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This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt. The optimal sanction rates implied by our calibrated model are much higher than the sanction rates typically observed in European labor markets.
An important incentive problem for the design of unemployment insurance is the fraudulent collection of unemployment benefits by workers who are gainfully employed. We show how to efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the optimal monitoring cost is 60 percent of the cost in the current U.S. system.
This paper studies threat effects of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit sanctions on job exit rates. Using a difference-in-differences design, I exploit two reforms of the Swedish UI system that made monitoring and sanctions considerably stricter at different points in time for different jobseeker groups. The results show that men and long-term unemployed individuals respond to the tighter monitoring and the threat of sanctions by finding jobs faster, whereas women do not. I also estimate the effect of receiving a sanction on the job exit rates and find significant sanction imposition effects. However, a decomposition exercise shows that these sanction imposition effects explain very little of the overall reform effects, so that most of the reform effects arise through threat effects. A direct policy implication is that the total impact of monitoring and sanctions may be severely underestimated when focusing solely on the effects on those actually receiving sanctions.
This paper discusses theoretical aspects and evidences related to designing labor market institutions in emerging market and developing economies. This note reviews the state of theory and evidence on the design of labor market institutions in a developing economy context and then reviews its consistency with actual labor market advice in a selected set of emerging and developing economies. The focus is mainly on three broad sets of institutions that matter for both workers’ protection and labor market efficiency: employment protection, unemployment insurance and social assistance, minimum wages and collective bargaining. Text mining techniques are used to identify IMF recommendations in these areas in Article IV Reports for 30 emerging and frontier economies over 2005–2016. This note has provided a critical review of the literature on the design of labor market institutions in emerging and developing market economies, and benchmarked the advice featured in IMF recommendations for 30 emerging market and frontier economies against the tentative conclusions from the literature.
Since the inception and design of Canada's Employment Insurance (EI) program, the Canadian economy and labour market have undergone dramatic changes. It is clear that EI has not kept pace with those changes, and experts and advocates agree that the program is no longer effective or equitable. Making EI Work is the result of a panel of distinguished scholars gathered by the Mowat Centre Employment Insurance Task Force to analyze the strengths, weaknesses, and future directions of EI. The authors identify the strengths and weaknesses of the system, and consider how it could be improved to better and more fairly support those in need. They make suggestions for facilitating a more efficient Canadian labour market, and meeting the human capital requirements of a dynamic economy for the present and the foreseeable future. The chapters that comprise Making EI Work informed the task force's final recommendations, and form an engaging dialogue that makes the case for, and defines the parameters of, a reformed support system for Canada's unemployed. Contributors include Ken Battle (Caledon Institute of Social Policy), Robin Boadway (Queen's University), Allison Bramwell (University of Toronto), Sujit Choudhry (New York University School of Law), Kathleen M. Day (University of Ottawa), Ross Finnie (University of Ottawa), Jean-Denis Garon (Queen's University), David Gray (University of Ottawa), Morley Gunderson (University of Toronto), Ian Irvine (Concordia University), Stephen Jones (McMaster University), Thomas R. Klassen (York University), Michael Mendelson (Caledon Institute of Social Policy), Alain Noël (Université de Montréal), Michael Pal (University of Toronto Faculty of Law), W. Craig Riddell (University of British Columbia), William Scarth (McMaster University), Luc Turgeon (University of Ottawa), Leah F. Vosko (York University), Stanley L. Winer (Carleton University), Donna E. Wood (University of Victoria), and Yan Zhang (Statistics Canada).