of unauthorized migrants apprehended at the border. Trends in total apprehensions do not, however, by themselves speak to the effectiveness of DHS's investments in immigration enforcement. In particular, to evaluate whether heightened enforcement efforts have contributed to reducing the flow of undocumented migrants, it is critical to estimate the number of border-crossing attempts during the same period for which apprehensions data are available. With these issues in mind, DHS charged the National Research Council (NRC) with providing guidance on the use of surveys and other methodologies to estimate the number of unauthorized crossings at the U.S.-Mexico border, preferably by geographic region and on a quarterly basis. Options for Estimating Illegal Entries at the U.S.-Mexico Border focuses on Mexican migrants since Mexican nationals account for the vast majority (around 90 percent) of attempted unauthorized border crossings across the U.S.-Mexico border.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for securing and managing the nation's borders. Over the past decade, DHS has dramatically stepped up its enforcement efforts at the U.S.-Mexico border, increasing the number of U.S. Border patrol (USBP) agents, expanding the deployment of technological assets, and implementing a variety of "consequence programs" intended to deter illegal immigration. During this same period, there has also been a sharp decline in the number of unauthorized migrants apprehended at the border. Trends in total apprehensions do not, however, by themselves speak to the effectiveness of DHS's investments in immigration enforcement. In particular, to evaluate whether heightened enforcement efforts have contributed to reducing the flow of undocumented migrants, it is critical to estimate the number of border-crossing attempts during the same period for which apprehensions data are available. With these issues in mind, DHS charged the National Research Council (NRC) with providing guidance on the use of surveys and other methodologies to estimate the number of unauthorized crossings at the U.S.-Mexico border, preferably by geographic region and on a quarterly basis. Options for Estimating Illegal Entries at the U.S.-Mexico Border focuses on Mexican migrants since Mexican nationals account for the vast majority (around 90 percent) of attempted unauthorized border crossings across the U.S.-Mexico border.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is responsible for controlling the flow of goods and people across the U.S. border, but compelling methods for producing estimates of the total flow of illicit goods or border crossings do not yet exist. This paper describes four innovative approaches to estimating the total flow of illicit border crossings between ports of entry. Each approach is sufficiently promising to warrant further attention.
The authors examine U.S. efforts to prevent illegal immigration to the United States. Although the United States has witnessed a sharp drop in illegal border crossings in the past decade alongside an enormous increase in government activities to prevent illegal immigration, there remains little understanding of the role enforcement has played. Better data and analyses to assist lawmakers in crafting more successful policies and to support administration officials in implementing these policies are long overdue.
Border enforcement is intended to prevent and deter the illegal movement of goods and people across a country's border. The intensification of border enforcement activities creates impediments to illegal entry that increase the costs incurred by migrants when crossing the border. Increased costs may include additional time investment, physical hardship, and higher fees charged by smugglers who assist migrants across the border. The impact of enforcement on illegal immigration depends on how enforcement affects migration costs and how migration costs affect the decision to migrate. Our goal in this paper is to estimate the impact that enforcement has on the price smugglers charge to bring illegal immigrants across the U.S.-Mexico border. The degree to which migration costs rise in response to intensified enforcement can be termed the cost elasticity with respect to enforcement, and the degree to which the number of potential illegal immigrants falls in response to increased costs can be termed the migration elasticity with respect to cost. One important aspect of migration costs that can be quantified and measured is the fee charged by smugglers of illegal immigrants. Intensified enforcement activities should increase the difficulty and cost to a smuggler for getting clients successfully across the border, and this would be passed on to clients through an increase in the smuggling cost. It is probable that an increased smuggling cost would deter potential illegal immigration, thus creating a level of deterrence. The degree to which border enforcement activities have prevented and deterred the movement of illegal immigrants across the Southwest border of the United States is an issue of public policy importance and has been the subject of considerable debate. It is also a challenging measurement issue with respect to both data availability and statistical methodology. In this study, we estimate the value of the smuggling cost elasticity with respect to enforcement on the Southwest border of the United States using data on the price charged by smugglers to assist illegal immigration, as collected by the United States Border Patrol (USBP) from individuals apprehended at the border, and the level of enforcement activity, as captured by hours spent on enforcement activity by the USBP. Apprehended migrants respond to a series of questions by Border Patrol agents, including whether they were smuggled and how much they paid the smuggler. The data are then reported as part of an administrative apprehension record. Collection of such records began in certain sectors in the early 1990s and was comprehensively implemented in all sectors along the Southwest border by fiscal year 1999. Using data collected along the entire Southwest border on smuggling cost and enforcement hours at the apprehended migrant's crossing location at the monthly frequency, we estimate the smuggling cost elasticity with respect to enforcement.
