Download Free Optimal Design Of Bank Bailouts Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Optimal Design Of Bank Bailouts and write the review.

In most recent banking crises bank regulators have been caught off their guard and have been forced to respond to the crisis in a hurry without the support of an institutional or legal framework designed to deal with bank failures. This is in sharp contrast with the non-financial sector, where a detailed and elaborate bankruptcy law governs the process of liquidation or reorganisation of financially distressed firms. In this paper we address the question of how to design a bankruptcy institution for banks that would serve a similar purpose as existing bankruptcy laws for non-financial firms.
Bank bailouts in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the onset of the Great Recession brought into sharp relief the power that the global financial sector holds over national politics, and provoked widespread public outrage. In The Power of Inaction, Cornelia Woll details the varying relationships between financial institutions and national governments by comparing national bank rescue schemes in the United States and Europe. Woll starts with a broad overview of bank bailouts in more than twenty countries. Using extensive interviews conducted with bankers, lawmakers, and other key players, she then examines three pairs of countries where similar outcomes might be expected: the United States and United Kingdom, France and Germany, Ireland and Denmark. She finds, however, substantial variation within these pairs. In some cases the financial sector is intimately involved in the design of bailout packages; elsewhere it chooses to remain at arm’s length. Such differences are often ascribed to one of two conditions: either the state is strong and can impose terms, or the state is weak and corrupted by industry lobbying. Woll presents a third option, where the inaction of the financial sector critically shapes the design of bailout packages in favor of the industry. She demonstrates that financial institutions were most powerful in those settings where they could avoid a joint response and force national policymakers to deal with banks on a piecemeal basis. The power to remain collectively inactive, she argues, has had important consequences for bailout arrangements and ultimately affected how the public and private sectors have shared the cost burden of these massive policy decisions.
This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing “value effect” that more than outweighs the moral hazard component of such a policy.
We study optimal bailout policies in the presence of banking and sovereign crises. First, we use European data to document that asset guarantees are the most prevalent way in which sovereigns intervene during banking crises. Then, we build a model of sovereign borrowing with limited commitment, where domestic banks hold government debt and also provide credit to the private sector. Shocks to bank capital can trigger banking crises, with government sometimes finding it optimal to extend guarantees over bank assets. This leads to a trade-off: Larger bailouts relax domestic financial frictions and increase output, but also imply increasing government fiscal needs and possible heightened default risk (i.e., they create a 'diabolic loop'). We find that the optimal bailouts exhibit clear properties. Other things equal, the fraction of banking losses that the bailouts would cover is: (i) decreasing in the level of government debt; (ii) increasing in aggregate productivity; and (iii) increasing in the severity of the bank- ing crisis. Even though bailouts mitigate the adverse effects of banking crises, we find that the economy is ex ante better off without bailouts: the 'diabolic loop' they create is too costly.
We examine the optimal design of bank regulation in a general equilibrium model. The benchmark unregulated economy has a unique equilibrium in which banks are maximally leveraged and financed entirely via inside equity and deposits. We characterize the efficient allocation and show that the unregulated economy underinvests (overinvests) in risky production when aggregate risk is low (high). We carry out a normative analysis by showing how the efficient allocation can be implemented via capital and reserve requirements, deposit insurance and bailouts. There is a range of efficient regulatory policies with a stricter capital requirement on banks being accompanied by a looser reserve requirement and less deposit insurance. Capital and reserve requirements become stricter as aggregate risk increases. Depositor subsidies are efficient if aggregate risk is below a threshold. When aggregate risk exceeds the threshold, it is efficient to subsidize productive firms by levying taxes (in expectation) on bank depositors and equityholders.
The Oxford Handbook of Banking, Third Edition provides an overview and analysis of developments and research in this rapidly evolving field. Aimed at graduate students of economics, banking, and finance; academics; practitioners; regulators; and policy makers, it strikes a balance between abstract theory, empirical analysis, and practitioner and policy-related material. Split into five distinct parts The Oxford Handbook of Banking is a one-stop source of relevant research in banking. It examines the theory of banking, bank operations and performance, regulatory and policy perspectives, macroeconomic perspectives in banking, and international differences in banking structures and environments. Taking a global perspective it examines banking systems in the United States, China, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, Africa, the European Union, transition countries of Europe, and Latin America. Thematic issues covered include financial innovation and technological change; consumer and mortgage lending; Islamic banking; and how banks influence real economic activity. Fully revised and now including brand new chapters on a range of geographical regions, bank bailouts and bail-ins, and behavioral economics amongst many other topics, this third edition of The Oxford Handbook of Banking provides readers with insights to seminal and contemporary research in banking and an opportunity to learn about the diversity of financial systems around the world.
The Oxford Handbook of Banking, Second Edition provides an overview and analysis of developments and research in banking written by leading researchers in the field. This handbook will appeal to graduate students of economics, banking and finance, academics, practitioners, regulators, and policy makers. Consequently, the book strikes a balance between abstract theory, empirical analysis, and practitioner, and policy-related material. The Handbook is split into five parts. Part I, The Theory of Banking, examines the role of banks in the wider financial system, why banks exist, how they function, and their corporate governance and risk management practices. Part II deals with Bank Operations and Performance. A range of issues are covered including bank performance, financial innovation, and technological change. Aspects relating to small business, consumer, and mortgage lending are analysed together with securitization, shadow banking, and payment systems. Part III entitled Regulatory and Policy Perspectives discusses central banking, monetary policy transmission, market discipline, and prudential regulation and supervision. Part IV of the book covers various Macroeconomic Perspectives in Banking. This part includes a discussion of systemic risk and banking and sovereign crises, the role of the state in finance and development as well as how banks influence real economic activity. The final Part V examines International Differences in Banking Structures and Environments. This part of the Handbook examines banking systems in the United States, European Union, Japan, Africa, Transition countries, and the developing nations of Asia and Latin America.
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks represents the frontier of research into how and why networks they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective decision making, opinion formation, and diffusion dynamics. From a methodological perspective, the contributors to this volume devote attention to theory, field experiments, laboratory experiments, and econometrics. Theoretical work in network formation, games played on networks, repeated games, and the interaction between linking and behavior is synthesized. A number of chapters are devoted to studying social process mediated by networks. Topics here include opinion formation, diffusion of information and disease, and learning. There are also chapters devoted to financial contagion and systemic risk, motivated in part by the recent financial crises. Another section discusses communities, with applications including social trust, favor exchange, and social collateral; the importance of communities for migration patterns; and the role that networks and communities play in the labor market. A prominent role of networks, from an economic perspective, is that they mediate trade. Several chapters cover bilateral trade in networks, strategic intermediation, and the role of networks in international trade. Contributions discuss as well the role of networks for organizations. On the one hand, one chapter discusses the role of networks for the performance of organizations, while two other chapters discuss managing networks of consumers and pricing in the presence of network-based spillovers. Finally, the authors discuss the internet as a network with attention to the issue of net neutrality.