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The Department of Defense activated the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office in May, 2007, to improve space capability responsiveness to Joint Force Commanders. This paper examines why the office was established, changes in the space threat environment and U.S. response to those threats during the first year of the office's existence, and what activities the office has engaged in. It recommends curtailing Tier-1 and Tier-3 activities and emphasizing Tier-2; incorporating ORS into joint and service exercises, and pursuing anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities.
The Dept. of Defense¿s (DoD) operational dependence on space has placed new and increasing demands on current space systems to meet commanders¿ needs. DoD¿s Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept is designed to more rapidly satisfy commanders¿ needs for information and intelligence during ongoing operations. Given the potential for ORS to change how DoD acquires and fields space capabilities to support the warfighter, this report discusses to what extent DoD: (1) is developing ORS to support warfighter requirements; and (2) has a plan that integrates ORS into existing DoD and intelligence community processes and architecture. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.
The recent formation of a comprehensive Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program is a critical first step in addressing the long-recognized inability of the nation to respond to emergent space needs of the warfighters in an adaptive and operationally- relevant timeframe. A proper assessment of the initial ORS source documents is crucial in identifying the key ORS elements and determining if Joint Functional Commander requirements will be better met by the envisioned processes and capabilities. This paper gives a brief review of the problem, assesses the key functions and activities proposed within U.S. Strategic Command's Concept of Operations, and explores the process needed to integrate ORS into the campaign planning process and operations execution. Finally, this paper will draw some conclusions concerning timely space support to the warfighter and identify further areas of effort required to increase the likelihood of program success.
Joint Force Commanders continually submit Joint Urgent Operational Need Statements identifying communications, surveillance, reconnaissance, and early warning capability gaps. Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concepts and capabilities have emerged as a potential solution for filling Joint Commander's needs. The ORS office is responsible for developing low-cost, rapid reaction payloads, buses, space lift, and launch control capabilities in order to fulfill joint military operational requirements for on-demand space support and reconstitution. The ORS office and USATRATCOM have developed a request and solutions process to employ responsive space capabilities. The processes fall short in defining responsive space required capabilities and validating the requirements within the Department of Defense's program acquisition framework. The lack of validated requirements has led to continuous funding issues, lack of understanding of responsive space concepts, and continued debate over the validity of the programs.
"The purpose of this paper is to determine to what extent and how the Joint Force Commander (JFC) should control support from space forces. Current Air Force doctrine, as delineated in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, identifies the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) as being responsible for both air and space for the theater. This statement follows the Air Force notion that air and space are an indivisible medium of warfare. On the other hand, Joint Pub 3-14 states the Operations Directorate, J-3, on the supported commander's (the JFC's) staff functions in this role. To examine this issue of in-theater control of space forces more closely, this study is divided into five chapters. Following the Introduction, Chapter 2 looks into how space forces were planned for and employed during Desert Storm. This chapter discusses who was in-charge and what planning processes were used. In Chapter 3, lessons and initiatives to improve planning and employment of support from space forces are discussed. Chapter 4 explores the possible need to have one individual in-theater clearly identified as being responsible for directing space forces. Centralized control, similar to air, may have beneficial effects that allow joint commanders to take better advantage of space forces' full potential. The study concludes by offering recommendations."--Abstract.
The utility of a Joint Force Space Component Commander (JFSCC) as an additional functional component commander in a Joint Task Force (JTF) has been explored and debated repeatedly since Operation DESERT STORM witnessed the first substantial use of space assets in military operations. Most studies have focused on force planning by considering the feasibility of an independent U.S. Space Force. This study aims to examine the question from the perspective of joint doctrine and operational art. Joint Pub 3-14 requires a single authority to coordinate joint theater space operations and integrate space capabilities. Historically, this authority has been granted to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) because the Air Force service component traditionally possesses most military space assets. Doctrine does not adequately address how space power can be related to elements of operational art. A qualified JFSCC would be uniquely positioned to take full advantage of trends in space technology and integrate space missions into campaign planning. Projected trends include space force application and operationally responsive space systems. Until such projections become reality, the space coordination authority is best left to the Joint Force Commander to implement within the existing JTF organization structure.
Under the auspices of the joint Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program, two supporting aggressive research programs are being conducted by the US Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). ORS is actively focused on timely satisfaction of the urgent needs of the joint force commanders for improving the responsiveness of space capabilities to meet national security requirements. ORS communication, navigation, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites are being designed to rapidly meet near-term space needs of in-theater tactical forces by supporting contingency operations, such as increased communication bandwidth and ISR imagery over the theater for a limited period to support air, ground, and naval force missions. This article discusses two of these programs: the plug-and-play (PnP) satellite design for rapid construction through modular components, and the Training and Tactical ORS Operations (TATOO) Laboratory, which provides a computer-based simulation environment directed at improving warfighters' space capability responsiveness.
"When appropriate, the U.S. Air Force needs to be prepared to supply joint task force (JTF) headquarters. If the U.S. Air Force takes the steps necessary to produce JTF-capable units, both the service and the nation would benefit. The authors consider the nature of JTF command, survey command-related developments in other services and in other elements of the defense community, and examine four JTF operations. They raise issues for the Air Force to consider and offer a set of recommendations aimed at enhancing the Air Force's ability to staff and run JTF headquarters."--Provided by publisher.
This paper is an outgrowth of comments I heard and attitudes I experienced at the JFCOM Joint Space Concept Development and Experimentation Workshop in Norfolk at the end of March 2004. I presented a briefing on near-space at the conference along with colleagues from JFCOM, the Army Space and Missile Defense Battlelab, the Naval Research Laboratory, and the Navy Warfare Development Command. It discussed how many functions that are currently done with satellites could be performed for tactical and operational commanders using near-space assets much more cheaply and with much greater operational utility. The briefing was very well received with nothing but positive comments all around. However, once we broke into focus groups trying to develop exercise inputs for such subjects as operationally responsive space, the near-space concept was almost forgotten. It didn't fit into the normal mindset of what space meant, so it was difficult to convince other group members that it should be discussed in the same breath as, say, a TacSat-type program. After much thought, it was my perception that the problem was one of mindset as to what the word "space" meant to the warfighter. After reading space doctrine (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Joint), I discovered that the mindset I sensed at the workshop had actually been codified to define space as a place where we operate satellites. That mindset is counterproductive.
General Kenney Reports is a classic account of a combat commander in action. General George Churchill Kenney arrived in the South- west Pacific theater in August 1942 to find that his command, if not in a shambles, was in dire straits. The theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur, had no confidence in his air element. Kenney quickly changed this situation. He organized and energized the Fifth Air Force, bringing in operational commanders like Whitehead and Wurtsmith who knew how to run combat air forces. He fixed the logistical swamp, making supply and maintenance supportive of air operations, and encouraging mavericks such as Pappy Gunn to make new and innovative weapons and to explore new tactics in airpower application. The result was a disaster for the Japanese. Kenney's airmen used air power-particularly heavily armed B-25 Mitchell bombers used as commerce destroyers-to savage Japanese supply lines, destroying numerous ships and effectively isolating Japanese garrisons. The classic example of Kenney in action was the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, which marked the attainment of complete Allied air dominance and supremacy over Japanese naval forces operating around New Guinea. In short, Kenney was a brilliant, innovative airman, who drew on his own extensive flying experiences to inform his decision-making. General Kenney Reports is a book that has withstood the test of time, and which should be on the shelf of every airman.