We examine illegal immigration in the United States from Mexico over the period 1976-1995. One challenge is that we do not observe the number of individuals that attempt to enter the United States illegally; we only observe the number of individuals apprehended attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border illegally. Based on a simple migration model, we postulate the existence of an apprehensions function, which expresses apprehensions at the border as a function of illegal attempts to cross the border and U.S. border-enforcement effort. We estimate a reduced-form apprehensions function using monthly data on apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border, person hours the U.S. Border Patrol spends policing the border, and wages in the United States and Mexico. We find that a 10% decrease in the Mexican real wage leads to a 7.5% to 8.8% increase in apprehensions at the border. Under plausible conditions this is a lower bound for the effect of the Mexican wage on attempted illegal immigration. It is the purchasing power of U.S. wages in Mexico, not the purchasing power of U.S. wages in the United States, that matters for border apprehensions, suggesting that migrants expect to maintain ties with Mexico. Border apprehensions are higher in the month following a large devaluation of the peso and higher when the change in the Mexican real wage is negative. Each additional hour the U.S. Border Patrol spends policing the border yields an additional 0.25 to 0.33 apprehensions
Controlling illegal immigration into the United States has become a major issue in U.S. politics. A February 1997 report released by the INS estimates that there are currently 5 million illegal aliens in the United States. In 1986, when the estimated number of illegal aliens was also 5 million nationally, the U.S. Congress passed an immigration reform that allowed for many of the undocumented workers in the United States to become legal residents. Approximately, 3 million illegal immigrants have become legal residents since the passage of the 1986 legislation. The latest estimate confirms the claims of some U.S. lawmakers and immigration activists that U.S. immigration policy is largely ineffective. In 1995 two bills were introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives that called for the use of U.S. military forces to assist the INS in controlling the flow of illegal immigration. Both bills were killed in committee. With the most recent INS estimate, it is possible that similar legislation will again be introduced. This thesis examines the military option for border control. The findings are that the use of the military to control illegal immigration would result in lowered military readiness, and that the militarization of the border will produce tensions in U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Latin American relations. Therefore, it is recommended that the military not be used to supplement the Border Patrol.
This report presents initial findings from a scoping study titled “Economic Value of Human Smuggling to Transnational Criminal Organizations.” A primary goal of this study, which was completed in less than two months, was to develop a preliminary estimate of transnational criminal organizations’ (TCOs’) revenues from smuggling migrants from the Northern Triangle region of Central America—consisting of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—to the United States. In addition, we sought to establish what is known or knowable about the characteristics, including the structure, operations, and financing, of TCOs that engage in human smuggling along those routes.
Controlling illegal immigration into the United States has become a major issue in U.S. politics. A February 1997 report released by the INS estimates that there are currently 5 million illegal aliens in the United States. In 1986, when the estimated number of illegal aliens was also 5 million nationally, the U.S. Congress passed an immigration reform that allowed for many of the undocumented workers in the United States to become legal residents. Approximately, 3 million illegal immigrants have become legal residents since the passage of the 1986 legislation. The latest estimate confirms the claims of some U.S. lawmakers and immigration activists that U.S. immigration policy is largely ineffective. In 1995 two bills were introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives that called for the use of U.S. military forces to assist the INS in controlling the flow of illegal immigration. Both bills were killed in committee. With the most recent INS estimate, it is possible that similar legislation will again be introduced. This thesis examines the military option for border control. The findings are that the use of the military to control illegal immigration would result in lowered military readiness, and that the militarization of the border will produce tensions in U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Latin American relations. Therefore, it is recommended that the military not be used to supplement the Border Patrol.