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This monograph discusses the role of operational art in the Sioux War of 1876, the U.S. Army’s largest campaign between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War. This campaign, often overlooked in the historical study of operational art, demonstrates the successful application of operational art in a non-traditional campaign: the U.S. Army’s defeat of the Northern Sioux Indians and their allies. This campaign also demonstrates how operational art can lead to operational victory, despite repeated tactical failures. The monograph first defines operational art, based on emerging U.S. Army doctrine, and then reviews its role in three campaigns that served as models for the Army’s operations in the Sioux War of 1876: Grant’s 1864-1865 campaign to defeat the Confederacy, the Southern Plains War of 1868-1869, and the Red River War of 1874-1875. The plans and execution of the Sioux War of 1876 are then reviewed and analyzed utilizing the definition of operational art and modem concepts for operational planning. The causes of failure in the 1876 campaign are then analyzed, based on Cohen and Gooch’s methodology for analysis of military failure, followed by explanation of the campaign’s ultimate success. The monograph concludes that the Frontier Army’s success in this campaign demonstrates successful application of operational art, despite many errors in planning and execution committed by General Sheridan and his subordinates. Additional lessons from this campaign include the danger of blindly applying previously successful models for operations, the preeminent role of the operational commander, and the validity of operational art in campaigns against unconventional foes.
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During the first half of 1876 the Army conducted three expeditions against the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians. The results of these three expeditions were: the first expedition destroying a small village, the second expedition being defeated in a meeting engagement, and the third expedition suffering the annihilation of five companies. The results lead to questioning the Army’s focus on attacking and destroying villages as the primary target of their expeditions. If the Army had a complete understanding of the Sioux they would have realized that the “hub of all power” or center of gravity of the Sioux was the horse, which every major aspect of Sioux life was augmented and dependent upon. The first three expeditions of the Sioux Campaign of 1876 demonstrate that: senior Army commanders planned their campaigns, expeditions, and organizations around their knowledge of Sioux mobility, the primary source of power for the Sioux warrior was mobility gained from the horse, Army forces could not bring their advantage in firepower to bear on Sioux warriors. Army commanders understood the mobility of the Sioux village and their warriors, but they failed to take the next step—challenging the old assumption that attacking villages and using a strategy of exhaustion was the correct way to subdue the Sioux. Instead, Army forces should have concentrated their attacks on center of gravity of the Sioux—the horse.
Martin van Creveld, a noted theorist, contends that the concept of operational art did not take off in the U.S. until after the Vietnam War. Conversely, James Schneider, a prominent military theorist, asserts that operational art began in the American Civil War. This monograph provides a holistic analysis of four Plains Indian War Campaigns. Lieutenant General (LTG) Philip Sheridan conducted all four campaigns. This analysis illustrates several enduring principles of both operational art and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The purpose of the monograph is to explain the initial failure of LTG Sheridan’s 1876 Centennial Campaign against the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians. Additionally, this explanation relates the significance of LTG Sheridan’s planning to contemporary COIN campaign planning. The overall methodology is the incorporation of four case studies to test the theory of sanctuary control and elimination of resources to defeat insurgencies. The monograph contains three key findings. The first key finding is that the failure at the Little Big Horn was LTG Sheridan’s fault not LTC Custer’s, and this directly relates to the second finding. The second key finding is the importance of operational art in designing a campaign plan to link tactical actions to strategic objectives. The third finding is the efficacy of some of the current COIN tenets...Ultimately, this monograph demonstrates the utility of a strategy of exhaustion and its resulting operations to control terrain and insurgent sanctuaries as well as to deny the enemy resources to defeat an insurgency.
This study of the “Battle of the Rosebud” shows parallels between the army of 1876 and our army today. It briefly investigates the linkage of National Policy, political objectives, National Military Strategy, and the operational level of war. The army of 1876, like the army of today, experienced drastic downsizing. It had problems adjusting doctrine to the type of fight they were experiencing, not unlike our experience in Vietnam. The study of the battle provides some lessons we have had to relearn in the recent past. It is a study of how a relatively small, unsophisticated culture fought and won against an adversary that was vastly superior in population, organization, technology and resources. As a secondary benefit, the study of this battle offers a look at the advantages, disadvantages and compromises that must be considered in combined warfare. For these reasons, this study holds powerful lessons for soldiers serving in our armed forces today. The struggles with doctrine, training the force, force structure, combined warfare, and leadership challenges are just some of the parallels that can be drawn between Crook’s Big Horn and Yellowstone Expedition and our modern units.
Expansion! The history of the United States might well be summed up in that single word. The Indian Wars of the American West were a continuation of the struggle that began with the arrival of the first Europeans, and escalated as they advanced across the Appalachians before American independence had been won. This history of the Indian Wars of the Trans-Mississippi begins with the earliest clashes between Native Americans and Anglo-European settlers. The author provides a comprehensive narrative of the conflict in eight parts, covering eight geographical regions--the Pacific Northwest; California and Nevada; New Mexico, the Central Plains, the Southern Plains; Iowa, Minnesota and the Northern Plains; the Intermountain West, and the Desert Southwest--with an epilogue on Wounded Knee.
Full color maps and illustrations throughout.